本文選題：網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告拍賣 + GSP機(jī)制��； 參考：《西安電子科技大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著社會的發(fā)展,網(wǎng)絡(luò)已然成為一種重要的廣告媒介。近年來,像Google這樣的搜索引擎巨頭,采用了一種新的基于廣義二級價(jià)格(Generalized Second Price,GSP)機(jī)制的廣告拍賣模式,成為全球研究的熱點(diǎn),同時(shí)更多的人在關(guān)注如何將這種模式推廣告?zhèn)鹘y(tǒng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告銷售中。基于此,本文建立一種基于GSP機(jī)制的傳統(tǒng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告拍賣模型。 首先,本文分析了國內(nèi)外網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告拍賣的研究現(xiàn)狀,介紹了傳統(tǒng)拍賣理論和網(wǎng)上拍賣理論。在對比了傳統(tǒng)廣告拍賣和關(guān)鍵詞廣告拍賣的異同的在基礎(chǔ)之上,針對基于GSP機(jī)制的關(guān)鍵詞廣告拍賣的局限性,設(shè)計(jì)了一種適用于傳統(tǒng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告的拍賣模型。該模型改進(jìn)了基于GSP機(jī)制的關(guān)鍵詞廣告拍賣對廣告位的排序規(guī)則和廣告主的支付規(guī)則,把曝光率和點(diǎn)擊率共同融入拍賣規(guī)則中。基于上述規(guī)則的改進(jìn),本文分析了新規(guī)則下廣告主的納什均衡條件,以及納什均衡條件下賣方的收益范圍。接著,為了適應(yīng)傳統(tǒng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告的要求,本文分析了賣方期望收益和拍賣時(shí)間的關(guān)系,提出了網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告拍賣的時(shí)間模型,給出了最優(yōu)拍賣時(shí)間的分析過程。該時(shí)間模型不僅適用于網(wǎng)絡(luò)廣告拍賣,同時(shí)也適用于多物品歧視價(jià)格拍賣。最后,本文將該模型與VCG機(jī)制進(jìn)行了比較,并用實(shí)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)驗(yàn)證了模型的有效性,同時(shí)把該模型應(yīng)用到健康資訊平臺的廣告銷售中。
[Abstract]:With the development of society, the network has become an important advertising medium. In recent years, search engine giants such as Google have adopted a new advertising auction model based on generalized secondary pricing (GSP) mechanism, which has become a global research hotspot. At the same time, more people are concerned about how to push this model into traditional online advertising sales. Based on this, this paper establishes a traditional online advertising auction model based on GSP mechanism. Firstly, this paper analyzes the current situation of online advertising auction at home and abroad, and introduces the traditional auction theory and online auction theory. On the basis of comparing the similarities and differences between the traditional advertising auction and the keyword advertising auction, this paper designs an auction model suitable for traditional online advertising, aiming at the limitation of the keyword advertising auction based on GSP mechanism. The model improves the sorting rules of advertising bit and the payment rules of advertisers based on GSP mechanism, and integrates the exposure and click rate into the auction rules. Based on the improvement of the above rules, this paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium conditions of advertisers under the new rules and the seller's profit range under Nash equilibrium conditions. Then, in order to meet the requirements of traditional online advertising, this paper analyzes the relationship between seller's expected income and auction time, puts forward the time model of online advertising auction, and gives the analysis process of optimal auction time. The time model is not only suitable for online advertising auction, but also suitable for multi-item discriminatory price auction. Finally, the model is compared with the VCG mechanism, and the validity of the model is verified by the experimental data. At the same time, the model is applied to the advertising sales of the health information platform.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：F713.8;F713.359;F224

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