中國上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移市場反應(yīng)研究
本文關(guān)鍵詞:中國上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移市場反應(yīng)研究 出處:《南京師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
更多相關(guān)文章: 事件研究法 上市公司 控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移 市場反應(yīng)
【摘要】:我國證券市場從20世紀(jì)90年代初起步,歷經(jīng)20多年的發(fā)展,逐步走向成熟。1993年7月的寶延風(fēng)波標(biāo)志著中國控制權(quán)市場的形成,拉開了上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的序幕。它讓大家認(rèn)識到,股票市場的存在并不是以投機(jī)為目的的,而是應(yīng)該形成一個完善的產(chǎn)權(quán)市場,從而幫助資源達(dá)到有效配置。隨著控制權(quán)市場的發(fā)展,學(xué)術(shù)界對控制權(quán)的相關(guān)研究也越來越多,所以對我國控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的市場反應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究有十分重要的意義。 本文采用事件研究法,對我國證券市場在2006-2012年問發(fā)生控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的134個樣本進(jìn)行實證研究,首先是針對總體樣本進(jìn)行研究,其后對樣本按不同的條件分類,具體的分類方式包括1.分年度,2.不同的控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓方式,3.控股股東性質(zhì),4.持股比例,5.兩權(quán)分離度。最后,對控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的長期市場反應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究。 研究結(jié)果表明,從總體市場反應(yīng)來看,CAR顯著為正,控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移給目標(biāo)企業(yè)帶來了顯著為正的累計超額收益率。在分年度市場反應(yīng)數(shù)據(jù)來看,我國控制權(quán)市場存在一定程度的信息提前泄露的現(xiàn)象,以2008-2010年間尤為嚴(yán)重。 對三種主要轉(zhuǎn)移方式進(jìn)行分析的研究結(jié)果顯示三種轉(zhuǎn)移方式均給目標(biāo)企業(yè)帶來了正的累計超額收益率,但不同的控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移方式的效果不同,協(xié)議轉(zhuǎn)讓方式時市場的反應(yīng)最強(qiáng)烈,接著依次是二級市場收購方式與無償轉(zhuǎn)移方式 控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移后為國有控股或民營控股都給口標(biāo)企業(yè)帶來了正的累計超額收益率,但是民營控股的累計超額收益率明顯大于國有控股的累計超額收益率?刂茩(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移后控股股東的持股比例以及兩權(quán)分離度的大小也會對目標(biāo)企業(yè)價值產(chǎn)生一定的影響。適度的股權(quán)集中與適度的兩權(quán)分離度對公司的價值有正的效應(yīng)。 從長期來看,控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移企業(yè)的市場表現(xiàn)優(yōu)于所選取的對比企業(yè),特別是在轉(zhuǎn)移后的3年里,控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移事件從長期來看增加了企業(yè)股東的財富,為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造了價值。
[Abstract]:China's securities market started at the beginning of 1990s, after more than 20 years of development, gradually towards maturity. July 1993 Baoyan storm marked the formation of China's control market. It makes everyone realize that the existence of stock market is not for the purpose of speculation, but should form a perfect property market. With the development of control market, there are more and more researches on control rights in academia. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the market reaction of control transfer in China. This paper uses the event study method to conduct empirical research on 134 samples of control transfer in China's securities market from 2006 to 2012, first of all, the overall sample is studied. Then the samples are classified according to different conditions. The specific classification methods include 1. 2. Different ways of transfer of control. 3. The nature of the controlling shareholder 4. the proportion of holding shares is 5. the degree of separation of two rights. Finally. The long-term market reaction to the transfer of control is studied. The results show that the car is significantly positive from the overall market response, and the transfer of control rights brings significant positive cumulative excess return to the target firm. There is a phenomenon of information leakage in China's control market, especially in 2008-2010. The results of the analysis of the three main transfer modes show that the three transfer methods have brought positive cumulative excess return to the target enterprises, but different transfer of control rights have different effects. The market reaction is strongest when the agreement is transferred, followed by the secondary market acquisition mode and the free transfer mode. After the transfer of control rights for the state-owned holding or private holding have brought positive cumulative excess returns to the mouth mark enterprises. However, the cumulative excess return rate of private holding is obviously higher than that of state-owned holding. After the transfer of control, the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders and the degree of separation of the two rights will also produce a certain amount of value to the target enterprise. Influence. Moderate concentration of equity and proper separation of two rights have positive effects on the value of the company. In the long run, the market performance of the control transfer enterprises is better than that of the selected contrast enterprises, especially in the three years after the transfer, the control transfer events increase the wealth of the shareholders in the long run. Value has been created for the enterprise.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:南京師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F832.51;F271
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