本文選題：股權(quán)控制 + 股權(quán)制衡　； 參考：《安徽財經(jīng)大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：基于現(xiàn)代公司制企業(yè)特征的委托代理理論認為,提高公司績效我們首先需要解決兩個問題：一是委托人(股東)和代理人(經(jīng)理人員)之間的沖突；二是大股東和中小股東之間的利益沖突。這兩類代理問題是分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司績效之間關(guān)系的理論基礎。為了解決上述兩類代理問題,我們需要采取一定的激勵和約束手段,使得上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)達到最優(yōu),從而提高上市公司的績效水平。但以往學者關(guān)于股權(quán)控制、股權(quán)制衡以及公司績效之間關(guān)系的研究還沒有達成一致,因此,深入研究以上三者之間的關(guān)系,具有一定的理論現(xiàn)實意義。本文正是對以上三者之間的關(guān)系進行理論和實證分析,同時在本文的最后給出了對應的政策建議。 由于我國國情的特殊性,上市公司大多數(shù)是由國有企業(yè)改制而來,這樣就會導致一股獨大等現(xiàn)象的存在,對上市公司的業(yè)績水平產(chǎn)生負面影響。因此本文希望通過一定的理論與實證研究,試圖找到一種最有股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),從而能夠有效地解決兩類委托代理問題,實現(xiàn)公司績效最大化。本文通過一定的理論分析,并在文章的后半部分通過因子分析、回歸分析,t檢驗,最終得出以下結(jié)論：(1)股權(quán)控制和公司績效間呈N型曲線關(guān)系；(2)公司績效與前五大股東持股比例呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,公司績效與赫芬達爾指數(shù)H5負相關(guān)關(guān)系,即前五大股東持股較分散,持股比例差距較小時,公司績效越好；(3)公司績效與股權(quán)制衡度呈倒U型關(guān)系,即適當?shù)墓蓹?quán)制衡程度有利于使得公司績效達到最大化。 本文共分為五個章節(jié),各章節(jié)的劃分是按照以下的思路展開的。第一章緒論,主要介紹了本選題選題背景、選題意義,然后寫的是國內(nèi)外文獻綜述,通過對國內(nèi)外文獻的學習闡述造成學者們研究結(jié)論沒有達成一致的原因,并在此基礎上提出問題,同時在本章的最后提出的本文的框架以及研究方法。第二章介紹的有關(guān)股權(quán)控制、股權(quán)制衡與公司績效的理論基礎。主要介紹了相關(guān)概念以及它們的度量指標。第三章寫的是股權(quán)控制、股權(quán)制衡與公司績效的作用機理分析,本章介紹了相關(guān)理論,并闡述了相關(guān)的經(jīng)濟學理論的定義,然后詳細的介紹了股權(quán)控制、股權(quán)制衡與公司績效三者之間的關(guān)系。第四章是實證分析,介紹了數(shù)據(jù)的來源、指標的選取、研究假說。第五章是研究結(jié)論與政策建議,文中通過因子分析、描述性統(tǒng)計以及回歸分析的方法對上一章的研究假說進行了檢驗,并對實證結(jié)果進行了分析。并在最后系統(tǒng)的概括了本文的研究結(jié)果并在此基礎上提出了相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent theory based on the characteristics of modern corporate enterprises holds that to improve corporate performance we need to solve two problems: one is the conflict between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager); Second, there is a conflict of interest between major shareholders and minority shareholders. These two kinds of agency problems are the theoretical basis of analyzing the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. In order to solve the above two kinds of agency problems, we need to adopt certain incentives and constraints to optimize the equity structure of listed companies and improve the performance level of listed companies. However, previous researches on the relationship among equity control, equity checks and balances and corporate performance have not reached agreement. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the relationship between the above three. This paper makes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between the above three and gives corresponding policy recommendations at the end of this paper. Because of the particularity of China's national conditions, most of the listed companies come from the reform of state-owned enterprises, which will lead to the existence of a dominant phenomenon, which has a negative impact on the performance level of listed companies. Therefore, this paper hopes to find one of the most effective ownership structure through some theoretical and empirical research, so as to effectively solve the two kinds of principal-agent problems and realize the maximization of corporate performance. In this paper, through a certain theoretical analysis, and in the second half of the article through factor analysis, regression analysis and t test, the following conclusion is drawn: 1) the relationship between equity control and corporate performance is N-shaped curve; (2) there is a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of the top five shareholders, and a negative correlation between corporate performance and H5, that is, the first five shareholders are more dispersed, and the smaller the gap is, the better the corporate performance; 3) the relationship between corporate performance and equity balance is inversely U-shaped, that is, a proper degree of equity balance is conducive to maximizing corporate performance. This paper is divided into five chapters, each chapter is divided according to the following ideas. The first chapter is introduction, which mainly introduces the background of this topic, the significance of the topic, and then the literature review at home and abroad, through the study of domestic and foreign literature to explain the reasons why scholars did not reach a consensus. At the end of this chapter, the frame and research method of this paper are put forward. The second chapter introduces the theoretical basis of equity control, equity balance and corporate performance. This paper mainly introduces the related concepts and their metrics. The third chapter describes the mechanism of equity control, equity checks and balances and corporate performance, this chapter introduces the relevant theories, and describes the definition of relevant economic theory, and then introduces the ownership control in detail. The relationship between equity balance and corporate performance. The fourth chapter is empirical analysis, introduces the source of the data, the selection of indicators, research hypothesis. The fifth chapter is the conclusion of the research and policy recommendations, the paper through factor analysis, descriptive statistics and regression analysis methods to test the hypothesis of the previous chapter, and the empirical results were analyzed. Finally, the research results are summarized systematically and the relevant policy recommendations are put forward.
【學位授予單位】：安徽財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.5;F832.51

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