發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-04-07 16:05

【摘要】：匹配理論作為博弈論的重要分支，理論上主要研究穩(wěn)定匹配的存在性、存在條件、集合特征以及策略問(wèn)題。實(shí)踐上主要結(jié)合理論運(yùn)用到人與組織、人力資源、學(xué)生與學(xué)校、醫(yī)生與醫(yī)院等實(shí)際活動(dòng)中，分析參與主體的匹配決策、匹配過(guò)程以及匹配結(jié)果。匹配理論在各個(gè)實(shí)際領(lǐng)域都發(fā)揮了重要作用。 目前我國(guó)銀行信貸市場(chǎng)充斥著信息不對(duì)稱、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、逆向選擇、博弈策略等投機(jī)行為問(wèn)題，也存在資源配置低效問(wèn)題，具體表現(xiàn)為信貸集中、中小企業(yè)貸款難、銀行惜貸、流動(dòng)性過(guò)剩以及不良貸款嚴(yán)重。除此之外，市場(chǎng)機(jī)制也存在缺陷，主要是信貸激勵(lì)機(jī)制和約束機(jī)制不對(duì)稱、制度管理過(guò)度、信貸流程繁雜耗時(shí)。本文研究目的是運(yùn)用匹配理論緩解以上存在問(wèn)題。 通過(guò)對(duì)中國(guó)銀行信貸市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)狀的分析，制度變遷、雙方的博弈策略選擇和目前市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的問(wèn)題和原因進(jìn)行深入研究調(diào)查。根據(jù)實(shí)際情況，對(duì)匹配對(duì)象進(jìn)行細(xì)分，并且在各自的效用函數(shù)上考慮了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和利率這兩個(gè)因素，使得效用函數(shù)更加準(zhǔn)確，推導(dǎo)出的偏好排序清單更加嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)、得出的匹配結(jié)果更加科學(xué)。最后，運(yùn)用遞延接受算法，得出中小銀行和中小企業(yè)可以穩(wěn)定匹配以及大銀行和大企業(yè)的可以穩(wěn)定匹配的結(jié)果，并收集大型銀行和中小型銀行的貸款情況進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證結(jié)論。 在分析銀行和企業(yè)的穩(wěn)定匹配關(guān)系基礎(chǔ)上，結(jié)合匹配在金融市場(chǎng)運(yùn)用經(jīng)驗(yàn)和學(xué)者的理論研究基礎(chǔ)上，提出信貸匹配體系，能有效解決目前存在問(wèn)題，信貸匹配體系主要運(yùn)作步驟是：1、雙方向信貸匹配體系提交信息，銀行提交目標(biāo)收益率信息，企業(yè)提交愿意承擔(dān)的最高利率信息。2、銀行目標(biāo)收益率低于企業(yè)愿承擔(dān)最高利率時(shí)，該企業(yè)為銀行的可行集。同理可以構(gòu)建企業(yè)的可行集。3、運(yùn)用遞延接受算法進(jìn)行匹配，得出穩(wěn)定的匹配結(jié)果。4、企業(yè)支付銀行利率是銀行的目標(biāo)收益率，，而銀行獲得的利率是企業(yè)愿意承擔(dān)的最高利率，而兩者的差額由機(jī)構(gòu)承擔(dān)。這樣設(shè)計(jì)是為了激勵(lì)相容，促使銀行和企業(yè)在匹配過(guò)程中表達(dá)真實(shí)意愿，有效避免尋租行為、博弈行為，集中資源，提高資源配置效率。而且運(yùn)作步驟簡(jiǎn)單，通過(guò)信貸匹配體系搭建企業(yè)和銀行進(jìn)行中央化匹配過(guò)程的橋梁，節(jié)省銀行重重審批環(huán)節(jié)，簡(jiǎn)化貸款流程，節(jié)省貸款發(fā)放時(shí)間。相比之前的匹配結(jié)果，能更好更高效的實(shí)現(xiàn)資金資源配置。
[Abstract]:As an important branch of game theory, matching theory focuses on the existence, existence conditions, set characteristics and strategy problems of stable matching. In practice, the theory is applied to the actual activities of people and organizations, human resources, students and schools, doctors and hospitals, etc., to analyze the matching decision-making, matching process and matching results of the participants. Matching theory plays an important role in every practical field. At present, the bank credit market in China is full of speculation problems such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, game strategy, etc., and there is also the problem of inefficient resource allocation, which is manifested in the concentration of credit, the difficulty of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and the reluctance of banks to lend. Excess liquidity and bad loans. In addition, the market mechanism also has the defect, mainly is the credit incentive mechanism and the restraint mechanism asymmetry, the system management is excessive, the credit process is complicated and time-consuming. The purpose of this paper is to use the matching theory to alleviate the above problems. Through the analysis of the present situation of the credit market of the Bank of China, the institutional changes, the choice of the game strategy between the two sides, and the problems and reasons of the present market mechanism are investigated in depth. According to the actual situation, the matching object is subdivided, and the risk and interest rate are considered in each utility function, which makes the utility function more accurate and the preference ranking list deduced more rigorous. The matching results are more scientific. Finally, using the deferred acceptance algorithm, the stable matching results of small and medium-sized banks and small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the stable matching of large banks and large enterprises are obtained, and the loans of large banks and small and medium-sized banks are collected for empirical analysis. Further verify the conclusion. On the basis of analyzing the stable matching relationship between banks and enterprises, combining with the experience of financial market application and the theoretical research of scholars, the credit matching system is put forward, which can effectively solve the existing problems. The main operating steps of the credit matching system are as follows: 1. Both sides submit information to the credit matching system, banks submit target yield information, and enterprises submit information about the highest interest rate they are willing to bear. When the target rate of return of the bank is lower than the highest interest rate the bank is willing to bear, the enterprise is a feasible set for the bank. In the same way, the feasible set of enterprises can be constructed. 3. Using the deferred acceptance algorithm to match, a stable matching result can be obtained. 4, the interest rate paid by the enterprise is the target rate of return of the bank. The interest rate that banks receive is the highest interest rate companies are willing to bear, and the difference between the two is borne by institutions. This design is designed to encourage compatibility, urge banks and enterprises to express their true wishes in the process of matching, effectively avoid rent-seeking behavior, game behavior, concentrate resources, and improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Moreover, the operation steps are simple, through the credit matching system to build a bridge between enterprises and banks for the central matching process, to save banks from a number of approval links, simplify the loan process, save time for lending. Compared with the previous matching results, can achieve better and more efficient allocation of capital resources.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4

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本文編號(hào)：2454201