【摘要】：我國自1990年上海證券交易所和深證證券交易所建立以來,不到三十年時間的發(fā)展對我國經(jīng)濟和國有企業(yè)的改革起到了很大的推動作用。西方發(fā)達國家的資本市場用三百多年的時間發(fā)展完善,而我國在短時間內(nèi)的迅速發(fā)展帶來了經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的同時也暴露出很多的問題。這其中,公司治理問題逐漸成為近些年來國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)注的熱點,也是我國上市公司和我國法律制度亟待完善的方面。 本文基于對中國退市企業(yè)的綜合整理,對中國上市公司的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)進行研究,旨在分析公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對上市企業(yè)退市的影響。本文首先分別對國內(nèi)外關(guān)于退市和公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的文獻進行闡述,并從退市企業(yè)的個案研究和中間指標兩方面分析退市與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的聯(lián)系。其次,對我國退市制度的發(fā)展、我國47家退市企業(yè)的特征和公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的模式及現(xiàn)狀進行介紹,為下文實證分析奠定基礎(chǔ)。再次,進行實證研究設(shè)計。從董事會特征、監(jiān)事會特征、股權(quán)特征和外聘審計機構(gòu)四方面提出假設(shè),構(gòu)建一元分析模型和多元分析模型,在多元分析模型中采用是probit二值選擇模型進行定性分析。通過篩選36家仍在正常上市的公司作為36家已退市企業(yè)的控制樣本,本文對公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對我國上市公司退市進行實證研究。 研究結(jié)果表明：(1)在本文考慮的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)因素中,外部董事、董事長和總經(jīng)理兼任情況、第一大股東持股比例、國家控股比例和外部審計機構(gòu)更換個數(shù)與上市公司的退市概率有顯著影響。(2)每年董事會會議次數(shù)、第二至第十大股東持股比例和境外持股情況對上市公司的經(jīng)營管理也有影響但不顯著。(3)我國上市公司特別是中小企業(yè)的董事會和監(jiān)事會在形式上較完善,但在實際經(jīng)營管理中并未發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的管理、監(jiān)管職能。因此,在我國當前形勢下,我國證券監(jiān)管部門、上市公司和投資者都應(yīng)充分利用有顯著影響的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)因素。相關(guān)部門應(yīng)進一步完善相關(guān)的法律法規(guī),加強對上市公司的監(jiān)管,上市公司和投資者也應(yīng)加強對公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的重視,逐步改善如董事會、監(jiān)事會流于形式的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)缺陷,從而降低上市公司退市風險、保護投資者的利益并保證上市公司的長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Since the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1990, the development of the stock exchange in less than 30 years has played a great role in promoting the reform of China's economy and state-owned enterprises. The capital market of the western developed countries has been developed and perfected for more than three hundred years, but the rapid development of our country in a short period of time has brought about the economic development and exposed a lot of problems. Among them, corporate governance has gradually become the focus of attention of domestic and foreign scholars in recent years, and it is also an urgent need to improve our listed companies and our legal system. Based on the comprehensive arrangement of delisting enterprises in China, this paper studies the corporate governance structure of Chinese listed companies in order to analyze the influence of corporate governance structure on the delisting of listed enterprises. At first, this paper expounds the literature about delisting and corporate governance structure at home and abroad, and analyzes the relationship between delisting and corporate governance structure from the two aspects of case study and intermediate index of delisting enterprises. Secondly, the development of China's delisting system, the characteristics of 47 delisting enterprises and the mode and present situation of corporate governance structure are introduced, which lays a foundation for the empirical analysis below. Thirdly, empirical research design is carried out. From four aspects of board characteristics, board of supervisors characteristics, equity characteristics and external audit institutions, this paper puts forward the hypothesis, and constructs a univariate analysis model and a multivariate analysis model. In the multivariate analysis model, the probit binary selection model is used to carry out qualitative analysis. By selecting 36 listed companies as the control samples of 36 delisted companies, this paper makes an empirical study on the corporate governance structure of the delisting of listed companies in China. The results show that: (1) among the factors of corporate governance structure considered in this paper, the external directors, chairman and general manager hold the same positions, the proportion of the largest shareholders holding shares, The proportion of state holding and the number of external audit institutions have a significant impact on the probability of delisting of listed companies. (2) the number of board meetings per year, The second to the tenth shareholder's shareholding ratio and the overseas stock holding situation also have the influence to the listed company's management, but not remarkable. (3) the board of directors and the supervisory board of our country listed company, especially the small and medium-sized enterprises, are more perfect in form. But in the actual management has not played the proper management, the supervisory function. Therefore, under the current situation of our country, the securities supervision department, the listed company and the investor should make full use of the significant influence factors of the corporate governance structure. The relevant departments should further improve the relevant laws and regulations, strengthen the supervision of the listed companies, and the listed companies and investors should also pay more attention to the corporate governance structure, and gradually improve, for example, the board of directors, The board of supervisors is merely a defect of corporate governance structure, which can reduce the risk of delisting of listed companies, protect the interests of investors and ensure the long-term and stable development of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

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