發(fā)布時間：2018-02-24 03:07

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 分析師 盈余管理 盈利預(yù)測 外部監(jiān)督　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國的資本市場是一個新興的市場,而作為資本市場重要組成部分的證券分析師更是一個年輕的行業(yè)。分析師通過分析報告和盈利預(yù)測的方式向市場投資者傳遞隱藏于財務(wù)報表背后的信息,減輕了投資者與被投資者之間的信息不對稱的現(xiàn)象,并在一定程度上促進(jìn)了整個資本市場的資源配置效率,成為公司治理的一種外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制。 由于我國資本市場法律環(huán)境尚不健全,我國上市公司管理層普遍存在著盈余管理的行為,這使得盈余管理成為國內(nèi)學(xué)者研究的熱點。在理論上代理理論和信息不對稱理論均為管理層的盈余管理行為提供了操作的空間。鑒于我國資本市場特殊的歷史制度背景,上市公司管理層具有更強(qiáng)烈的盈余管理動機(jī),并且采用的盈余管理手段也與發(fā)達(dá)國家成熟的資本市場上的上市公司不同。 雖然國外的文獻(xiàn)對于兩者在國外資本市場的關(guān)系有充分的研究,但是國內(nèi)關(guān)于二者關(guān)系的研究尚未形成體系。為此,本文力圖研究分析師作為外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制與公司管理層的盈余管理行為有著怎樣的相互關(guān)系,以此揭露分析師對于公司治理和資本市場的重要作用。 本文選取2008-2012年我國深滬兩市A股上市公司為研究樣本,通過構(gòu)建分析師與盈余管理兩者的多元回歸模型,從選擇關(guān)注公司的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、分析報告的預(yù)測結(jié)果和盈余管理手段的改變等多個方面討論兩者的關(guān)系。 本文證明了分析師在選擇目標(biāo)公司時,偏好關(guān)注盈余管理程度較小的公司,回避盈余管理程度大的公司。針對已經(jīng)有分析師關(guān)注的公司樣本發(fā)現(xiàn),隨著分析師跟蹤人數(shù)的增加,對于公司管理層的外部監(jiān)督壓力增大,公司的盈余管理程度在逐漸變小。本文也發(fā)現(xiàn)了公司管理層盈余管理行為會對分析師預(yù)測結(jié)果產(chǎn)生影響,實證結(jié)果證明,公司的盈余管理程度越高,分析師預(yù)測準(zhǔn)確性越差；公司盈余管理程度越高,分析師預(yù)測的意見分歧越大。這是由于管理層的盈余管理行為,干涉了財務(wù)報告數(shù)據(jù)的生成過程,降低了財務(wù)報告會計信息的可靠性,導(dǎo)致了分析師對于公司未來盈余的誤判。最后,本文證明了分析師跟進(jìn)人數(shù)的增多會迫使公司管理層改變盈余管理的手段,管理層會采用更加隱蔽的方法來進(jìn)行盈余管理方法。 在研究過程中,本文還發(fā)現(xiàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股也在一定程度上對公司管理層的盈余管理行為起到了監(jiān)督作用。雖然機(jī)構(gòu)投資者監(jiān)督的力度或者效果不及分析師行業(yè),但是隨著我國資本市場的不斷完善,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者由于其投資數(shù)額巨大,擁有專業(yè)的管理和分析人才,在資本市場上的角色將會越來越重要。 最后,本文結(jié)合論文的結(jié)論對于分析師行業(yè)發(fā)展提出了建議,并指出了本文研究中的創(chuàng)新和貢獻(xiàn),也討論了本次研究的不足和未來研究的方向。
[Abstract]:China's capital market is an emerging market. Securities analysts, an important part of the capital market, are a young industry. Analysts pass information hidden behind financial statements to market investors by analyzing reports and forecasting earnings. It alleviates the information asymmetry between the investor and the investor, promotes the resource allocation efficiency of the whole capital market to a certain extent, and becomes an external supervision mechanism of corporate governance. Because the legal environment of our country's capital market is not perfect, the management of listed companies in our country generally exists the behavior of earnings management. This makes earnings management a hot topic for domestic scholars. In theory, agency theory and information asymmetry theory provide space for management's earnings management behavior. In view of the special historical background of China's capital market, The managers of listed companies have stronger motivation of earnings management, and the methods of earnings management are different from those of listed companies in the mature capital markets of developed countries. Although there has been sufficient research on the relationship between the two in foreign capital markets in foreign literature, the domestic research on the relationship between the two has not yet formed a system. This paper tries to study the relationship between analysts as an external supervision mechanism and earnings management behavior of corporate management in order to reveal the important role of analysts in corporate governance and capital markets. This paper selects the A-share listed companies in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2008 to 2012 as the research samples, and constructs the multiple regression model between the analysts and the earnings management to select the standards to focus on the companies. The relationship between the forecast results and the change of earnings management methods is discussed. This paper proves that when selecting target companies, analysts prefer to focus on companies with less earnings management and avoid companies with higher earnings management. With the increase of the number of analysts tracking, the external supervision pressure on the company management is increasing, and the degree of earnings management is gradually becoming smaller. This paper also found that the behavior of management earnings management will have an impact on the analyst forecast results. The empirical results show that the higher the level of earnings management, the worse the accuracy of analysts' forecasts; the higher the level of earnings management, the more divergent opinions analysts have. It interferes with the process of producing financial report data, reduces the reliability of accounting information of financial report, and leads to the misjudgment of the company's future earnings. This paper proves that the increase in the number of analysts will force the management of the company to change the means of earnings management, and the management will adopt a more covert approach to earnings management. In the course of the research, this paper also found that institutional investor shareholding also has a supervisory effect on the earnings management behavior of the management of the company to a certain extent, although the institutional investor supervision is not as strong or effective as that of the analyst industry. However, with the continuous improvement of the capital market in China, the role of institutional investors in the capital market will become more and more important because of their huge investment amount and professional management and analysis personnel. Finally, based on the conclusion of the paper, the paper puts forward some suggestions for the development of the analyst industry, points out the innovation and contribution of this research, and discusses the shortcomings of this study and the direction of future research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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本文編號：1528636