概念論與非概念論之爭下的康德直觀理論研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-23 08:51
【摘要】：康德在《純粹理性批判》中有一個著名的命題“思想無內容則空,直觀無概念則盲”,這個命題引起當前分析哲學家的關注,尤其是以塞拉斯、麥克道爾等為代表的“匹茲堡學派”的關注。他們尤其強調“直觀無概念則盲”,并以這個命題作為自己的理論基礎,來支撐自己的概念化經驗的主張。比如,羅蒂就指出,貫穿在塞拉斯的《經驗論與心靈哲學》一書中的主要思想是康德的“直觀無概念則盲”,而麥克道爾的《心靈與世界》也以這個命題為基礎來支撐自己的概念化經驗的主張。因此,有學者指出,康德的‘思想無內容則空,直觀無概念則盲’這個命題概括了概念論的學說。也正是基于這一點,塞拉斯和麥克道爾都力圖以此來對抗非概念論者的挑戰(zhàn),并對康德做強概念論解讀。這樣一來,康德就被引入分析哲學的語境中來,尤其是參與到當前分析哲學的核心話題,即知覺經驗的內容是否是概念性的這個討論之中。與此同時,麥克道爾對康德的強概念論解讀引起了學界關于“康德是否是概念論者”的討論,尤其是以羅伯特·漢那、露西·艾萊斯、漢娜·金斯博格等為代表的康德學者的理論回響。他們也把目光轉向這個命題,并立足于康德的立場做出不同的解讀。雙方爭論的焦點集中在如何理解康德的“直觀無概念則盲”,即康德是否承認存在有“盲”的直觀?如果有的話,這種“盲”的直觀如何具有認知意義?這就引向了康德的直觀理論,而來自雙方的理論互動為重新反思康德的直觀理論提供了新的語境和可能。因此,在分析哲學的語境下回到康德的直觀理論不僅能夠推動康德學界的深入發(fā)展,而且對康德直觀理論的重新反思也有利于推動分析哲學的發(fā)展。論文第一章主要介紹了康德直觀理論討論的分析哲學背景,澄清分析哲學家對康德哲學的關注源于其自身的理論關切。在這里需要注意區(qū)分兩個層次：第一個層次是在分析哲學內部的概念論與非概念論之爭。圍繞著“知覺經驗的內容是否是概念性的”這個爭論,在分析哲學內部出現了概念論與非概念論兩大相對獨立的陣營。簡要地說,概念論認為知覺經驗的內容是概念性的,麥克道爾是概念論主張最重要的代表。非概念論認為我們要想擁有經驗無須擁有全部或部分概念,雙方爭論的焦點是知覺經驗的內容是否是由我們的概念性能力塑造的；第二個層次是對康德的概念論與非概念論兩種解讀,麥克道爾對康德的強概念論解讀引發(fā)了康德學界對康德做出不同解讀。在麥克道爾看來,如果康德把他在認識論上的科學見解堅持到底,他本應否認“盲”的直觀的存在,因為“直觀無概念則盲”就表明直觀與概念是密不可分的,而作為未被組織的感覺雜多的“盲”直觀最終會不可避免地陷入“所予神話”。漢那和艾萊斯也承認直觀與概念要密切結合,但他們認為,這種密切結合只適用于“作客觀有效的判斷”或“認識”,除此之外,是存在有“盲”的直觀的。漢那認為這種“盲”的直觀指的“客觀有效的非概念性直觀”,是直觀中存在的那些在語義學結構和心理學功能上不同于概念性內容的知覺內容。艾萊斯則緊緊圍繞著康德對直觀的定義、地位和作用進行論述,指出直觀的作用就在于獨立于概念為我們知覺地顯現具體之物。他們認為麥克道爾之所以把“盲”的直觀與“所予神話”等同起來,事實上是混淆了康德的直觀與感覺,對康德的直觀做了感覺主義的理解。這就是第二章的主要內容。對康德的兩種解讀其爭論的焦點最終集中在知覺對象時是否需要概念。以康德的先驗演繹為理論依據,麥克道爾指出,直觀內容就是概念化塑造的內容,判斷的內容與直觀的內容是一致的。沒有概念,對象就不能知覺地顯現給我們。而非概念論解讀則認為對象向意識的顯現是獨立于概念的,因為空間(時間)的先天直觀表象在其中起了作用,非概念論解讀的理論依據是先驗感性論。兩種解讀各有優(yōu)點,也各種局限性。非概念論解讀強調知覺的在先性,這與我們的常識相符合,但它無法說明知覺對象如何具有認知意義,無法解釋康德知識論的根本立場；概念論解讀與康德的知識論立場一致,但忽視了知覺經驗的在先性。由此可見,爭論雙方在新的語境下突顯并拉大了康德知識論的核心困境。為了緩解這種張力,就要說明直觀與概念應當如何結合在一起,這需要重新反思康德的綜合理論與想象力。立足于這個困境,金斯博格提出一條可能的出路。她對上述兩種解讀進行揚棄,強調知覺經驗的邏輯在先性,認為是先前的經驗和當下的經驗共同構成了一個視域,借助這個視域對象被帶入概念之下,而這是由意識的規(guī)范性決定的。這是第三章要論述的中心。論文的最后一章是探討當前的兩種解讀能否與康德的形而上學融貫起來。盡管麥克道爾把康德看作是一條可能的出路,但他遺憾地發(fā)現康德哲學還包括先驗觀念論,正是由于這個觀念論使得康德最終陷入“所予神話”。因此,麥克道爾力圖把先驗觀念論與康德在知識論上的科學見解分離開來,并力圖用第二自然的自然主義來代替康德的先驗觀念論。非概念論解讀則堅持直接知覺實在論立場,對康德的先驗觀念論做形而上學的解讀。事實上,要想給康德的直觀理論提供一個融貫的解釋是非常困難的,康德直觀理論的困境靠康德自身是不可能解決的。當前的討論把我們引向一種新的可能。麥克道爾力圖用黑格爾來改造康德,其方式是把世界經驗化,把經驗概念化,把概念的來源歸因于人類的社會實踐,讓世界借助語言向我們敞開。這樣一來,麥克道爾就把人與世界的關系從康德式的靜態(tài)的認識論關系變成動態(tài)的存在論關系。但由于麥克道爾完全否認知覺經驗的邏輯在先性,使得他的理論不能融貫起來。而在金斯博格的方案中所體現出來的現象學精神成為解決康德直觀理論的一條可能出路。
[Abstract]:In the critique of pure reason, Kant has a famous proposition, "thought no content is empty, visual no concept is blind." this proposition causes the attention of current analytical philosophers, especially the "Pittsburgh school", represented by Sellars, Mcdowell and so on. They especially emphasize "visual non concept blindness", and take this proposition as a proposition. As the basis of his theory to support his own conceptual experience, Lottie, for example, points out that the main idea that runs through Sellars's theory of empiricism and philosophy is Kant's "visual inconceptual blindness", and Mcdowell's "mind and the world" support his own conceptualization based on this proposition. As a result, some scholars point out that the proposition that Kant's "thought without content and empty, intuitionistic and blind," generalizes the theory of conceptualization. It is based on this point that Sellars and Mcdowelturi Tu fight against the challenges of the non conceptualists and make a strong conceptual interpretation of Kant. In this way Kant is introduced. The analysis of the context of philosophy, especially the core topic involved in the current analytical philosophy, is the discussion of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual. At the same time, Mcdowell's interpretation of Kant's strong concept theory has caused a discussion on "whether Kant is a conceptuist or not", especially Robert Hanna, Lucy Ailes, Hannah Ginsburg and other Kantian scholars repercussions. They also turn their eyes to this proposition and make a different interpretation based on Kant's position. The focus of the dispute is on how to understand Kant's "visual non concept blindness", that is, Kant's recognition of the existence of "blind" intuition? If there is a sense of "blind" How does this "blind" intuition have cognitive meaning? This leads to Kant's theory of intuition, and the theoretical interaction from both sides provides a new context and possibility for rethinking of Kant's intuitive theory. Therefore, returning to Kant's visual theory in the context of analytic philosophy can not only promote the deep development of Kant's academic circles, And the rethinking of Kant's theory of intuitionism also helps to promote the development of analytic philosophy. The first chapter of the thesis mainly introduces the philosophical background of the discussion of Kant's intuitionistic theory, and clarifies that the analytical philosophers' attention to Kant's philosophy originates from his own theoretical concerns. Here we need to distinguish between two levels: the first level is in The contention between the concept theory and the non concept theory inside philosophy. Around the argument of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual, there are two relatively independent camps of conceptualization and non conceptualization in the analysis of philosophy. Briefly, conceptualization holds that the inner capacity of perceptual experience is conceptual, and Mcdowell is a concept theory. The most important representative. The non concept theory holds that we need to have experience without having all or part of the concept. The focus of the debate is whether the content of perceptual experience is shaped by our conceptual ability; the second level is two interpretations of Kant's conceptualization and non concept theory, and Mcdowell's strong conceptual interpretation of Kant Kant makes a different interpretation of Kant. In Mcdowell's view, if Kant insists on his epistemological scientific views to the end, he should deny the intuitive existence of "blindness", because "visual inconceptional blindness" indicates that intuition and concept are inseparable, and "blind" as unorganized. In the end, intuition inevitably falls into the "given myth". Hana and Ali admits that intuition and concept are closely integrated, but they think that this close combination applies only to "objective and effective judgment" or "understanding". In addition, there is a direct view of "blindness". The objective and effective non conceptual intuition is the perceptual content that is different from the conceptual content in the semantic structure and the psychological function of the intuition. Elis is closely related to Kant's definition, status and function of intuition, pointing out that the function of intuition lies in the independence of concept to our perception. They think that Mcdowell equates the intuition of "blindness" with "myths". In fact, it confuses Kant's intuition and feeling and makes a sense of sense of Kant's intuition. This is the main content of the second chapter. The focus of the two interpretations of Kant's argument on the subject of perception is at the time of the perceptual object. In the theoretical basis of Kant's transcendental deduction, Mcdowell points out that visual content is the content created by conceptualization. The content of judgment is consistent with the intuitive content. Without concept, the object can not appear to us perceptively, while the unconceptual interpretation thinks that the appearance of the image to the consciousness is independent of the concept, because emptiness is empty. The innate visual representation of inter (time) plays a role in which the theoretical basis of the unconceptual interpretation is the transcendental perceptual theory. The two interpretations have both advantages and limitations. The unconceptual interpretation emphasizes the first of perception, which is consistent with our common sense, but it can not explain how the perceptual objects have cognitive meaning and can not explain Kant. The fundamental position of the theory of knowledge is consistent with the standpoint of Kant's theory of knowledge, but ignores the first of the perceptual experience. Thus, the two sides of the debate highlight and widen the core predicament of Kant's theory of knowledge in the new context. In order to alleviate this tension, it is necessary to explain how the intuition and concept should be combined together, which needs to be weighed. A new reflection on Kant's comprehensive theory and imagination. Based on this dilemma, kins Berg puts forward a possible way out. She discarded the above two interpretations, emphasized the logic of the perceptual experience, and thought that the previous experience and the present experience together constituted a field of view, which was brought to the concept with the aid of the object of view. This is determined by the normalization of consciousness. This is the center of the third chapter. The last chapter of the thesis is to explore whether the current two interpretations can be combined with Kant's metaphysics. Although Mcdowell regards Kant as a possible outlet, he regrets that Kang Dezhe studies also include the transcendental concept, which is precisely because of this Idealism makes Kant finally fall into the "myth". Therefore, Mcdowell tries to separate the theory of transcendental ideas from Kant's scientific views on the theory of knowledge, and tries to use second natural naturalism to replace Kant's transcendental concept theory. The unconceptualistic interpretation insists on the position of direct perception realism and the transcendental concept of Kant. A metaphysical interpretation. In fact, it is very difficult to provide a coherent explanation of Kant's theory of intuition. Kant's intuition is difficult to solve by Kant itself. The current discussion leads us to a new possibility. Mcdowell tries to transform Kant with Hagel. The way is to take the world through. As a result, Mcdowell has transformed the relationship between man and the world from the static epistemological relationship of Kantian to the dynamic existentialism. But because Mcdowell completely denied the logic of the perceptual experience, Mcdowell completely denied the relationship between man and the world. His theory can not be intersected, and the phenomenological spirit embodied in Berg's plan becomes a possible way to solve Kant's theory of intuition.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：B516.31
本文編號：2138867
[Abstract]:In the critique of pure reason, Kant has a famous proposition, "thought no content is empty, visual no concept is blind." this proposition causes the attention of current analytical philosophers, especially the "Pittsburgh school", represented by Sellars, Mcdowell and so on. They especially emphasize "visual non concept blindness", and take this proposition as a proposition. As the basis of his theory to support his own conceptual experience, Lottie, for example, points out that the main idea that runs through Sellars's theory of empiricism and philosophy is Kant's "visual inconceptual blindness", and Mcdowell's "mind and the world" support his own conceptualization based on this proposition. As a result, some scholars point out that the proposition that Kant's "thought without content and empty, intuitionistic and blind," generalizes the theory of conceptualization. It is based on this point that Sellars and Mcdowelturi Tu fight against the challenges of the non conceptualists and make a strong conceptual interpretation of Kant. In this way Kant is introduced. The analysis of the context of philosophy, especially the core topic involved in the current analytical philosophy, is the discussion of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual. At the same time, Mcdowell's interpretation of Kant's strong concept theory has caused a discussion on "whether Kant is a conceptuist or not", especially Robert Hanna, Lucy Ailes, Hannah Ginsburg and other Kantian scholars repercussions. They also turn their eyes to this proposition and make a different interpretation based on Kant's position. The focus of the dispute is on how to understand Kant's "visual non concept blindness", that is, Kant's recognition of the existence of "blind" intuition? If there is a sense of "blind" How does this "blind" intuition have cognitive meaning? This leads to Kant's theory of intuition, and the theoretical interaction from both sides provides a new context and possibility for rethinking of Kant's intuitive theory. Therefore, returning to Kant's visual theory in the context of analytic philosophy can not only promote the deep development of Kant's academic circles, And the rethinking of Kant's theory of intuitionism also helps to promote the development of analytic philosophy. The first chapter of the thesis mainly introduces the philosophical background of the discussion of Kant's intuitionistic theory, and clarifies that the analytical philosophers' attention to Kant's philosophy originates from his own theoretical concerns. Here we need to distinguish between two levels: the first level is in The contention between the concept theory and the non concept theory inside philosophy. Around the argument of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual, there are two relatively independent camps of conceptualization and non conceptualization in the analysis of philosophy. Briefly, conceptualization holds that the inner capacity of perceptual experience is conceptual, and Mcdowell is a concept theory. The most important representative. The non concept theory holds that we need to have experience without having all or part of the concept. The focus of the debate is whether the content of perceptual experience is shaped by our conceptual ability; the second level is two interpretations of Kant's conceptualization and non concept theory, and Mcdowell's strong conceptual interpretation of Kant Kant makes a different interpretation of Kant. In Mcdowell's view, if Kant insists on his epistemological scientific views to the end, he should deny the intuitive existence of "blindness", because "visual inconceptional blindness" indicates that intuition and concept are inseparable, and "blind" as unorganized. In the end, intuition inevitably falls into the "given myth". Hana and Ali admits that intuition and concept are closely integrated, but they think that this close combination applies only to "objective and effective judgment" or "understanding". In addition, there is a direct view of "blindness". The objective and effective non conceptual intuition is the perceptual content that is different from the conceptual content in the semantic structure and the psychological function of the intuition. Elis is closely related to Kant's definition, status and function of intuition, pointing out that the function of intuition lies in the independence of concept to our perception. They think that Mcdowell equates the intuition of "blindness" with "myths". In fact, it confuses Kant's intuition and feeling and makes a sense of sense of Kant's intuition. This is the main content of the second chapter. The focus of the two interpretations of Kant's argument on the subject of perception is at the time of the perceptual object. In the theoretical basis of Kant's transcendental deduction, Mcdowell points out that visual content is the content created by conceptualization. The content of judgment is consistent with the intuitive content. Without concept, the object can not appear to us perceptively, while the unconceptual interpretation thinks that the appearance of the image to the consciousness is independent of the concept, because emptiness is empty. The innate visual representation of inter (time) plays a role in which the theoretical basis of the unconceptual interpretation is the transcendental perceptual theory. The two interpretations have both advantages and limitations. The unconceptual interpretation emphasizes the first of perception, which is consistent with our common sense, but it can not explain how the perceptual objects have cognitive meaning and can not explain Kant. The fundamental position of the theory of knowledge is consistent with the standpoint of Kant's theory of knowledge, but ignores the first of the perceptual experience. Thus, the two sides of the debate highlight and widen the core predicament of Kant's theory of knowledge in the new context. In order to alleviate this tension, it is necessary to explain how the intuition and concept should be combined together, which needs to be weighed. A new reflection on Kant's comprehensive theory and imagination. Based on this dilemma, kins Berg puts forward a possible way out. She discarded the above two interpretations, emphasized the logic of the perceptual experience, and thought that the previous experience and the present experience together constituted a field of view, which was brought to the concept with the aid of the object of view. This is determined by the normalization of consciousness. This is the center of the third chapter. The last chapter of the thesis is to explore whether the current two interpretations can be combined with Kant's metaphysics. Although Mcdowell regards Kant as a possible outlet, he regrets that Kang Dezhe studies also include the transcendental concept, which is precisely because of this Idealism makes Kant finally fall into the "myth". Therefore, Mcdowell tries to separate the theory of transcendental ideas from Kant's scientific views on the theory of knowledge, and tries to use second natural naturalism to replace Kant's transcendental concept theory. The unconceptualistic interpretation insists on the position of direct perception realism and the transcendental concept of Kant. A metaphysical interpretation. In fact, it is very difficult to provide a coherent explanation of Kant's theory of intuition. Kant's intuition is difficult to solve by Kant itself. The current discussion leads us to a new possibility. Mcdowell tries to transform Kant with Hagel. The way is to take the world through. As a result, Mcdowell has transformed the relationship between man and the world from the static epistemological relationship of Kantian to the dynamic existentialism. But because Mcdowell completely denied the logic of the perceptual experience, Mcdowell completely denied the relationship between man and the world. His theory can not be intersected, and the phenomenological spirit embodied in Berg's plan becomes a possible way to solve Kant's theory of intuition.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：B516.31
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前2條
1 張榮;“感性與知性的共同根”之辨——《純粹理性批判》導言的一個微觀考察[J];南京大學學報(哲學.人文科學.社會科學版);2004年04期
2 段麗真;;“概念論者”還是“非概念論者”——對康德知識論的兩種解讀[J];哲學動態(tài);2015年01期
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