本文關(guān)鍵詞： 研發(fā)投資 高管薪酬 基于行為的激勵(lì)機(jī)制　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)高級(jí)管理層與股東的委托代理矛盾一直是學(xué)術(shù)界研究的熱點(diǎn)。合理高效的高管薪酬制度可以激勵(lì)和約束公司高管行為,使其實(shí)現(xiàn)股東財(cái)富最大化的目標(biāo),從而解決代理問(wèn)題。研究表明,基于高管行為的薪酬機(jī)制有利于緩解高管與股東的委托代理沖突,并促使高管做出正確的研發(fā)投資決策。將高管薪酬與研發(fā)投資行為而非研發(fā)行為的結(jié)果相聯(lián)系時(shí),會(huì)減少高管們所承擔(dān)的業(yè)績(jī)波動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),使他們更專(zhuān)注于做出正確的研發(fā)投資決策,愿意將公司資源投入能帶來(lái)未來(lái)不確定回報(bào)的投資項(xiàng)目,從而提高公司的科技創(chuàng)新力和公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。本文以中國(guó)上市公司研發(fā)投資與高管薪酬的關(guān)系為研究對(duì)象,探究中國(guó)上市公司基于研發(fā)投資的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制。本文在我國(guó)高管薪酬制度演變與企業(yè)研發(fā)投資關(guān)系分析的基礎(chǔ)上,基于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新理論、委托代理理論、激勵(lì)理論,提出我國(guó)上市公司研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬的影響以及影響高管薪酬研發(fā)強(qiáng)度敏感性的研究假設(shè)。實(shí)證研究時(shí),本文選取了2009年至2012年滬深兩市A股1028家上市公司2077個(gè)研究樣本。通過(guò)構(gòu)建多元回歸模型,本文首先探究企業(yè)研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬是否產(chǎn)生影響,并進(jìn)一步研究在高科技公司、非國(guó)有企業(yè)、公司業(yè)績(jī)優(yōu)良、管理層權(quán)力較小的公司,企業(yè)研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬的影響是否顯著高于非高科技公司、國(guó)有企業(yè)、業(yè)績(jī)差的公司和管理層權(quán)力較大的公司。最后,本文得出結(jié)論,我國(guó)上市公司的研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬有顯著的影響；高科技公司研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬的影響顯著高于非高科技公司；非國(guó)有企業(yè)研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬的影響顯著高于國(guó)有企業(yè)；業(yè)績(jī)優(yōu)良的公司研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬的影響顯著高于業(yè)績(jī)差的公司；管理層權(quán)力大的公司研發(fā)強(qiáng)度對(duì)高管薪酬的影響顯著高于管理層權(quán)力小的公司。國(guó)內(nèi)外僅有的對(duì)于研發(fā)強(qiáng)度與高管薪酬的關(guān)系的研究都致力于將高管薪酬作為自變量,探究高管薪酬對(duì)研發(fā)強(qiáng)度的影響。本文將研發(fā)強(qiáng)度作為影響高管薪酬的因素進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,探究了基于研發(fā)投資的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制,填補(bǔ)了學(xué)術(shù)界研究的空白。同時(shí),前人對(duì)于研發(fā)強(qiáng)度與高管薪酬關(guān)系的研究并未區(qū)分公司的行業(yè)、實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)、業(yè)績(jī)和公司治理特征的影響,本文分別探究了在高科技公司、非國(guó)有企業(yè)、公司業(yè)績(jī)優(yōu)良、管理層權(quán)力較小這四種情況下,企業(yè)研發(fā)投入對(duì)高管薪酬的影響是否顯著高于非高科技公司、國(guó)有企業(yè)、業(yè)績(jī)差的公司和管理層權(quán)力較大的公司,本文的研究成果能啟示不同類(lèi)型的公司因地制宜的制定高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:The contradiction between senior management and stockholders is always a hot topic in academia. A reasonable and efficient executive compensation system can motivate and restrain the behavior of senior executives to achieve the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. In order to solve the agency problem. The research shows that the compensation mechanism based on executive behavior is helpful to alleviate the principal-agent conflict between executives and shareholders. It also urges executives to make the right decision on R & D investment. Linking executive compensation with R & D investment behavior rather than R & D behavior results will reduce the risk of performance volatility. Make them more focused on making the right R & D investment decisions, willing to invest the company's resources in investment projects that will bring future uncertain returns. In order to improve the scientific and technological innovation and competitiveness of the company. This paper focuses on the relationship between R & D investment and executive compensation of listed companies in China. On the basis of the analysis of the relationship between the evolution of the executive compensation system and the R & D investment of enterprises, based on the theory of technological innovation, the principal-agent theory. Incentive theory, put forward the impact of R & D intensity of listed companies on executive compensation and the impact of executive compensation R & D intensity sensitivity of research hypotheses. This paper selects 2077 samples of 1028 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2012, and constructs a multivariate regression model. This paper first explores the impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation, and further studies in high-tech companies, non-state-owned enterprises, companies with good performance, management power is small. Whether the impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation is significantly higher than that of non-high-tech companies, state-owned enterprises, poor performance companies and management power companies. Finally, this paper draws a conclusion. The R & D intensity of listed companies in China has a significant impact on executive compensation; The impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation of high-tech companies is significantly higher than that of non-high-tech companies; The impact of R & D intensity of non-state-owned enterprises on executive compensation is significantly higher than that of state-owned enterprises; The effect of R & D intensity on executive compensation is significantly higher than that of underperformance companies. The impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation is significantly higher in companies with large management power than in those with less management power. The only research on the relationship between R & D intensity and executive compensation at home and abroad is devoted to the study of executive compensation as a self-help. Variable. To explore the impact of executive compensation on R & D intensity. This paper takes R & D intensity as the factor of influencing executive compensation and explores the incentive mechanism based on R & D investment. At the same time, the former research on the relationship between R & D intensity and executive compensation is not the regional branch of the industry, the actual control of the nature of people, performance and corporate governance characteristics of the impact. This paper explores whether R & D investment has a significantly higher impact on executive compensation in high-tech companies, non-state-owned enterprises, companies with good performance, less management power, whether the impact of corporate R & D investment is significantly higher than that of non-high-tech companies. The research results of this paper can enlighten different types of companies to formulate executive compensation incentive mechanism according to local conditions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F272.92;F832.51

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