機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率的影響研究
本文關(guān)鍵詞:機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率的影響研究 出處:《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
更多相關(guān)文章: 定向增發(fā) 折價(jià)率 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者類型
【摘要】:自2006年證監(jiān)會(huì)頒布《上市公司證券發(fā)行管理辦法》以來,我國上市公司定向增發(fā)融資金額呈爆發(fā)式增長,定向增發(fā)成為近幾年我國A股上市公司股權(quán)再融資最重要的手段。由于定向增發(fā)具有諸多優(yōu)勢,受到上市公司和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的青睞。相比配股和公開發(fā)行,定向增發(fā)不僅發(fā)行程序簡單、融資門檻及發(fā)行費(fèi)用較低,能夠快速募集資金和置換資產(chǎn),而且還可以為上市公司引入戰(zhàn)略投資者或?qū)崿F(xiàn)整體上市的目的。在定向增發(fā)的案例研究中,各國均發(fā)現(xiàn)定價(jià)折價(jià)率是普遍存在的。國內(nèi)外研究表明,由于受流動(dòng)性、監(jiān)管成本、信息不對(duì)稱、發(fā)行對(duì)象等因素的影響,折價(jià)率的存在是正常的。中國證監(jiān)會(huì)規(guī)定,定向增發(fā)價(jià)格不得低于定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前20個(gè)交易日公司股票平均價(jià)格的90%,即折價(jià)率為10%,但根據(jù)國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究表明私募發(fā)行的折價(jià)率均超過了20%,個(gè)別案例的折價(jià)率甚至達(dá)到了80%,如此高的折價(jià)率不僅會(huì)侵害原有股東的合法權(quán)益,同時(shí)也會(huì)影響證券資本市場的穩(wěn)定。同時(shí)我們時(shí)常能在定向增發(fā)認(rèn)購對(duì)象中發(fā)現(xiàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,特別是近幾年我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)展迅速,QFII、中外合資的投資基金和證券公司也參與到我國的定向增發(fā)認(rèn)購當(dāng)中。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者相比于其他投資者,其在資本規(guī)模、專業(yè)化水平和信息收集能力上有著很大的優(yōu)勢。之前已有文獻(xiàn)研究了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)折價(jià)率的影響,得出的結(jié)論均為當(dāng)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與定向增發(fā)認(rèn)購時(shí),其折價(jià)率較低,但之前的研究只將是否有機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與作為研究變量之一,并未詳細(xì)深入研究其認(rèn)購比例,機(jī)構(gòu)類型等細(xì)分因素的影響。筆者根據(jù)代理理論和信息不對(duì)稱理論,同時(shí)結(jié)合機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的有關(guān)文獻(xiàn),從機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的角度出發(fā),研究其對(duì)定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率的影響。 本文以2011年和2012年成功完成非公開發(fā)行的A股上市公司為樣本,研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)折價(jià)率產(chǎn)生了怎樣的影響。根據(jù)發(fā)行對(duì)象和監(jiān)督效應(yīng)假說,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與定向增發(fā)能在一定程度上減少大股東進(jìn)行利益輸送的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),同時(shí)促進(jìn)認(rèn)購者之間的競爭,提高了定向增發(fā)的定價(jià),實(shí)現(xiàn)了監(jiān)督大股東的目的,從而在很大程度上維護(hù)了自身和中小股東的利益。根據(jù)公司治理理論,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股能夠改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),能對(duì)公司的再融資行為產(chǎn)生監(jiān)督效應(yīng)。因此本文將機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在定向增發(fā)前的持股比例和認(rèn)購的定向增發(fā)股份比例作為研究因素。根據(jù)管理者防御假說,在上市公司進(jìn)行定向增發(fā)時(shí),大股東為避免對(duì)外發(fā)行股份而引起的控制權(quán)分散問題,其傾向于將股份出售給關(guān)系密切的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,這類與大股東關(guān)系密切的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者通常不會(huì)參與公司的管理和監(jiān)督,以便于大股東控制企業(yè)。本文根據(jù)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的異質(zhì)性,將機(jī)構(gòu)投資者分為不同類型,研究不同類型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與定向增發(fā)時(shí)會(huì)對(duì)折價(jià)率產(chǎn)生怎么樣的影響。確定各解釋變量后,本文通過構(gòu)造多元線性回歸模型對(duì)提出的假說進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。 經(jīng)實(shí)證分析得出以下結(jié)論:(1)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與上市公司定向增發(fā)時(shí),折價(jià)率降低;(2)上市公司定向增發(fā)前機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例越大,定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率越低;(3)消極型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與定向增發(fā)則會(huì)提高定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率;(4)證券公司或保險(xiǎn)公司參與定向增發(fā)會(huì)提高定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率,而中外合資投資基金參與認(rèn)購,,則會(huì)降低定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率。本文比較詳細(xì)地分析了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率的影響,對(duì)投資者、上市公司以及證券監(jiān)管部門的決策具有非常積極的意義。
[Abstract]:Since 2006 the Commission promulgated the "administrative measures for the issuance of securities of listed companies", China's Listed Companies in the private placement financing amount was the explosive growth, private placement has become in recent years, China's A shares of equity refinancing of listed companies is the most important means. Because the private placement has many advantages, by the listed companies and institutional investors. Compared to the allotment and public offerings, private placement is not only a simple procedure, low cost and financing threshold issue, can quickly raise funds and replacement of assets, but also the introduction of strategic investors to the listed company or the whole stock market. In the case of private placement in all countries found that the discount rate is the common pricing. The domestic and foreign research shows that due to liquidity, regulatory costs, asymmetric information, influence factors such as the issue of the object, there is the discount rate is normal. The China Securities Regulatory Commission Provisions of the private placement price of 90% or 20 trading days the stock price is lower than the average of the pricing benchmark, the discount rate was 10%, but according to the domestic and foreign related research shows that the private placement discount rate was more than 20%, the individual case of the discount rate even reached 80%, such a high discount rate is not only against the original the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders, but also affect the stability of the capital market securities. At the same time, we can often find the institutional investors in private placement subscription object, especially institutional investors in our country has developed rapidly in recent years, QFII, Sino foreign joint venture investment funds and securities companies are also involved in the issuance of the subscription oriented institutional investors. Compared to other investors, the capital scale, professional level and information collection ability has a great advantage. Before the existing literature on the impact of institutional investors on the discount rate. The conclusion is, when institutional investors in private placement subscription, the discount rate is low, but in the previous study, only whether institutional investors to participate in the study as one of the variables, not with the in-depth study of the impact of institutional subscription ratio type subdivision factors. According to the agency theory and information asymmetry theory, related literature at the same time combined with the institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, starting from the perspective of institutional investors, to study the influence of SEO discount rate on the orientation.
In 2011 and 2012 the successful completion of the non-public offering of A shares of listed companies as the sample of institutional investors has what influence the rate of discount. According to the issue and supervision effect hypothesis, institutional investors in private placement can to some extent reduce the risk of transfer of benefits to large shareholders, while promoting the competition between subscribers and improve the private placement pricing, to achieve the purpose of supervision of large shareholders, so as to maintain their own interests of minority shareholders and to a great extent. According to the theory of corporate governance, institutional investors can improve corporate governance structure, can affect the company's Refinancing Behavior supervision effect. So this paper will orientation of institutional investors in stock the proportion of private placement and before the issuance of the subscription shares as the research factors. According to the management entrenchment hypothesis, private placement of listed companies When large shareholders to avoid foreign shares and control rights caused by the dispersion problem, which tend to be sold to the close relationship between institutional investors, this kind of relationship between large shareholders and institutional investors are usually not closely involved in the management and supervision of the company, in order to facilitate the large shareholder control of enterprise. According to the heterogeneity of institutional investors institutional investors, will be divided into different types, different types of institutional investors in private placement will produce what kind of influence on the discount rate. The explanatory variables, this paper establishes a regression model to test the hypothesis.
Through empirical analysis the following conclusions: (1) institutional investors to participate in the private placement of listed companies, the discount rate decreased; (2) the private placement of listed companies before the proportion of institutional investors holding more private placement discount rate is low; (3) the negative type of institutional investors in private placement will increase the private placement discount rate; (4) the securities company or insurance companies to participate in the private placement will improve the private placement discount rate, and joint investment funds to participate in the subscription, it will reduce the private placement discount rate. The paper analyzed in detail the influence of institutional investors on the orientation, the additional discount rate for investors, has a very positive meaning of listed companies and the securities regulatory authorities the decision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F832.51;F275;F276.6
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前7條
1 任曉暉;;新形勢下上市公司定向增發(fā)再融資淺析[J];金融與經(jīng)濟(jì);2007年04期
2 李青原;論機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在公司治理中角色的定位及政策建議[J];南開管理評(píng)論;2003年02期
3 王永海;王鐵林;李青原;;機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理積極性的分析[J];南開管理評(píng)論;2007年01期
4 劉宇;;定向增發(fā)對(duì)相關(guān)利益體財(cái)富的影響分析[J];證券市場導(dǎo)報(bào);2006年04期
5 鄭琦;;定向增發(fā)對(duì)象對(duì)發(fā)行定價(jià)影響的實(shí)證研究[J];證券市場導(dǎo)報(bào);2008年04期
6 陳政;;非公開發(fā)行折價(jià)、大小股東利益沖突與協(xié)同[J];證券市場導(dǎo)報(bào);2008年08期
7 徐壽福;;上市公司定向增發(fā)公告效應(yīng)及其影響因素研究[J];證券市場導(dǎo)報(bào);2010年05期
本文編號(hào):1430141
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/touziyanjiulunwen/1430141.html