發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-10 15:37

  本文選題：金融上市公司 + 高管薪酬�。� 參考：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)金融業(yè)承擔(dān)著資金儲(chǔ)存，轉(zhuǎn)移和融通等社會(huì)職能，政府在一定程度上給予其政策扶持。金融業(yè)是一個(gè)非充分競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的行業(yè)，在國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)體制中起著舉足輕重的作用，，其盈利水平越來越受到人們的廣泛關(guān)注。在影響公司績(jī)效的眾多因素中，高管薪酬是重要影響因素之一，人們對(duì)其高管的薪酬激勵(lì)更關(guān)注。隨著資本結(jié)構(gòu)的多元化和復(fù)雜化，金融上市公司吸引了越來越多的精英管理人才。針對(duì)金融上市公司，旨在以公司監(jiān)管為視角，分析高管薪酬對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。希望通過理論分析和實(shí)證研究，為完善金融上市公司高管激勵(lì)體系的設(shè)計(jì)提供參考。 研究對(duì)象選取41家金融上市公司，分析高管貨幣性薪酬、高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)部的薪酬差距和高管持股對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響機(jī)制，以及股東監(jiān)管和獨(dú)立董事監(jiān)管對(duì)薪酬激勵(lì)效果和公司績(jī)效的影響。以實(shí)證工作設(shè)計(jì)為支撐，選擇前五大股東持股比例和獨(dú)立董事比例代表股東和獨(dú)立董事監(jiān)管變量，利用Excel表格和SPSS18.0統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件，通過對(duì)2010-2012年金融上市公司的123個(gè)樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性分析和多元線性回歸分析，研究公司監(jiān)管、高管薪酬對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響關(guān)系，驗(yàn)證理論分析中提出的研究假設(shè)。 研究結(jié)果表明，引入公司監(jiān)管因素前后，金融上市公司高管貨幣薪酬對(duì)公司績(jī)效均有顯著的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)，高管持股對(duì)公司績(jī)效有負(fù)面影響且影響不顯著，擴(kuò)大高管薪酬差距不利于公司績(jī)效的提高，同時(shí)認(rèn)為股東和獨(dú)立董事的監(jiān)管未能發(fā)揮有效的監(jiān)管和約束作用，應(yīng)創(chuàng)造良好的激勵(lì)體制的同時(shí)建立有效監(jiān)管和約束環(huán)境，以進(jìn)一步提高薪酬激勵(lì)效應(yīng)和公司績(jī)效。
[Abstract]:China's financial industry undertakes social functions such as fund storage, transfer and financing, and the government gives its policy support to a certain extent.The financial industry is an industry which is not fully competitive and plays an important role in the national economic system, and its profit level is paid more and more attention by people.Executive compensation is one of the most important factors that affect the performance of the company. People pay more attention to the incentive of the executive.With the diversification and complexity of capital structure, financial listed companies attract more and more elite management talents.The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance from the perspective of corporate supervision.Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper provides a reference for improving the design of financial listed companies' executive incentive system.The participants selected 41 financial listed companies to analyze the monetary compensation of senior executives, the pay gap within the executive team and the impact mechanism of executive ownership on corporate performance.And the influence of shareholder supervision and independent director supervision on salary incentive effect and company performance.Based on the empirical design, this paper selects the top five shareholder shareholding ratio and independent director ratio to represent the shareholder and independent director supervision variables, and uses Excel table and SPSS18.0 statistical software.Through the descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression analysis of 123 sample data of financial listed companies from 2010 to 2012, the relationship between corporate supervision and executive compensation on corporate performance is studied.Verify the research hypotheses put forward in the theoretical analysis.The results show that, before and after the introduction of corporate regulatory factors, the monetary compensation of financial listed companies have significant incentive effects on corporate performance, and executive ownership has a negative impact on corporate performance and the impact is not significant.Expanding executive pay gap is not conducive to the improvement of corporate performance. At the same time, it is considered that the supervision of shareholders and independent directors can not play an effective regulatory and binding role, and we should create a good incentive system and establish an effective regulatory and constraint environment at the same time.To further improve compensation incentives and corporate performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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