【摘要】：運(yùn)用多任務(wù)代理模型,將財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效和發(fā)展能力作為政府(委托人)激勵(lì)P2P網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)(代理人)發(fā)展的兩個(gè)維度,分析政府對(duì)網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)的最優(yōu)激勵(lì)契約,以及網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)在經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效與發(fā)展能力兩項(xiàng)任務(wù)的激勵(lì)優(yōu)化問題。研究表明,當(dāng)網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)發(fā)展能力不確定性較大時(shí),政府應(yīng)該增加監(jiān)督成本,完善相關(guān)法律法規(guī),增加信息透明度,提高激勵(lì)效力。誠然,政府應(yīng)當(dāng)依據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效和發(fā)展能力兩項(xiàng)任務(wù)之間激勵(lì)成本的依存關(guān)系,調(diào)整對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效任務(wù)的激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度,提升網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)的發(fā)展能力。因此,政府應(yīng)該針對(duì)網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境、成長(zhǎng)時(shí)期和規(guī)模,采取不同的激勵(lì)方案,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)的有效激勵(lì)。
[Abstract]:Using the multi-task agent model, the financial performance and development ability are regarded as the two dimensions of government (principal) incentive P2P network loan platform (agent) development, and the government's optimal incentive contract to the network loan platform is analyzed. And the incentive optimization problem of the net loan platform in the two tasks of economic performance and development ability. The research shows that the government should increase the supervision cost, perfect the relevant laws and regulations, increase the information transparency and improve the incentive effectiveness when the development ability of the network loan platform is uncertain. To be sure, the government should adjust the incentive intensity of economic performance task according to the dependence of incentive cost between economic performance and development ability, and enhance the development ability of network loan platform. Therefore, the government should adopt different incentive schemes according to the market environment, growth period and scale of the net loan platform, so as to realize the effective incentive to the network loan platform.
【作者單位】： 濟(jì)南大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社科基金項(xiàng)目(16BJY016) 山東省自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(ZR2012GL01)
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F832.4
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本文編號(hào)：2394258