本文選題：項目外包　切入點：項目管理　出處：《南京理工大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文通過對NY公司軟件外包項目現(xiàn)有激勵政策不足的研究,從激勵機(jī)制角度尋求提升軟件外包項目的交付質(zhì)量的措施。 本文從企業(yè)間的契約關(guān)系以及外包員工個體感受兩個層面加以分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)影響NY公司軟件交付質(zhì)量的根本問題在于承包企業(yè)缺乏持續(xù)改進(jìn)的動力,以及對外包員工的人文關(guān)懷不夠。運用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論進(jìn)一步分析研發(fā)現(xiàn),導(dǎo)致承包企業(yè)缺乏持續(xù)改進(jìn)動力的原因在于質(zhì)量激勵合約正向激勵不足,導(dǎo)致承包方不愿意在質(zhì)量達(dá)標(biāo)基礎(chǔ)上,花費額外成本來進(jìn)一步提升質(zhì)量的“逆向選擇”現(xiàn)象,以及沒有建立起有效的“關(guān)系契約”導(dǎo)致承包企業(yè)擔(dān)心被“敲竹杠”而不愿意進(jìn)行“專屬性投資”。而從知識型員工的個體激勵要素來看,非物質(zhì)激勵能夠?qū)ν獍鼏T工起很大作用,在這方面存在直接工作接觸的NY公司能夠發(fā)揮較強(qiáng)的積極作用。 本文最終從解決“信息不對稱”和消除承包方對“專屬性人力資源投資”的顧慮入手,提出：簽訂針對質(zhì)量改進(jìn)、效率提升實施獎勵的框架協(xié)議,將承包公司的持續(xù)改進(jìn)量化并與獎勵指標(biāo)掛鉤等手段,調(diào)動承包公司持續(xù)改進(jìn)和長期合作意愿,建立起有效的“關(guān)系契約”；為承包企業(yè)專屬性人力資源投資帶來的效率提升溢價予以獎勵,并通過推薦優(yōu)秀外包員工入職為承包方專屬性人力投資提供退出方案的方式,消除承包方對“專屬性人力資源投資”的顧慮。同時本文強(qiáng)調(diào)了直接面向外包員工精神激勵的必要性,給出以較低的成本通過設(shè)立各種針對外包員工的專項獎勵的建議,直接激勵外包員工主動改進(jìn)。最終通過上述多種措施的綜合運用,實現(xiàn)軟件外包項目交付質(zhì)量的提升。
[Abstract]:Based on the research on the insufficient incentive policy of the software outsourcing project in NY Company, this paper looks for measures to improve the delivery quality of the software outsourcing project from the angle of incentive mechanism. This paper analyzes the contractual relationship among enterprises and the individual feelings of outsourced employees, and finds that the fundamental problem affecting the quality of software delivery in NY Company lies in the lack of motivation for continuous improvement in the contracting enterprises. And the humanistic concern of outsourcing staff is not enough. Further analysis and research on the application of economic theory shows that the reason for the lack of continuous improvement power of contracting enterprises lies in the lack of positive incentives for quality incentive contracts. The "adverse selection" phenomenon that leads to the contractor's unwillingness to spend additional costs to further improve the quality on the basis of quality standards, And the lack of an effective "relationship contract" that causes contracting firms to be "rigged" and unwilling to make "exclusive investments." and in terms of individual motivational elements for knowledge workers, Non-material incentive can play a great role in outsourcing employees, and NY company, which has direct working contact in this respect, can play a strong positive role. Finally, this paper begins with the solution of "information asymmetry" and the elimination of contractor's concern about "exclusive human resource investment", and proposes to sign a framework agreement for quality improvement and efficiency enhancement. To quantify and link the continuous improvement of the contracting company with the incentive index, and to mobilize the willingness of the contracting company to continuously improve and cooperate in the long run, Establish an effective "relationship contract", reward the efficiency improvement premium brought by the exclusive human resource investment of the contracting enterprise, and provide the exit scheme for the contractor's exclusive human resources investment by recommending the excellent outsourcing staff to join the position. At the same time, this paper emphasizes the necessity of direct encouragement for outsourced employees, and gives some suggestions for setting up special incentives for outsourced employees at lower cost. Direct incentive outsourcing employees to actively improve. Finally, through the comprehensive use of the above measures to achieve the quality of software outsourcing project delivery.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F49

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