本文選題：高管薪酬　切入點：公司績效　出處：《吉林財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：伴隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)快速發(fā)展和當(dāng)前國際經(jīng)濟(jì)的大環(huán)境的影響，房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)發(fā)展的突飛猛進(jìn)，對我國國民經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生很大的影響。同時高管人員也是最近比較受關(guān)注的焦點，鑒于以上兩點，本文就以上市公司房地產(chǎn)的高管薪酬為研究對象，研究上市公司高管薪酬激勵體制。 本文選取了2009-2011年深圳交易所和上海交易所中的房地產(chǎn)A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)作為研究客體。數(shù)據(jù)來源于中國證監(jiān)會官方網(wǎng)站、深圳國泰安信息技術(shù)有限公司開發(fā)的CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫、巨潮資訊官網(wǎng)以及上市公司年報，輔助SPSS13.0統(tǒng)計軟件進(jìn)行了多元回歸分析。通過建立回歸模型進(jìn)行實證分析，檢驗房地產(chǎn)上市公司的高管薪酬與公司績效、公司規(guī)模、董事會規(guī)模、股權(quán)集中度是否具有關(guān)聯(lián)性，實證結(jié)論表明：（1）房地產(chǎn)上市公司的業(yè)績與高管薪酬這兩者之間有著很明顯的正比例關(guān)系。這也就說明我國房地產(chǎn)上市公司的業(yè)績與高管薪酬的掛鉤的原則越來越完善，從而使房地產(chǎn)上市公司的高管薪酬---業(yè)績合約得到進(jìn)一步完善。（2）房地產(chǎn)公司規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大，會使高管薪酬得到相應(yīng)的提高。（3）房地產(chǎn)上市公司股權(quán)集中度與高管薪酬有著顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)的影響，證實了股權(quán)集中度越明顯，大股東對高管的監(jiān)督就會越有效，高管薪酬就會越少。但是股權(quán)集中度這一公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)還需要進(jìn)一步完善，從而使高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制得到完善。（4）房地產(chǎn)上市公司的董事會規(guī)模與高管薪酬的正相關(guān)性沒有通過t檢驗。說明兩者的正相關(guān)是不成立的。針對實證研究的結(jié)論，，本文最后提出了完善房地產(chǎn)上市公司高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制的相關(guān)建議和措施：(1)房地產(chǎn)上市公司績效目標(biāo)的正確設(shè)定，從而使高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制得到進(jìn)一步完善；（2）建立科學(xué)合理有效的業(yè)績評價機(jī)制將短期激勵與長期激勵相結(jié)合，從而進(jìn)一步完善高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制；（3）完善相關(guān)的法律法規(guī)，從而為高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制提供法律保障。
[Abstract]:With the sustained and rapid development of our economy and the impact of the current international economic environment, the rapid development of the real estate industry has a great impact on our national economy.At the same time, executives are also the focus of attention recently, in view of the above two points, this paper takes the real estate executive compensation of listed companies as the research object, studies the incentive system of executive compensation of listed companies.The data of real estate A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011 are selected as the object of this study.The data comes from the official website of CSRC, the CSMAR database developed by Shenzhen Cathay & an Information Technology Co., Ltd., the giant information website and the annual report of listed companies, and the multivariate regression analysis of SPSS13.0 statistical software.By establishing a regression model to analyze the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, corporate size, board size, ownership concentration, and so on, the paper analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, corporate size, board size, and equity concentration of listed real estate companies.The empirical results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the performance of real estate listed companies and executive compensation.This also shows that the principle of linking the performance of listed real estate companies with executive compensation is becoming more and more perfect, thus making the real estate listed companies' executive compensation -performance contracts further improved. 2) the scale of real estate companies is expanded.It will increase the executive compensation accordingly.) the ownership concentration degree of the real estate listed companies has a significant negative correlation with the executive compensation, which proves that the more obvious the equity concentration degree, the more effective the supervision of the executive will be by the large shareholders.The lower the executive pay, the less.However, the corporate governance structure of equity concentration needs to be further improved, so that the incentive mechanism of executive compensation is improved. 4) the positive correlation between board size and executive compensation of listed real estate companies has not passed t test.It shows that the positive correlation between the two is untenable.In view of the conclusion of the empirical study, this paper finally puts forward the relevant suggestions and measures to improve the executive compensation incentive mechanism of real estate listed companies, and measures: 1) the correct setting of performance objectives of real estate listed companies.So that the incentive mechanism of executive compensation can be further improved. 2) to establish a scientific, reasonable and effective performance evaluation mechanism to combine short-term incentive with long-term incentive, thus further improve the incentive mechanism of executive compensation and improve the relevant laws and regulations.In order to provide legal protection for executive compensation incentive mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F299.233.4

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本文編號：1719496