【摘要】：摘要：證券投資基金從業(yè)人員背信行為是指在處理投資者事務(wù)或管理、處分投資者財(cái)產(chǎn)或財(cái)產(chǎn)性利益的基金公司從業(yè)人員,故意濫用權(quán)限或違背信托義務(wù),損害投資者財(cái)產(chǎn)利益的行為。證券投資背信行為出現(xiàn)主要有四個(gè)原因：基金法律制度不健全；背信行為刑事責(zé)任和民事責(zé)任缺失；基金外部監(jiān)管不力；內(nèi)部控制制度不健全。正是由于上述原因的存在,導(dǎo)致了證券投資基金背信行為的頻發(fā)。證券投資基金從業(yè)人員背信行為對(duì)基金份額持有人、基金經(jīng)理、基金公司乃至整個(gè)基金行業(yè)都有著巨大的危害。對(duì)證券投資基金從業(yè)人員背信行為的民事責(zé)任追究面臨著許多問題。最大的問題在于現(xiàn)行法對(duì)其過于原則的規(guī)定,使得該行為基本處于一個(gè)不受限制的狀態(tài)。我國偏重于采用刑事和行政手段,較為忽略民事責(zé)任作用,從而導(dǎo)致證券投資基金背信行為肆虐,因此應(yīng)完善現(xiàn)有的證券投資基金從業(yè)人員背信行為民事責(zé)任追究制度。在追究其民事責(zé)任時(shí),首先需對(duì)其民事責(zé)任性質(zhì)作出判斷,由于該行為的違法行為人與受害者之間不存在合同關(guān)系,因此,該行為的民事責(zé)任應(yīng)認(rèn)定為侵權(quán)責(zé)任。由于受害人取證手段缺乏,因此采用過錯(cuò)推定原則更妥當(dāng)。在證券投資基金從業(yè)人員背信行為的侵權(quán)要件認(rèn)定中,由于證券市場(chǎng)的特點(diǎn),損害數(shù)額的計(jì)算應(yīng)以違法行為人的違法所得作為損害數(shù)額。在因果關(guān)系認(rèn)定上,由于股價(jià)是諸多因素共同影響的結(jié)果,因此需采用因果關(guān)系推定原則。在民事賠償方面,由于基金持有人變動(dòng)頻繁,因此應(yīng)以買入股票時(shí)基金公司的基金持有人作為受害主體。證券投資基金從業(yè)人員背信行為雖然短時(shí)間內(nèi)無法徹底遏制,但是隨著民事責(zé)任制度的進(jìn)一步細(xì)化,同時(shí)通過完善現(xiàn)有的監(jiān)督執(zhí)法體制,加重其違法成本,該行為橫行的現(xiàn)狀有望得到改善。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: the breach of trust by the employees of securities investment funds refers to the employees of fund companies who deal with the affairs or management of investors and punish the property or property interests of investors, and intentionally abuse their authority or violate their trust obligations. The act of harming the property interests of an investor. There are four main reasons for the appearance of securities investment breach of trust: the imperfect legal system of the fund; the lack of criminal liability and civil liability of the breach of trust; the weak external supervision of the fund; and the unsound internal control system. It is because of the existence of the above reasons, leading to the frequent occurrence of securities investment fund breach of trust. The dishonest behavior of the employees of the securities investment fund has great harm to the fund share holders, fund managers, fund companies and even the whole fund industry. There are many problems in the investigation of civil liability for the breach of trust of securities investment fund employees. The biggest problem is that the current law is too principled, making the behavior basically in an unrestricted state. Our country pays more attention to the criminal and administrative means, neglects the civil liability function, thus causes the securities investment fund to break the trust behavior rampant, therefore should consummate the existing securities investment fund employee dishonest behavior civil liability investigation system. When we investigate their civil liability, we should first judge the nature of their civil liability. As there is no contractual relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, the civil liability of the act should be regarded as tort liability. Due to the lack of means of obtaining evidence, it is more appropriate to adopt the principle of presumption of fault. Due to the characteristics of the securities market, the amount of damage should be calculated by the illegal income of the illegal perpetrator in the identification of the tort elements of the breach of trust of the employee of the securities investment fund. In causality determination, because stock price is the result of many factors, it is necessary to adopt the principle of causality presumption. In the aspect of civil compensation, the fund holder of the fund company should be regarded as the victim because of the frequent change of the fund holder. Although the breach of trust of securities investment fund practitioners cannot be completely curbed in a short period of time, but with the further refinement of the civil liability system and the improvement of the existing supervisory and law enforcement system, the illegal costs will be increased. The current state of this behavior is expected to improve.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D923;D922.287

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