本文關(guān)鍵詞： 關(guān)聯(lián)交易 公平性 監(jiān)管 上市公司　出處：《陜西師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：目前,在我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展的帶動下,證券市場也迅速發(fā)展起來,關(guān)聯(lián)交易已經(jīng)成為我國上市公司一種常見的交易方式。近些年來,上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易的方式和種類也不斷變化,從關(guān)聯(lián)購銷發(fā)展到資產(chǎn)置換和股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓,還從有形資產(chǎn)交易發(fā)展到無形資產(chǎn)交易,委托經(jīng)營作為過去很少發(fā)生的交易類型現(xiàn)在也開始普遍。關(guān)聯(lián)交易實(shí)際上是一種中性的經(jīng)濟(jì)范疇,公平的關(guān)聯(lián)交易可以有效降低企業(yè)交易成本,提高企業(yè)的運(yùn)營效益,加強(qiáng)市場競爭能力,而且集團(tuán)企業(yè)只要在內(nèi)部做出適當(dāng)?shù)慕灰装才?就有助于集團(tuán)企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤最大化和整體戰(zhàn)略的目標(biāo)。但是由于交易雙方之間的利益關(guān)系,導(dǎo)致關(guān)聯(lián)交易會產(chǎn)生不規(guī)范行為,例如上市公司降低關(guān)聯(lián)交易中的信息披露透明程度,比如公開報(bào)表中的盈余信息；或者在股東董事等內(nèi)部中,利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易在相關(guān)企業(yè)之間進(jìn)行不正當(dāng)?shù)馁Y產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移的現(xiàn)象；還有關(guān)聯(lián)交易中的交易價格問題,這些行為都會造成不公平的關(guān)聯(lián)交易,也稱作“非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易”,傷害中小股東和債權(quán)人的利益。 上市公司“一股獨(dú)大”的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)形式使得控股股東掌握了上市公司的實(shí)際控制權(quán),對其經(jīng)營決策有重要影響,控股股東出于追求利益最大化的目的,操縱上市公司進(jìn)行關(guān)聯(lián)交易。不公平的關(guān)聯(lián)交易侵占了中小投資者的利益,阻礙公司的長期發(fā)展,也影響整個證券市場和資本市場公平、公正的市場秩序,危及國民經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。所以對于關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管和治理就顯得尤為重要,加強(qiáng)對上市公司及其利益關(guān)聯(lián)方行為的規(guī)范和監(jiān)管,有利于廣大中小投資者合法權(quán)益的保護(hù),并且維護(hù)市場秩序的健康發(fā)展。 解決上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易中不公平交易問題的基礎(chǔ)是判定關(guān)聯(lián)交易的公平性。現(xiàn)有的國內(nèi)外研究中對關(guān)聯(lián)交易的界定主要是從法學(xué)的角度研究,由于涉及的法律種類較多,所以并沒有一個統(tǒng)一的得到廣泛認(rèn)可的界定。本文則從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度出發(fā),提出一個可以普遍適用的,可以判斷關(guān)聯(lián)交易公平性的方法,也就是根據(jù)現(xiàn)金流收益和控制權(quán)收益占總收益比例的大小來判斷交易公平與否。運(yùn)用博弈論的方法分析關(guān)聯(lián)交易中利益相關(guān)者之間的利益關(guān)系,發(fā)現(xiàn)監(jiān)管部門監(jiān)督以及次大股東制衡對于不公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管效果明顯,而中小股東的監(jiān)督作用較小,為關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管提供理論支撐。
[Abstract]:At present, with the rapid development of China's market economy, the securities market has also developed rapidly, related party transactions have become a common trading mode of listed companies in China in recent years. The ways and types of related party transactions of listed companies are also constantly changing, from associated purchase and sale to asset replacement and equity transfer, but also from tangible assets transactions to intangible assets transactions. As a kind of transaction that rarely happened in the past, entrustment operation is becoming more and more common. In fact, affiliated transaction is a kind of neutral economic category, and fair related party transaction can effectively reduce the transaction cost of enterprises. Improve the efficiency of the operation of enterprises, strengthen market competitiveness, and the group enterprises as long as the appropriate transaction arrangements. It is helpful for group enterprises to achieve the goal of profit maximization and overall strategy. However, due to the interest relationship between the parties to the transaction, related transactions will produce non-standard behavior. For example, listed companies reduce the transparency of information disclosure in related party transactions, such as earnings information in public statements; Or in the shareholders, directors and other internal, the use of related transactions in the relevant enterprises between the phenomenon of improper transfer of assets; There is also the issue of transaction price in related party transactions, which can result in unfair related party transactions, also known as "unfair related party transactions", which harm the interests of minority shareholders and creditors. The ownership structure of the listed company makes the controlling shareholder master the actual control right of the listed company, which has an important influence on the management decision, and the controlling shareholder pursues the goal of maximizing the profit. Unfair related party transactions encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized investors, hinder the long-term development of the company, but also affect the entire securities market and capital market fair and just market order. Endanger the development of the national economy. So the supervision and governance of related party transactions is particularly important, strengthen the behavior of listed companies and their related parties to regulate and supervise. It is conducive to the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and the healthy development of the market order. The basis of solving the problem of unfair transaction in related party transactions of listed companies is to judge the fairness of related party transactions. The definition of related party transactions in existing domestic and foreign studies is mainly from the perspective of law. Because there are many kinds of laws involved, there is not a unified and widely accepted definition. This paper, from the perspective of economics, puts forward a universally applicable one. The method that can judge the fairness of related party transaction. That is, judging whether the transaction is fair or not according to the proportion of cash flow income and control income to the total income. Using the method of game theory to analyze the interest relationship between the stakeholders in the related party transactions. It is found that the supervision of supervision and the checks and balances of minor shareholders have obvious effect on the supervision of unfair related party transactions, while the supervision of small and medium-sized shareholders has little effect, which provides theoretical support for the supervision of related party transactions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.6;F275;F832.51

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