發(fā)布時間：2018-03-24 18:24

  本文選題：盈余管理　切入點(diǎn)：終極控制權(quán)　出處：《江蘇師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：盈余管理問題,不僅是公司財(cái)務(wù)會計(jì)領(lǐng)域的研究課題,也是公司治理領(lǐng)域的研究課題,倍受學(xué)術(shù)界的關(guān)注。大量研究表明,我國上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)高度集中,并且存在終極控股股東,公司終極控股股東以較少現(xiàn)金流權(quán)獲取較大控制權(quán),導(dǎo)致其更有動機(jī)和能力攫取其他股東的利益。同時,產(chǎn)品市場競爭日趨激烈,直接或間接影響著公司的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營決策�；诖�,本文嘗試將作為公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)內(nèi)容中的終極控制權(quán)與作為公司外部治理機(jī)制內(nèi)容中的產(chǎn)品市場競爭納入統(tǒng)一框架,探尋兩者對公司盈余管理的影響。本文在梳理國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,對盈余管理進(jìn)行了理論透視,且分別對終極控制權(quán)影響盈余管理、產(chǎn)品市場競爭影響盈余管理進(jìn)行了理論分析。實(shí)證研究樣本來自2010~2015年我國A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù),經(jīng)過剔除后共選取1203家上市公司,共計(jì)7218個研究樣本,并依據(jù)終極控股股東性質(zhì)區(qū)分了國有和非國有樣本,且從應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)活動盈余兩個角度測度盈余管理程度,從行業(yè)內(nèi)與行業(yè)間兩個角度衡量產(chǎn)品市場競爭程度。在此基礎(chǔ)上,將實(shí)證分析分為三大部分,分別提出假設(shè)、構(gòu)建多個多元回歸方程、進(jìn)行回歸結(jié)果分析、穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn),以期較為系統(tǒng)地研究終極控制權(quán)對盈余管理的影響、產(chǎn)品市場競爭對盈余管理的影響以及終極控制權(quán)和產(chǎn)品市場競爭的交互作用對盈余管理的影響。通過實(shí)證研究,得到以下結(jié)論:第一,終極控股股東擁有的控制權(quán)比例越高,公司的盈余管理程度越高;第二,終極控股股東的兩權(quán)分離程度與公司盈余管理呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系;第三,終極控股股東為非國有的公司,其盈余管理程度高于終極控股股東為國有的公司;第四,公司在行業(yè)內(nèi)擁有的產(chǎn)品市場勢力越強(qiáng),其盈余管理程度越低;第五,具有較高產(chǎn)品市場競爭程度的行業(yè),企業(yè)的盈余管理程度越高;第六,相對于終極控股股東為非國有企業(yè)的公司,行業(yè)內(nèi)的產(chǎn)品市場勢力對國有控股企業(yè)進(jìn)行盈余管理行為的抑制作用更強(qiáng);行業(yè)間的產(chǎn)品市場競爭對國有控股企業(yè)進(jìn)行盈余管理行為的誘發(fā)作用較弱;第七,終極控股股東兩權(quán)分離程度越高,越會削弱產(chǎn)品市場勢力對盈余管理程度的抑制作用;越會加劇行業(yè)間產(chǎn)品市場競爭對公司盈余管理程度的誘發(fā)作用�；谘芯拷Y(jié)論,提出以下對策建議:第一,推行和完善會計(jì)信息披露制度,保障相關(guān)準(zhǔn)則執(zhí)行力度;第二,限制終極控股股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的兩權(quán)分離,縮短企業(yè)間控制鏈條;第三,營造良好的市場競爭氛圍,善于利用產(chǎn)品市場競爭的積極治理作用。
[Abstract]:Earnings management is not only a research topic in the field of corporate finance and accounting, but also a research topic in the field of corporate governance. A large number of studies show that the ownership structure of listed companies in China is highly concentrated. And there are ultimate controlling shareholders, the ultimate controlling shareholders of the company obtain greater control rights with less cash flow right, which leads to its more motive and ability to seize the interests of other shareholders. At the same time, the competition in the product market is becoming more and more fierce. Based on this, this paper attempts to bring into the unified framework the ultimate control right as the content of the internal corporate governance structure and the product market competition as the content of the corporate external governance mechanism. On the basis of combing the relevant literature at home and abroad, this paper makes a theoretical perspective on earnings management, and respectively affects earnings management on the ultimate control right. This paper analyzes the influence of product market competition on earnings management theoretically. The empirical research samples are from the data of A share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2015. After eliminating 1203 listed companies, a total of 7218 research samples are selected. According to the nature of ultimate controlling shareholder, the paper distinguishes state-owned and non-state-owned samples, and measures the degree of earnings management from two angles of accrual earnings management and real activity earnings. On the basis of this, the empirical analysis is divided into three parts. The hypothesis is put forward, multiple regression equations are constructed, the regression results are analyzed, and the robustness test is carried out. In order to systematically study the impact of ultimate control on earnings management, the impact of product market competition on earnings management, and the interaction of ultimate control and product market competition on earnings management. The conclusions are as follows: first, the higher the proportion of control rights owned by the ultimate controlling shareholder, the higher the degree of earnings management; second, the degree of separation of the two rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder is positively related to the earnings management of the company; third, The ultimate controlling shareholder is a non-state-owned company, its earnings management degree is higher than that of the ultimate controlling shareholder company; fourth, the stronger the market power of the company in the industry, the lower the earnings management degree. The higher the degree of earnings management, the higher the degree of earnings management. Sixth, compared to the ultimate controlling shareholder, the company is a non-state-owned enterprise. The product market forces in the industry can restrain the earnings management behavior of the state-owned holding enterprises more strongly; the product market competition among the industries has a weaker effect on the earnings management behavior of the state-owned holding enterprises; seventh, The higher the degree of separation of the ultimate controlling shareholder's two rights, the more it will weaken the restraining effect of the product market power to the earnings management degree, and will aggravate the inducement effect of the product market competition to the earnings management degree of the company. Put forward the following countermeasures and suggestions: first, promote and improve the accounting information disclosure system to ensure the enforcement of relevant standards; second, limit the ultimate controlling shareholder control and cash flow rights separation, shorten the chain of control between enterprises; third, Create a good market competition atmosphere, good at making use of the positive governance role of product market competition.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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