發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-21 06:55

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 自由現(xiàn)金流量 代理成本 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 內(nèi)部人控制　出處：《安徽財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：西方發(fā)達(dá)資本主義國家已經(jīng)在實(shí)踐中證實(shí),股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度作為一項(xiàng)重大的激勵(lì)機(jī)制創(chuàng)新,在降低公司所有者和經(jīng)營者之間的代理成本、提升公司價(jià)值和推動經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展等方面發(fā)揮了重要作用。相比在國外取得的巨大成功和廣泛應(yīng)用,股權(quán)激勵(lì)體制在我國的起步較晚。2005年的股權(quán)分置改革,解決了制約中國資本市場發(fā)展的重大制度性缺陷,為股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施掃除了制度層面的障礙。近幾年,隨著有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的法律法規(guī)的出臺,我國的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度走上了規(guī)范化的道路,但是,股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃在我國上市公司,特別是國有公司中的實(shí)施比例相對較低,使股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度這種優(yōu)良的長期激勵(lì)機(jī)制不能為提升我國上市公司的價(jià)值和促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展做出貢獻(xiàn)。學(xué)者們對自由現(xiàn)金流量的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果和股權(quán)激勵(lì)的影響因素都有研究,但是將兩者結(jié)合起來并考慮公司治理機(jī)制對兩者之間關(guān)系的影響的研究很少。以此為啟示,采用規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方式,探討自由現(xiàn)金流量、代理成本與股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃選擇的關(guān)系,以及公司治理機(jī)制對兩者之間關(guān)系的影響,具有一定意義。 在規(guī)范研究部分,對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究成果進(jìn)行了梳理、歸納與整理。同時(shí),對相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行了概述,并結(jié)合理論對自由現(xiàn)金流量、代理成本與股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃選擇的關(guān)系,以及公司治理機(jī)制對自由現(xiàn)金流量與股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃選擇關(guān)系的影響進(jìn)行了理論分析,為實(shí)證研究模型的設(shè)計(jì)提供了有力的支撐。在實(shí)證研究部分,選取了2006年至2012年我國A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本。首先,對樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和相關(guān)性分析；然后,對全樣本和國有公司樣本進(jìn)行多元LOGISTIC回歸分析。根據(jù)回歸結(jié)果進(jìn)行比較分析,得出以下研究結(jié)果：(1)自由現(xiàn)金流量越多的上市公司,越不傾向于選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃,對于國有、所處地區(qū)市場化程度低和非兩職合一的公司而言,自由現(xiàn)金流量越多的上市公司,更加不傾向于選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。(2)對于國有公司,市場化程度低、董事會獨(dú)立性低和股權(quán)制衡度低的國有公司,自由現(xiàn)金流量越多,公司更加不傾向于選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。 基于以上研究結(jié)果,可以得出以下啟示：加快市場化進(jìn)程、培育職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場、發(fā)揮銀行的債權(quán)人治理作用、深化國有公司組織關(guān)系改革、強(qiáng)化信息披露機(jī)制、強(qiáng)制現(xiàn)金分紅、完善公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。
[Abstract]:Western developed capitalist countries have confirmed in practice that the equity incentive system as a major incentive mechanism innovation, in reducing the cost of agency between the owner and operator of the company. Compared with the great success and extensive application in foreign countries, the equity incentive system started later in our country. In 2005, the reform of split share structure was carried out. It solves the major institutional defects that restrict the development of China's capital market, and removes the institutional barriers for the implementation of equity incentive. In recent years, with the introduction of laws and regulations on equity incentive system. The equity incentive system of our country has taken the standardized road, however, the proportion of the equity incentive plan in the listed companies, especially the state-owned companies, is relatively low. This fine long-term incentive mechanism can not contribute to the promotion of the value and economic development of listed companies in China. Both the economic consequences of free cash flow and the influencing factors of equity incentive are discussed by scholars. There's research. However, there are few studies on the relationship between the two by combining the two and considering the impact of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between them. This paper uses the combination of normative research and empirical research to explore the free cash flow. The relationship between agency cost and the choice of equity incentive plan, and the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between them are of certain significance. In the normative research part, the related research results at home and abroad are combed, summarized and sorted out. At the same time, the related theories are summarized, and the free cash flow is combined with the theory. The relationship between agency cost and stock incentive plan selection, and the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between free cash flow and equity incentive plan selection are analyzed theoretically. In the part of empirical research, we choose the data of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2012 as the research sample. Descriptive statistical analysis and correlation analysis of sample data; Then, the multivariate LOGISTIC regression analysis of the total sample and the state-owned company sample is carried out. According to the regression results, the following research results: 1) the more the free cash flow is, the more listed companies are. The less inclined to choose the equity incentive plan, for the state-owned companies with low degree of marketization and non-two-position integration, the more free cash flow of listed companies. For state-owned companies with low marketization, low board independence and low equity checks and balances, the more free cash flow. Companies are less inclined to opt for equity incentives. Based on the above research results, we can draw the following enlightenment: speed up the process of marketization, cultivate the market of professional managers, give play to the role of creditor governance of banks, deepen the reform of the organizational relationship of state-owned companies. Strengthen information disclosure mechanism, force cash dividends, and improve the company's internal governance structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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