【摘要】：財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告作為上市公司對(duì)外信息披露的最主要形式,是投資者了解上市公司財(cái)務(wù)狀況、經(jīng)營(yíng)成果和現(xiàn)金流量的主要途徑。高質(zhì)量的信息披露可以降低資本市場(chǎng)各參與者間的信息不對(duì)稱程度,有利于經(jīng)濟(jì)資源的有效配置。然而,日益泛濫的財(cái)務(wù)重述干擾了會(huì)計(jì)信息需求者對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的閱讀和理解,對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息的有效披露提出了嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)。已有的研究文獻(xiàn)表明,財(cái)務(wù)重述對(duì)證券、投資者及企業(yè)有嚴(yán)重后果,導(dǎo)致巨大的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值損失、投資者信心下降和資本成本上升。 本文采用了規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,選取2010年-2012年間發(fā)布財(cái)務(wù)重述公告的滬深兩市A股上市公司為樣本,在梳理相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,利用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和行為學(xué)理論,結(jié)合我國(guó)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)重述、債務(wù)融資以及其他制度環(huán)境,運(yùn)用邏輯回歸和線性回歸模型,對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)重述對(duì)銀行貸款契約中的價(jià)格條款及非價(jià)格條款的影響進(jìn)行了理論分析和實(shí)證研究,得出的主要結(jié)論有：(1)財(cái)務(wù)重述后重述公司獲得的銀行貸款利率會(huì)上升、銀行貸款總額會(huì)降低、銀行貸款保護(hù)性條款會(huì)趨嚴(yán),而銀行貸款期限在財(cái)務(wù)重述前后差異并不顯著。(2)進(jìn)一步,本文區(qū)分重述企業(yè)的所有權(quán)性質(zhì)及其所處制度環(huán)境研究了財(cái)務(wù)重述對(duì)銀行貸款契約的影響,結(jié)果表明,財(cái)務(wù)重述會(huì)使國(guó)有和非國(guó)有上市公司的貸款利率增加、貸款保護(hù)性條款更嚴(yán)格,而國(guó)有上市公司財(cái)務(wù)重述前后獲得的銀行貸款總額沒有顯著差異,非國(guó)有上市公司財(cái)務(wù)重述后獲得的銀行貸款總額則顯著減少；財(cái)務(wù)重述會(huì)使所有地區(qū)上市公司的貸款利率都增加,而相比于處于制度環(huán)境好的地區(qū)的上市公司,處于制度環(huán)境差的地區(qū)的上市公司發(fā)生財(cái)務(wù)重述會(huì)使其銀行貸款總額減少、貸款保護(hù)性條款趨嚴(yán)。
[Abstract]:As the most important form of information disclosure of listed companies, financial report is the main way for investors to understand the financial situation, operating results and cash flow of listed companies. High quality information disclosure can reduce the degree of information asymmetry among the participants in the capital market and is beneficial to the effective allocation of economic resources. However, the increasingly widespread financial restatement interferes with the reading and understanding of the financial report by the accounting information demanders, and poses a severe challenge to the effective disclosure of the accounting information. The existing research literature shows that financial restatement has serious consequences on securities, investors and enterprises, resulting in huge loss of market value, falling investor confidence and rising cost of capital. This paper adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research, selects the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares that issued the financial restatement announcement from 2010 to 2012 as samples, combing the relevant literature, using economics and behavior theory. Combined with the financial restatement, debt financing and other institutional environment of listed companies in China, the logical regression model and linear regression model are used. The influence of financial restatement on price clause and non-price clause in bank loan contract is analyzed theoretically and empirically. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) after the financial restatement, the interest rate of bank loans obtained by the company will rise, the total amount of bank loans will decrease, and the protective provisions of bank loans will become stricter. However, the bank loan term is not significantly different before and after the financial restatement. (2) further, this paper studies the influence of the financial restatement on the bank loan contract by distinguishing the ownership nature of the restatement enterprise and its institutional environment. The financial restatement will increase the interest rate of the state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies and tighten the protective terms of the loans. However, there is no significant difference in the total amount of bank loans received by the state-owned listed companies before and after the financial restatement. The total amount of bank loans obtained by non-state-owned listed companies after financial restatement decreased significantly; The financial restatement will increase the loan interest rate of the listed companies in all regions, but compared with the listed companies in the areas with good institutional environment, the financial restatement of the listed companies in the areas with poor institutional environment will reduce the total amount of bank loans. The loan protection clause was tightened.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4;F275

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