本文選題：管理者過(guò)度自信 + 企業(yè)績(jī)效��； 參考：《西華大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：從20世紀(jì)50年代Modigliani提出MM理論以來(lái),各種財(cái)務(wù)理論層出不窮,例如Berle(1932)提出了公司治理理論,Krause(1973)提出了權(quán)衡理論,Jensen(1976)提出代理成本理論,Ross(1977)信息不對(duì)稱理論,Aghion(1992)的公司控制權(quán)理論。這些財(cái)務(wù)理論都認(rèn)為企業(yè)的決策者是理性的,他們會(huì)依據(jù)利益最大化的原則制定政策,也能夠及時(shí)獲取和處理市場(chǎng)信息,采取最理性、最合理的措施。但是,隨著國(guó)內(nèi)外財(cái)務(wù)研究的深入,這些基于理性人假設(shè)的研究結(jié)論遭到了學(xué)術(shù)界越來(lái)越多的懷疑與批判。因此,國(guó)外的心理學(xué)或者經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)專家基于管理者“非理性人”的假設(shè),嘗試將新的研究范式引入財(cái)務(wù)研究中,豐富和改進(jìn)了這些傳統(tǒng)的財(cái)務(wù)理論。近年,高級(jí)管理者的“非理性”現(xiàn)象逐漸成為了各學(xué)科的研究熱點(diǎn)。管理者過(guò)度自信是指管理層中有相當(dāng)一部分人會(huì)以自我為中心,高估自己的知識(shí)、信息獲取等能力,自信認(rèn)為可以獲取成功。隨著管理者過(guò)度自信理論不斷深入的研究,財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)領(lǐng)域開(kāi)始去研究管理者過(guò)度自信與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的相互作用和結(jié)果。目前學(xué)術(shù)界三種觀點(diǎn):管理者過(guò)度自信與企業(yè)績(jī)效正相關(guān)、負(fù)相關(guān)或者不存在明顯的相關(guān)性。另外,相關(guān)研究都證明了董事會(huì)治理會(huì)顯著影響企業(yè)整體的運(yùn)行、績(jī)效和發(fā)展。Vance(1968)認(rèn)為獨(dú)立董事比例與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間是反向關(guān)系,但內(nèi)部董事所占比例與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間是正向關(guān)系。不過(guò),這些研究中都很少會(huì)考慮到管理層的心理狀態(tài),我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在實(shí)際情境中,管理層會(huì)比較容易出現(xiàn)過(guò)度自信的現(xiàn)象,甚至這種自信會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重的影響。通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于管理者過(guò)度自信、企業(yè)績(jī)效和董事會(huì)治理結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行回顧和分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)很少有學(xué)者將董事會(huì)治理作為管理者過(guò)度自信-企業(yè)績(jī)效的“中間橋梁”,所以本研究確立以此為切入點(diǎn),將董事會(huì)治理納入因素研究之中,以期能夠豐富國(guó)內(nèi)關(guān)于管理者過(guò)度自信對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效影響機(jī)制的學(xué)術(shù)成果。在前人的研究成果之上精選衡量指標(biāo),完整收集上市企業(yè)有效數(shù)據(jù),并進(jìn)行了數(shù)據(jù)的描述性分析、相關(guān)性分析和回歸分析。通過(guò)實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn):管理者過(guò)度自信與企業(yè)績(jī)效的關(guān)系是正向的;董事會(huì)規(guī)模越大,管理者過(guò)度自信和企業(yè)績(jī)效的正向關(guān)系越弱;獨(dú)立董事比例越大,管理者過(guò)度自信和企業(yè)績(jī)效的正向關(guān)系越弱;董事會(huì)越勤勉,管理者過(guò)度自信和企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的正向關(guān)系越弱。根據(jù)研究結(jié)果,筆者提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議:在企業(yè)聘用企業(yè)管理者時(shí)注重考查其心理特征;控制企業(yè)董事會(huì)規(guī)模;控制獨(dú)立董事比例;增加事前董事會(huì)會(huì)議的次數(shù),使董事會(huì)會(huì)議真正的發(fā)揮事前監(jiān)督作用。希望這些建議能為實(shí)際的企業(yè)管理策略所參考。
[Abstract]:Since Modigliani put forward MM theory in 1950s, various financial theories have emerged in endlessly. For example, Berle (1932) put forward corporate governance theory. Krause (1973) put forward a tradeoff theory. Jensen (1976) put forward agent cost theory and Ross (1977) information asymmetry theory and Aghion (1992) theory of corporate control rights. These financial theories hold that the decision-makers of enterprises are rational, they will make policies according to the principle of maximization of interests, they can also obtain and deal with market information in time, and take the most rational and reasonable measures. However, with the development of financial research at home and abroad, these conclusions based on rational man hypothesis have been more and more doubted and criticized by academic circles. Therefore, foreign psychology or economics experts try to introduce new research paradigm into financial research based on the assumption of "irrational people" of managers, which enriches and improves these traditional financial theories. In recent years, the "irrational" phenomenon of senior managers has gradually become the research hotspot of various disciplines. Management overconfidence refers to the management of a considerable number of people will be self-centered, overestimated their own knowledge, access to information and other abilities, confidence that can achieve success. With the further study of the theory of manager overconfidence, the financial accounting field begins to study the interaction and results between manager overconfidence and enterprise performance. At present, there are three viewpoints in academic circles: manager overconfidence is positively correlated with firm performance, negative correlation or no obvious correlation. In addition, relevant studies have proved that board governance can significantly affect the operation of the enterprise as a whole, performance and development. Vance (1968) believes that the proportion of independent directors and corporate performance is a reverse relationship, However, the proportion of internal directors and corporate performance is a positive relationship. However, these studies rarely consider the psychological state of management, we find that in the actual situation, management will be prone to the phenomenon of overconfidence, and even this confidence will have a serious impact on corporate performance. Based on the review and analysis of the literature on manager overconfidence, corporate performance and the governance structure of the board of directors at home and abroad, It is found that few scholars regard board governance as the "intermediate bridge" between managers' overconfidence and enterprise performance, so this study takes board governance as a starting point and brings board governance into the study of factors. In order to enrich the domestic academic achievements about the influence mechanism of manager overconfidence on enterprise performance. Based on the former research results, the effective data of listed enterprises are collected, and the descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis of the data are carried out. The empirical study shows that the relationship between manager overconfidence and enterprise performance is positive; the larger the board size, the weaker the positive relationship between manager overconfidence and firm performance; the larger the proportion of independent directors, the greater the positive relationship between manager overconfidence and enterprise performance. The stronger the positive relationship between manager overconfidence and firm performance, the weaker the positive relationship between manager overconfidence and firm performance. According to the results of the study, the author puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions: pay attention to the psychological characteristics of the enterprise managers, control the size of the enterprise board of directors, control the proportion of independent directors, increase the number of prior board meetings. Enable the board meeting to play a real supervisory role in advance. I hope these suggestions can be used as a reference for the actual enterprise management strategy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.91;F832.51

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