本文選題：不完備契約 + 不確定性�。� 參考：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：在剩余索取權(quán)與剩余控制權(quán)相分離的委托-代理模型中,委托人和代理人通過簽訂契約來約定各自的權(quán)利和義務(wù),明確雙方目標(biāo)和收益。但契約不能準(zhǔn)確描述未來狀態(tài)以及每種狀態(tài)下的各方權(quán)利和責(zé)任,并事先約定相應(yīng)的對策寫在契約里,即這樣的契約是不完備的。由于委托人和代理人之間信息不對稱、有限理性和不確定性的影響,往往使得最終的結(jié)果偏離了預(yù)期。現(xiàn)有研究多是從信息不對稱(信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué))和人的有限理性方面(心理學(xué)和行為金融)去研究不完備契約的,較少從不確定性的角度去探討不完備契約以及公司治理機(jī)制。董事會是公司治理的核心,是聯(lián)系股東和管理層之間的橋梁。董事會對內(nèi)代表股東行使監(jiān)督、激勵、聘任管理層的職能,對外進(jìn)行信息披露,降低股東投資風(fēng)險。研究不確定性對董事會機(jī)制的影響,既豐富了公司治理理論,也為委托人理解代理人行為,制定更完備的契約,提高投資者回報提供了的經(jīng)驗借鑒。本文通過對不確定性的界定,從企業(yè)面臨的內(nèi)部不確定性和外部不確定性兩個維度出發(fā),構(gòu)建了包括組織不確定性、管理不確定性、技術(shù)不確定性、宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定、市場不確定性和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險6個方面的指標(biāo)體系,并對指標(biāo)的選取依據(jù)、衡量方法進(jìn)行了闡述。在實證研究中,根據(jù)董事會機(jī)制的基本職能,分別研究不確定性對董事會監(jiān)督機(jī)制、制定管理層薪酬機(jī)制、替換管理層機(jī)制以及在不確定性條件下董事會機(jī)制對權(quán)益資本成本的影響。本文系統(tǒng)地研究了不確定性作為影響企業(yè)活動的重要因素對影響董事會行為和結(jié)果的影響。本文主要研究內(nèi)容和創(chuàng)新性工作如下：(1)研究了不確定性對董事會監(jiān)督管理層機(jī)制的影響。采用盈余管理水平和事會會議次數(shù)兩個指標(biāo)作為被解釋變量,實證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),不確定性對盈余管理水平的影響較為一致,除股權(quán)制衡度之外,其他指標(biāo)均是正向影響盈余水平,說明了不確定性弱化了董事會監(jiān)督機(jī)制。在進(jìn)一步的研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)董事會結(jié)構(gòu)變化、業(yè)務(wù)復(fù)雜性、權(quán)益乘數(shù)和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險等因素對盈余管理與董事會次數(shù)表現(xiàn)出同向發(fā)展的特征。而股權(quán)制衡度、企業(yè)財務(wù)危機(jī)預(yù)測和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性等因素對盈余管理與董事會會議次數(shù)表現(xiàn)出反向發(fā)展的特征。通過理論分析認(rèn)為,在不確定性環(huán)境下,董事會弱化了監(jiān)督職能,而強(qiáng)化了咨詢、建議和戰(zhàn)略制定等職能。(2)研究了不確定性對董事會激勵管理層機(jī)制的影響。采用高管薪酬集中度和高管人均薪酬兩個指標(biāo)作為被解釋變量,分析不確定性對高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制的影響。在單獨考察各種類型不確定性對薪酬影響時,組織不確定性對薪酬集中度的負(fù)向影響較為明顯,對人均薪酬數(shù)影響不明顯。而宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性對人均薪酬的負(fù)向影響更加明顯,對薪酬集中度的影響不明顯。一定程度上說明內(nèi)部不確定性導(dǎo)致董事會更注重薪酬“公平”,外部不確定性導(dǎo)致其更注重“效率”。當(dāng)考察所有不確定性因素對薪酬的綜合影響時,管理不確定性增加高管薪酬,宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性仍會減少高管薪酬。此外,獨立董事的大幅度變動將導(dǎo)致少數(shù)有控制力的高管獲得相對更多的薪酬。(3)研究了不確定性對董事會替換管理層機(jī)制影響。運(yùn)用logistic回歸模型發(fā)現(xiàn)了董事會結(jié)構(gòu)變化和股權(quán)制衡度變化是影響管理層變更的因素,進(jìn)一步分析發(fā)現(xiàn),相對于董事會規(guī)模變動,獨立董事變動對管理層變更的影響更小,說明獨立董事發(fā)揮作用還受到一定的限制。財務(wù)危機(jī)預(yù)測得分與管理層替換負(fù)相關(guān),印證了財務(wù)危機(jī)是公司治理弱化的觀點。宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性對管理層替換影響不顯著,市場不確定性和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險減小管理層替換的可能性。實證結(jié)果說明董事會替換管理層,主要是基于企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理的需要,而非受外部不確定性環(huán)境的影響。(4)研究了不確定性對權(quán)益資本成本的影響。權(quán)益資本成本是投資者對權(quán)益資本風(fēng)險價值的期望貼現(xiàn)率,體現(xiàn)了公司治理機(jī)制對投資者利益的保護(hù)水平。本章多元回歸分析對比發(fā)現(xiàn)內(nèi)部不確定性和外部不確定性對權(quán)益資本成本有正向影響,不確定性將會導(dǎo)致會引起權(quán)益資本成本升高。弱化的董事會機(jī)制會增加權(quán)益資本成本。當(dāng)董事會機(jī)制與不確定性共同作用下,一方面減弱了不確定性對權(quán)益資本成本的正向影響,另一面也降低了董事會的作用,產(chǎn)生了抵消效應(yīng)。在進(jìn)一步分析來看,內(nèi)部不確定性條件下董事會與權(quán)益資本成本的影響顯著。企業(yè)需積極提升面對不確定性的能力,同時提高董事會機(jī)制有效性,共同降低權(quán)益資本成本。
[Abstract]:In the principal-agent model residual claim and residual control of phase separation, the principal and the agent by signing contracts to define their respective rights and duties, clear both goals and benefits. But the contract can not accurately describe the future state and each state of the parties rights and obligations, and agreed in advance corresponding countermeasures in writing in this contract, the contract is not complete. Because of the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the impact of bounded rationality and uncertainty, often makes the final results deviate from the expected. The existing researches are from asymmetric information (Information Economics) and the limited rationality (Psychology and behavioral finance to study) incomplete contract, less uncertainty perspective to explore the incomplete contract and the mechanism of corporate governance. The board of directors is the core of corporate governance, is the relationship between shareholders and managers The board of directors of the bridge. On behalf of shareholders to exercise supervision, incentive, appointment management functions, information disclosed, reduce shareholder investment risk. Effects of uncertainty on the board mechanism, not only enrich the theory of corporate governance, but also to understand the agent acts as the principal, to develop a more complete contract, improve the return of investors to provide the experience. Through the definition of the uncertainty, starting from two dimensions of internal enterprises are facing uncertainties and external uncertainties, including the construction of organization management of uncertainty, uncertainty, technological uncertainty, macroeconomic uncertainty, the index system of 6 aspects of market uncertainty and systemic risk. And select the indexes based on the measurement methods are described. In the empirical study, according to the basic functions of the board of directors mechanism, supervision mechanism of uncertainty on the board of directors, system Set the management compensation mechanism, management mechanism and the effect of replacement of directors under uncertainty mechanism on the cost of equity capital. This paper systematically studies the influence of uncertainty as an important factor affecting the activities of the enterprise behavior and will influence on the board. The main research contents of this paper are as follows: (1) study the impact of uncertainty on the supervision of the board of directors management mechanism. The level of earnings management and business meetings two indicators as explanatory variables, the empirical results show that the impact of uncertainty on the earnings management level is the same, except the equity balance degree, other indicators are positively affect the earnings level, the uncertainty the weakening of the supervision mechanism of the board of directors. In the further research found that the board structure changes, business complexity, equity multiplier and systemic risk factors of earnings The number of the board of directors and management to show the same characteristics. The development and equity balance degree, enterprise financial crisis prediction and macroeconomic uncertainty factors such as meetings characterized by reverse development of earnings management and the board of directors. Through theoretical analysis, in an uncertain environment, the board of directors has weakened the function of supervision, and strengthen the the consultation, advice and strategy functions. (2) studied the effect of the uncertainty of management incentive mechanism for the board of directors. The executive compensation concentration and executives remuneration per capita two indicators as explanatory variables, analysis of the impact of uncertainty on the executive compensation incentive mechanism. In a separate survey of various types of uncertainty on compensation the influence of uncertainty on the organization, compensation concentration negative effect is more obvious, is not obvious to pay per capita number. The macroeconomic uncertainty negatively influence on per capita salary Sound is more obvious, is not obvious. The effects of concentration of compensation to a certain extent on the internal uncertainty leads to the board of directors pay pay more attention to the "fair", the external uncertainty leads to more focus on "efficiency". When examining all the uncertainty factors influence on salary management, increase the uncertainty of executive compensation, macro economy the uncertainty will reduce executive pay. In addition, substantial changes will lead to a small number of independent directors have control executives receive relatively more salary. (3) study the uncertainty of the board of directors to replace the management mechanism. Using the logistic regression model found that the board structure change and equity balance degree change is affecting factors a change of management, further analysis found that, compared to the size of the board of directors of independent directors changes, changes on the impact of management change is smaller, that independent directors play a role also Subject to certain restrictions. The financial crisis forecast score with management to replace negative correlation, confirms the financial crisis is weakening corporate governance point of view. The macroeconomic uncertainty on the management of replacement did not significantly affect the market uncertainty, and reduce systemic risk management replacement is possible. The empirical results show that the board of directors to replace management major is based on the needs of management, not affected by external environment uncertainty. (4) studied the effect of uncertainty on the cost of equity capital. The cost of equity capital is the expected discounted value of equity investors to the risk rate reflects the level of protection of corporate governance mechanism on the interests of the investors. In this chapter, the multiple regression analysis comparison of internal uncertainty and external uncertainty has a positive impact on the cost of equity capital, the uncertainty will lead to the cost of equity capital will cause weak rise. The board of directors mechanism will increase the cost of equity capital. When the board of directors mechanism and uncertainty together, a reduced uncertainty have a positive effect on the cost of equity capital, the other side also reduces the role of the board of directors, the offsetting effect. Further analysis, the internal uncertainty condition of board of directors and significantly influences the cost of equity capital. Enterprises need to actively promote the ability to face uncertainty, and improve the mechanism of board effectiveness, to reduce the cost of equity capital.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F275;F271

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本文編號：1760327