【摘要】：運用多任務(wù)代理模型,將財務(wù)績效和發(fā)展能力作為政府(委托人)激勵P2P網(wǎng)貸平臺(代理人)發(fā)展的兩個維度,分析政府對網(wǎng)貸平臺的最優(yōu)激勵契約,以及網(wǎng)貸平臺在經(jīng)濟績效與發(fā)展能力兩項任務(wù)的激勵優(yōu)化問題。研究表明,當網(wǎng)貸平臺發(fā)展能力不確定性較大時,政府應(yīng)該增加監(jiān)督成本,完善相關(guān)法律法規(guī),增加信息透明度,提高激勵效力。誠然,政府應(yīng)當依據(jù)經(jīng)濟績效和發(fā)展能力兩項任務(wù)之間激勵成本的依存關(guān)系,調(diào)整對經(jīng)濟績效任務(wù)的激勵強度,提升網(wǎng)貸平臺的發(fā)展能力。因此,政府應(yīng)該針對網(wǎng)貸平臺的市場環(huán)境、成長時期和規(guī)模,采取不同的激勵方案,從而實現(xiàn)對網(wǎng)貸平臺的有效激勵。
[Abstract]:Using the multi-task agent model, the financial performance and development ability are regarded as the two dimensions of government (principal) incentive P2P network loan platform (agent) development, and the government's optimal incentive contract to the network loan platform is analyzed. And the incentive optimization problem of the net loan platform in the two tasks of economic performance and development ability. The research shows that the government should increase the supervision cost, perfect the relevant laws and regulations, increase the information transparency and improve the incentive effectiveness when the development ability of the network loan platform is uncertain. To be sure, the government should adjust the incentive intensity of economic performance task according to the dependence of incentive cost between economic performance and development ability, and enhance the development ability of network loan platform. Therefore, the government should adopt different incentive schemes according to the market environment, growth period and scale of the net loan platform, so as to realize the effective incentive to the network loan platform.
【作者單位】： 濟南大學商學院;
【基金】：國家社科基金項目(16BJY016) 山東省自然科學基金項目(ZR2012GL01)
【分類號】：F724.6;F832.4
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本文編號：2394258