本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股票期權(quán) 委托代理 激勵(lì) 約束　出處：《昆明理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在現(xiàn)代公司治理中,激勵(lì)是一個(gè)核心問題。企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的分離導(dǎo)致委托代理關(guān)系矛盾的產(chǎn)生,股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)被認(rèn)為是減少代理成本,達(dá)到長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)效果的有效手段之一。JL高速公路股份有限公司資產(chǎn)優(yōu)良,收益穩(wěn)定,發(fā)展前景廣闊。但是由于公司存在長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制不健全,在傳統(tǒng)的薪酬分配制度激勵(lì)不當(dāng)?shù)那闆r下,高管人員的工作積極性無法得到有效的調(diào)動(dòng),他們沒有將自身利益與公司長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益結(jié)合起來,進(jìn)而損害公司利益。一種基于在委托代理雙方建立起利益紐帶的長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)方式---股票期權(quán)激勵(lì),能有效的解決公司發(fā)展過程中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)不足的問題。同時(shí),結(jié)合人力資本理論,得出企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者作為較高層次的人力資本,對(duì)其應(yīng)當(dāng)采取復(fù)合型手段來進(jìn)行激勵(lì)的結(jié)論。在企業(yè)實(shí)施激勵(lì)的過程中,應(yīng)當(dāng)多種激勵(lì)方式相結(jié)合,對(duì)人力資本進(jìn)行產(chǎn)權(quán)化界定,分享企業(yè)剩余價(jià)值,從而解決激勵(lì)不足的問題。再次,本文還結(jié)合管理學(xué)中的成就需要理論和公平理論角度對(duì)股票期權(quán)制度進(jìn)行理論擴(kuò)展和補(bǔ)充。隨著我國(guó)股權(quán)分置改革的順利進(jìn)行以及證券市場(chǎng)的逐步完善,政策上進(jìn)一步為JL高速公路股份有限公司實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)提供了有利的外部條件。本文結(jié)合JL高速公路股份有限公司的實(shí)際情況,設(shè)計(jì)一套切實(shí)可行的股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,通過將企業(yè)所有者和經(jīng)營(yíng)者的利益目標(biāo)緊密聯(lián)結(jié)在一起,形成利益共同體,將有利于激發(fā)經(jīng)營(yíng)者工作積極性,約束其不道德行為,為公司的可持續(xù)發(fā)展奠定良好的基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:In modern corporate governance, incentive is a core issue. The separation of enterprise ownership and management right leads to the contradiction of principal-agent relationship, and stock option incentive is considered to reduce agency costs. JL Expressway Co., Ltd. has good assets, stable income and broad development prospects. However, because of the existence of long-term incentive mechanism is not perfect. Under the improper incentive of the traditional salary distribution system, the work enthusiasm of the senior managers can not be effectively mobilized, they do not combine their own interests with the long-term interests of the company. And then damage the interests of the company. A long-term incentive based on the principal-agent to establish the interests of the bond---stock option incentive can effectively solve the problem of the long-term lack of incentive in the process of corporate development. At the same time. Combined with the theory of human capital, this paper draws the conclusion that the enterprise manager, as a higher level of human capital, should adopt compound means to encourage. Should be combined with a variety of incentives to define the property rights of human capital and share the surplus value of enterprises, so as to solve the problem of inadequate incentives. This paper also combines the achievements in management theory and equity theory to expand and supplement the stock option system. With the smooth implementation of the reform of the split share structure and the gradual improvement of the securities market. The policy provides favorable external conditions for JL Expressway Company Limited to implement stock option incentive. This paper combines the actual situation of JL Expressway Co., Ltd. Design a set of feasible stock option incentive scheme, through the enterprise owners and managers of the interests of the objectives closely linked together to form a community of interests, will be conducive to stimulate the enthusiasm of the operator. Restrain its immoral behavior and lay a good foundation for the sustainable development of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：昆明理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F542.6;F724.5;F272.92

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