本文關(guān)鍵詞：交叉上市、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余質(zhì)量的關(guān)系研究　出處：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 交叉上市 企業(yè)盈余質(zhì)量 公司治理

【摘要】：我國資本市場還不夠完善,與強(qiáng)勢有效市場的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)還相去甚遠(yuǎn),因而會(huì)計(jì)信息的重要性不言而喻。企業(yè)的所有者、債權(quán)人以及其他利益相關(guān)者都將通過會(huì)計(jì)信息來了解企業(yè)的狀況,獲取有價(jià)值的信息。高質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)盈余信息不僅有助于評(píng)估企業(yè)真實(shí)的收益,而且能夠監(jiān)督管理者的行為,提防道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的下降。但所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離,管理者或多或少地運(yùn)用較為隱秘的會(huì)計(jì)方法以及操縱真實(shí)的會(huì)計(jì)交易等方式,粉飾報(bào)表,使得會(huì)計(jì)信息失真成為一大現(xiàn)象。盈余質(zhì)量作為會(huì)計(jì)信息的重要指標(biāo),在相關(guān)者利用會(huì)計(jì)信息的決策中起到很大的參考意義,更直接的說,對(duì)盈余質(zhì)量的分析將顯著緩解市場中由于委托代理關(guān)系帶來的信息不對(duì)稱性的問題,為投資者更加精準(zhǔn)地預(yù)測被投資單位的經(jīng)營狀況提供可靠依據(jù)。自2014年起,我國正式將企業(yè)年度檢驗(yàn)改為年度報(bào)告公示制度,這一改進(jìn)使更多的投資者能有效快速的獲取企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)狀況,因而對(duì)于企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)盈余質(zhì)量的研究將更具實(shí)際價(jià)值。盈余質(zhì)量問題的產(chǎn)生根源在于不完善的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。作為公司的產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),是企業(yè)管理的核心部分,對(duì)盈余質(zhì)量有著先天性的決定作用。按照股東的持股比例以及股東的類型出發(fā),可將股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)分為股權(quán)集中度與股權(quán)構(gòu)成兩方面。有效的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),將有助于會(huì)計(jì)信息披露的真實(shí)性,保障會(huì)計(jì)盈余信息質(zhì)量。此外,我國上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有其特殊性,選擇合適的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)而提高企業(yè)的的盈余質(zhì)量是相當(dāng)重要的。同時(shí),伴隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的發(fā)展,國際間資本的流動(dòng)加快,更多的企業(yè)傾向于選擇在多個(gè)不同的資本市場實(shí)現(xiàn)上市,形成交叉上市。交叉上市給企業(yè)的治理結(jié)構(gòu)帶來很大影響,從而影響企業(yè)的盈余質(zhì)量。因此,交叉上市行為對(duì)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余質(zhì)量之間的相關(guān)性會(huì)產(chǎn)生深刻的影響,以及面對(duì)更嚴(yán)格的資本市場監(jiān)管,交叉上市企業(yè)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是否會(huì)得到進(jìn)一步的優(yōu)化,這些方面都是值得學(xué)者進(jìn)一步研究的。但可以肯定的是交叉上市將降低企業(yè)的盈余管理,這與交叉上市的企業(yè)處于更加嚴(yán)格監(jiān)督環(huán)境是分不開的。因而本文將著重探討交叉上市、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余質(zhì)量三者之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系。本文從有效市場理論、委托代理理論以及信息不對(duì)稱理論三個(gè)角度出發(fā)探討股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)盈余質(zhì)量的影響,為不同股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)盈余質(zhì)量的影響方向給予解釋。同時(shí),又通過流動(dòng)性假說、投資者假說、信息披露假說以及市場分割假說等理論分析了企業(yè)交叉上市的動(dòng)因�；谶@些理論基礎(chǔ),本文選取2012-2015年間在A+H股實(shí)現(xiàn)交叉上市的企業(yè)作為研究樣本,并且采用一對(duì)一配比的方法(企業(yè)所處行業(yè)相同、樣本年份一致、相匹配企業(yè)年末總資產(chǎn)規(guī)模相近)選取了同樣數(shù)量的僅在A股市場上市的公司作比較對(duì)象,進(jìn)而提出假設(shè)并進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。本文選取股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)構(gòu)成作為研究的解釋變量,以盈余質(zhì)量變量作為因變量,以是否實(shí)現(xiàn)交叉上市作為本文的調(diào)節(jié)變量,同時(shí)設(shè)置公司規(guī)模、凈資產(chǎn)收益率、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率作為本文的控制變量。通過多元回歸分析比較A+H股交叉上市企業(yè)與純A股上市企業(yè)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)盈余質(zhì)量的影響差異,并研討產(chǎn)生結(jié)果不一致的原因。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明:對(duì)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中的股權(quán)制衡度、公眾股持股比例、法人股持股比例以及管理層持股比例指標(biāo),交叉上市在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余質(zhì)量關(guān)系中起到了正向向調(diào)節(jié)作用;對(duì)于股權(quán)集中度以及國有股持股比例兩個(gè)指標(biāo),公司交叉上市行為對(duì)兩者的關(guān)系起到了反向調(diào)節(jié)作用�；谘芯拷Y(jié)論,本文在最后給出相應(yīng)的建議:(1)降低大股東持股比例,助力企業(yè)內(nèi)部權(quán)力制約與平衡;(2)適當(dāng)降低國有股持股比例,推動(dòng)股東類型多樣化;(3)提高法人持股比例,加強(qiáng)股東專業(yè)知識(shí)掌握力度;(4)加強(qiáng)企業(yè)股票流動(dòng)性,提高公眾股持股比例;(5)積極推動(dòng)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度,提高管理層持股比例;(6)完善資本市場,推動(dòng)交叉上市發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:China's capital market is still not perfect, and the strong efficient market standard is also far from the importance of accounting information is self-evident. Business owners, creditors and other stakeholders will use the accounting information to understand the situation of enterprises, to obtain valuable information. High quality accounting information is not only helpful to evaluate the real business returns, and can supervise the management behavior, decrease the moral risk. But beware of the separation of ownership and management, management mode, using accounting methods more or less secretive and manipulation of the real accounting transactions whitewash statements, the distortion of accounting information has become a major phenomenon. As an important indicator of earnings quality of accounting information play, great reference significance by using accounting information in their decision-making, more directly, analysis of earnings quality will significantly slow Solution market due to information asymmetry caused principal-agent problems, for investors to more accurately predict is to provide a reliable basis for investment unit operating conditions. Since 2014, China's official corporate annual inspection to the annual report of the public system, this improvement enables more investors can quickly obtain financial enterprises the status, so research on accounting earnings quality will be more valuable. Causes of earnings quality is the imperfect corporate governance structure. The ownership structure as the foundation of the property rights of the company, is the core part of enterprise management, has a decisive role on congenital earnings quality. According to the proportion of shareholders and the type of shareholders can be divided into the ownership structure, ownership concentration and ownership structure in two aspects. The ownership structure effectively, will be conducive to the accounting information disclosure of the real Security, the quality of accounting information. In addition, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies has its particularity, the appropriate choice of ownership structure and improve enterprise's earnings quality is very important. At the same time, with the development of economic globalization, international capital flows accelerated, more and more enterprises tend to choose from a number of different the capital market listing, the formation of cross listing. Cross listing has great influence to the corporate governance structure, thus affecting the quality of corporate earnings. Therefore, cross listing behavior between ownership structure and earnings quality relationship will have a profound impact, and face more stringent supervision of capital market, whether the ownership structure of cross listing the enterprise will be further optimized, these are worthy of further study. But it is certain that the cross listing will reduce earnings management of enterprises, the In a more strict supervision environment is inseparable with the cross listed companies. So this paper will focus on the cross listing, the relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality of the three. From the efficient market theory, commissioned three aspects of agency theory and asymmetric information theory to explore the influence of ownership structure on earnings quality, explanation effect of different ownership structure on earnings quality direction. At the same time, through the liquidity hypothesis, investors hypothesis, information disclosure hypothesis and market segmentation hypothesis, analysis the motivation of cross listed companies. Based on these theories, this paper selects 2012-2015 years to achieve cross listed companies as research samples in the A+H shares, and a the ratio method (business the same year, the sample, to match the size of the total assets of enterprises at the end of the same or similar) Listed on the A stock market, the number of samples only compare objects, and then put forward the hypotheses and empirical analysis. This paper selects ownership concentration, ownership structure as the explanatory variable, the variable quality of earnings as the dependent variable, whether to cross listing as a moderator of this paper, and set the size of the company, return on net assets rate, asset liability ratio as control variables in this paper. The influence of ownership structure through multiple regression analysis and comparison of A+H shares cross listed companies with pure A A-share listed companies on earnings quality differences, and causes the result is not consistent with research. The empirical results show that: for the equity structure of the equity balance degree, the shareholding ratio of the public shares, legal person shares, management shareholding ratio index, cross listing on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality has played a positive role in the regulation of equity to set; The moderate and the proportion of state-owned shares two indicators, companies cross listing of the relationship between the two plays a negativemoderating effect. Based on the research conclusions, this paper gives some suggestions: (1) reduce the proportion of large shareholders, corporate internal power restriction and balance; (2) appropriate to reduce the proportion of state-owned shares. To promote the shareholder diversification; (3) improve corporate ownership, strengthen shareholder knowledge efforts; (4) strengthen the enterprise stock liquidity, improve the shareholding proportion of public shares; (5) actively promote equity incentive system, improve the management stake; (6) improve the capital market, promote the development of cross listing.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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