本文選題：城市 + 商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)��； 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：中國商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展相對滯后，回顧20多年的發(fā)展及現(xiàn)狀，既可以揭示中國商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)發(fā)展的軌跡，也可以發(fā)掘中國商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)業(yè)潛在的巨大機(jī)會。 商業(yè)地產(chǎn)表面繁榮的背后是規(guī)劃無序、生態(tài)破壞、經(jīng)營混亂等一系列問題，這讓越來越多的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)者對未來充滿憂慮。 商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場的不均衡發(fā)展是常態(tài)，研究我國商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場理論現(xiàn)狀及其市場所暴露的問題，既有其理論層面的意義，也有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場參與各方既具有一定的獨(dú)立性，又相互依存、相互影響；市場中的每一方都有各自的利益，而其利益的兌現(xiàn)卻取決于相關(guān)各方的承諾與選擇。毫無疑問，博弈論特別適合于對商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場的平衡分析并對制度設(shè)計與選擇提供支持與幫助。 商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)的發(fā)展可以帶動一個城市甚至一個區(qū)域的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，這是城市化進(jìn)程中重要的推動力量。商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)的開發(fā)投資額度巨大，影響廣泛，一個城市的商業(yè)發(fā)達(dá)程度直接影響著這個城市的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平。 商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場中，利益相關(guān)者一般是指參與商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場并對其產(chǎn)生影響的每一個群體，他們是房地產(chǎn)市場的重要構(gòu)成要素。概括而言，主要包括政府（中央政府和地方政府）、商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商、零售商三個主體。 本文第四章圍繞開發(fā)商行為與政府職能展開論述。重點(diǎn)針對監(jiān)管問題展開。在商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場中，政府一方面扮演土地提供方的角色，同時也是市場規(guī)則的制定者與裁判員（由不同政府部門執(zhí)行）。為了探究商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)過程中市場失衡的根本原因，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮這些行為主體的利益，并認(rèn)為他們的選擇是利益博弈的結(jié)果。 本文第五章介紹了開發(fā)商作為市場中最重要的主體，開發(fā)商與開發(fā)商之間也存在著博弈關(guān)系。最突出的問題就是，，面對市場利益，房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)面臨兩難選擇，價格競爭或者合謀。商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場競爭的激烈程度與企業(yè)的盈利能力負(fù)相關(guān)，因此，企業(yè)有強(qiáng)烈的動機(jī)通過合謀來弱化競爭，以獲取利潤最大化。房地產(chǎn)市場獨(dú)特的市場結(jié)構(gòu)使得房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)間的合謀不僅成為可能，而且具有相當(dāng)?shù)姆�(wěn)定性。 本文第六章討論的是在開發(fā)商與零售商相互選擇的過程，開發(fā)商與零售商在商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場中如何建立彼此的信任？在交易合作過程中如何降低交易成本？本章節(jié)引入了博弈論中的聲譽(yù)模型進(jìn)行詳盡的分析。在這一市場中，企業(yè)的行為正如我們所知道的那樣，聲譽(yù)的本質(zhì)在于可以使行為人獲取長期的收益。 本文第七章為案例研究，結(jié)合長春市房地產(chǎn)市場及ZD集團(tuán)的成功展開論述。 博弈論的核心是分析均衡。從商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場的供給、需求以及價格形成的過程來看，這個市場是非常典型的帶有博弈特征的競爭性業(yè)務(wù)活動的。商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)市場發(fā)展是為了滿足城市各種活動對空間的需求而進(jìn)行的土地開發(fā)過程，這一過程中，具有不同利益和目的的政府、開發(fā)商、零售商，作為最重要的主體構(gòu)成，其相互間的利益分配關(guān)系直接影響著市場的均衡發(fā)展。 商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展，不僅有利于國家監(jiān)督商業(yè)房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營行為，也能夠?qū)τ诖_立房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)發(fā)展的自律機(jī)制和競爭機(jī)制提供有效幫助，從而促進(jìn)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展，這對國家資源的合理配置，保證零售商的利益，協(xié)助政府相關(guān)部門制定決策并確保這一市場良性循環(huán)具有重要的意義
[Abstract]:The development of China's commercial real estate industry is lagging behind. Reviewing the development and current situation of more than 20 years, it can not only reveal the development track of Chinese commercial real estate, but also discover the potential great opportunities for Chinese commercial real estate industry.
Behind the prosperity of commercial real estate is a series of problems, such as planning disorder, ecological destruction, and operation confusion, which makes more and more economists worry about the future.
The unbalanced development of the commercial real estate market is normal. It is of both theoretical and practical significance to study the current situation of the commercial real estate market and the problems exposed in the market.
The participation of all parties in the commercial real estate market has a certain independence, interdependence and mutual influence; each party in the market has its own interests, and the cashing of its interests depends on the commitment and choice of the relevant parties. No doubt, game theory is especially suitable for the equilibrium analysis of the commercial real estate market and the design and selection of the system. Provide support and help.
The development of commercial real estate can drive the economic development of a city or even a region. It is an important driving force in the process of urbanization. The amount of investment in the development of commercial real estate is huge and its influence is widespread. The degree of commercial development of a city directly affects the economic development level of this city.
In the commercial real estate market, the stakeholders generally refer to each group participating in the commercial real estate market and affecting it. They are the important elements of the real estate market. In general, it mainly includes the government (the central government and the local government), the commercial real estate developer, and the retailer's three main bodies.
The fourth chapter focuses on the behavior of developers and government functions. In the commercial real estate market, the government plays the role of the land supplier on the one hand, and is also the maker of the market rules and the referee (carried out by different government departments). In order to explore the market loss in the process of commercial real estate development, the market is lost. The fundamental reason for balance is that we should consider the interests of these actors and think that their choice is the result of interest game.
The fifth chapter introduces the developer as the most important subject in the market, and there is a game relationship between the developer and the developer. The most prominent problem is that the real estate enterprises face the dilemma, price competition or conspiracy in the face of market interests. The fierce competition in the commercial real estate market is negatively related to the profitability of the enterprises. Therefore, enterprises have strong motivation to weaken the competition through conspiracy in order to maximize profits. The unique market structure of the real estate market makes the conspiracy between real estate enterprises not only possible, but also has considerable stability.
The sixth chapter discusses the process of mutual choice between developers and retailers. How do developers and retailers establish mutual trust in the commercial real estate market? How to reduce transaction costs in the process of trading cooperation? This chapter introduces the reputation model in the game theory for detailed analysis. In this market, the behavior of the enterprise As we all know, the essence of reputation is to enable actors to gain long-term benefits.
The seventh chapter is a case study, which is based on the success of Changchun real estate market and ZD group.
The core of the game theory is the analysis of equilibrium. From the perspective of the supply, demand and price formation of the commercial real estate market, this market is a very typical competitive business with game characteristics. The development of the commercial real estate market is to meet the needs of the various activities of the city in the land development process. In the process, the government, developers and retailers, with different interests and purposes, constitute the most important subject, and their mutual benefit distribution has a direct impact on the balanced development of the market.
The sustainable development of commercial real estate not only helps the state to supervise the business behavior of the commercial real estate enterprises, but also can provide effective help to establish the self-discipline mechanism and competition mechanism of the development of the real estate enterprise, thus promoting the healthy development of the real estate industry, the rational allocation of the national resources, the guarantee of the interests of the retailers, and the assistance of the retailers. It is of great significance for the relevant government departments to make policy decisions and ensure the virtuous circle of the market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F299.233.4;F224.32

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 李鐵;房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)濟(jì)與國民經(jīng)濟(jì)波動的主要因素分析[J];商業(yè)研究;2002年08期

2 李鐵,馬宇;房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)濟(jì)與國民經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展速度預(yù)測[J];商業(yè)研究;2002年11期

3 苗天青;我國城市土地出讓的尋租與博弈分析[J];商業(yè)研究;2004年11期

4 劉雷;;房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商與政府之間的博弈分析[J];財經(jīng)問題研究;2008年08期

5 唐緒兵;非對稱信息條件下的政府規(guī)制[J];財經(jīng)理論與實(shí)踐;2003年01期

6 張洪;城市土地供給制度的改革與創(chuàng)新[J];城市問題;2004年01期

7 王穎,孫斌棟;運(yùn)用博弈論分析和思考城市規(guī)劃中的若干問題[J];城市規(guī)劃匯刊;1999年03期

8 王鵬;;城市生態(tài)化與商業(yè)地產(chǎn)開發(fā)[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2012年04期

9 張鳳和;城市土地需求的四大決定因素[J];中國房地產(chǎn);2003年04期

10 許光建,秦永良;非對稱信息市場理論的貢獻(xiàn)及其應(yīng)用[J];宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2002年02期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前7條

1 叢屹;城市土地有償使用制度的改革與實(shí)踐[D];東北財經(jīng)大學(xué);2001年

2 陳富良;政府規(guī)制的均衡分析[D];江西財經(jīng)大學(xué);2002年

3 張瑩;我國招標(biāo)投標(biāo)的理論與實(shí)踐研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2002年

4 李波;城市房地產(chǎn)發(fā)展系統(tǒng)研究[D];天津大學(xué);2004年

5 鮑小飛;房地產(chǎn)市場泡沫的形成和預(yù)警[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2005年

6 呂振臣;我國土地征用出讓過程中和諧土地利益機(jī)制構(gòu)建研究[D];同濟(jì)大學(xué);2007年

7 張協(xié)奎;房地產(chǎn)估價方法與應(yīng)用[D];湖南大學(xué);1999年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前6條

1 徐宗明;基于利益相關(guān)者理論的土地利用沖突管理研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2011年

2 李勇;基于博弈論的企業(yè)決策行為研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2002年

3 都玲;重慶房地產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展及其風(fēng)險防范[D];重慶大學(xué);2005年

4 張普偉;西部地區(qū)房地產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2006年

5 陶s

本文編號：1950757