【摘要】：我國上市公司普遍存在“一股獨大”、股權(quán)高度集中的問題,大股東往往具有侵占中小股東利益的動機(jī),為了使中小投資者的利益得到更好的維護(hù),獨立董事制度被引入。然而現(xiàn)實中,獨立董事的獨立性備受爭議。鑒于投資者很難觀察到董事會內(nèi)部的決策過程,只能通過獨立董事行為來判斷公司狀況,特別是近年來獨立董事辭職潮的出現(xiàn),成為投資者決策的重要依據(jù)。在搜集及查閱相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上發(fā)現(xiàn),現(xiàn)有研究主要從獨立董事辭職的市場反應(yīng)以及個人特征對市場反應(yīng)影響兩方面來進(jìn)行研究,缺少將辭職原因進(jìn)一步劃分,以及從獨立董事功能角度進(jìn)行影響因素的探討,從而形成了本文的研究思路。本文首先對獨立董事辭職非正常辭職行為進(jìn)行界定,在此基礎(chǔ)上,基于信號傳遞理論分析獨立董事非正常辭職行為帶來的市場反應(yīng),并從獨立董事監(jiān)督大股東行為角度,根據(jù)委托代理理論,研究資金占用、關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保、關(guān)聯(lián)交易三個因素對市場反應(yīng)程度的影響,提出研究假設(shè)。用Wind金融數(shù)據(jù)庫中2010年到2014年536個存在獨立董事非正常辭職的A股上市公司樣本,采用事件研究法進(jìn)行研究,在此基礎(chǔ)上建立多元回歸模型進(jìn)行市場反應(yīng)影響因素的實證檢驗。通過理論分析和數(shù)據(jù)驗證,結(jié)果表明:外部投資者對獨立董事非正常辭職行為反應(yīng)消極信號,平均異常收益率和平均累計異常收益率均為負(fù)值,且持續(xù)較長時間;進(jìn)一步劃分不同辭職原因發(fā)現(xiàn),投資者對因個人原因造成的獨立董事辭職事件最為敏感;存在資金占用、關(guān)聯(lián)交易、關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保這三類大股東代理行為的公司,投資者對獨立董事非正常辭職行為的市場反應(yīng)更為強(qiáng)烈。另外,為了結(jié)果的準(zhǔn)確性,還進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗,所得結(jié)果與市場模型一致,說明結(jié)論是可信的。本文的結(jié)論為公司改善治理水平提供借鑒意義,同時為監(jiān)管部門完善獨立董事制度以及實行有效監(jiān)督提供證據(jù)支持。
[Abstract]:In order to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors, the independent director system is introduced in order to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors, because of the problem of "one share is dominant" and the stock rights are highly concentrated in the listed companies of our country, and the major shareholders often have the motive of encroaching on the interests of small and medium shareholders. However, in reality, the independence of independent directors is controversial. Since it is difficult for investors to observe the decision-making process within the board of directors, it is only through the behavior of independent directors that they can judge the situation of the company, especially the emergence of the tide of resignation of independent directors in recent years, which has become an important basis for investors to make decisions. On the basis of collecting and consulting relevant literature, it is found that the existing studies mainly focus on the market reaction of the resignation of independent directors and the influence of individual characteristics on the market reaction, and the lack of further division of the reasons for resignation. And from the independent director's function angle carries on the influence factor discussion, thus formed this research thought. This paper first defines the abnormal resignation behavior of independent directors, and based on this, analyzes the market reaction caused by the abnormal resignation of independent directors based on signal transmission theory, and from the angle of independent directors' supervision of the behavior of large shareholders, it analyzes the market reaction caused by the abnormal resignation of independent directors based on the theory of signal transmission. According to the principal-agent theory, this paper studies the influence of three factors on the market reaction degree, such as capital occupation, affiliated guarantee and related party transaction, and puts forward the research hypothesis. From 2010 to 2014, 536 samples of A-share listed companies with abnormal resignation of independent directors in Wind financial database were used to study them. On the basis of this, a multivariate regression model was established to test the influencing factors of market reaction. Through theoretical analysis and data verification, the results show that: external investors react to the abnormal resignation of independent directors, the average abnormal rate of return and the average cumulative abnormal rate of return are both negative, and continue for a long time; Further divided into different resignation reasons found that investors are most sensitive to the resignation of independent directors caused by personal reasons; There are three kinds of agency behavior of large shareholders, such as capital occupation, related party transaction and related party guarantee, and investors react more strongly to the abnormal resignation of independent directors in the market. In addition, for the accuracy of the results, the robustness test is carried out, and the results are consistent with the market model, which shows that the conclusions are credible. The conclusion of this paper provides reference significance for the improvement of corporate governance, and provides evidence support for the supervision department to perfect the independent director system and to carry out effective supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F271;F832.51
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本文編號：2299734