【摘要】：特殊的歷史背景造成了轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)中的我國(guó)上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)呈現(xiàn)流通與非流通股割裂和“一股獨(dú)大”的集中特征，控股股東偏好利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易“掏空”上市公司資源進(jìn)而獲得控制權(quán)私有收益。眾多惡性案例表明關(guān)聯(lián)交易已經(jīng)成為我國(guó)上市公司治理的一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問(wèn)題。 股權(quán)分置改革打破股權(quán)流動(dòng)性分裂的格局并進(jìn)入全流通時(shí)代，消除了阻礙中國(guó)上市公司發(fā)展的根本性制度缺陷，使得資本市場(chǎng)的定價(jià)功能增強(qiáng)，有效改善了制度環(huán)境。有鑒于此，本文基于中國(guó)股權(quán)分置改革這一制度變遷視角，在全面分析2000~2011年我國(guó)全部A股上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易總體狀況的基礎(chǔ)上，通過(guò)對(duì)比樣本和回歸分析方法，，從多維度考察了關(guān)聯(lián)交易及其影響因素的實(shí)際變化。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)這12年間上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易頻率和規(guī)模逐年上升；關(guān)聯(lián)交易頻率分布具有典型行業(yè)特征，主要集中在制造業(yè)、信息技術(shù)業(yè)、批發(fā)和零售貿(mào)易業(yè)及房地產(chǎn)業(yè)；發(fā)生最頻繁的關(guān)聯(lián)交易類(lèi)型分別是商品交易類(lèi)、抵押和擔(dān)保類(lèi)以及提供或接受勞務(wù)類(lèi)�；貧w檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明，股改前后關(guān)聯(lián)交易密度(平均單次交易規(guī)模)均與第一大股東持股比例正相關(guān)，與控股股東之間的股權(quán)制衡度、流通股比例和管理層持股比例負(fù)相關(guān)。股改前關(guān)聯(lián)交易密度與董事監(jiān)事高管年薪正相關(guān)，股改后變?yōu)樨?fù)相關(guān)。而獨(dú)立董事對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易的影響作用尚不顯著。最后根據(jù)關(guān)聯(lián)交易現(xiàn)狀和研究結(jié)論從法規(guī)建設(shè)、信息披露、公司治理和股權(quán)制衡等多角度給出了規(guī)范上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易的對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:The special historical background causes the ownership structure of the listed companies in the transitional economy to present the characteristics of the split of circulation and non-tradable shares and the "one big one". Controlling shareholders prefer to use affiliated transactions to "empty" the resources of listed companies to obtain private income of control rights. Many malignant cases show that affiliated transactions have become a serious problem in the governance of listed companies in China. The reform of split share structure breaks the split pattern of equity liquidity and enters the era of full circulation, eliminates the fundamental institutional defects that hinder the development of listed companies in China, enhances the pricing function of the capital market, and effectively improves the institutional environment. In view of this, this paper based on the perspective of institutional change of China's split share structure reform, on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the overall situation of all A-share listed companies in China from 2000 to 2011, through comparative samples and regression analysis. This paper examines the actual changes of related party transactions and their influencing factors from multiple dimensions. It is found that the frequency and scale of related party transactions of listed companies increase year by year during the past 12 years, and the frequency distribution of related party transactions has typical industry characteristics, mainly concentrated in manufacturing industry, information technology industry, wholesale and retail trade and real estate industry. The most frequent types of related party transactions are commodity transaction, mortgage and guarantee, and providing or receiving services. The results of regression test show that the relative transaction density (average single transaction scale) before and after the stock reform is positively correlated with the proportion of the largest shareholder, and negatively with the degree of equity balance among controlling shareholders, the proportion of tradable shares and the proportion of managerial shareholding. The relative transaction density before the stock reform is positively correlated with the annual salary of directors and supervisors, but it becomes negative after the stock reform. The influence of independent director on related party transaction is not significant. Finally, according to the current situation of related party transactions and the conclusion of the research, this paper gives the countermeasures and suggestions of regulating the related party transactions of listed companies from the aspects of law construction, information disclosure, corporate governance and equity balance and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：2313182