本文關(guān)鍵詞：過剩自由現(xiàn)金流和審計質(zhì)量對盈余管理的影響研究　出處：《東華大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：20世紀80年代中期以來,盈余管理逐漸成為公司金融領(lǐng)域最活躍的研究熱點之一,成為近年來監(jiān)管者和法規(guī)制定者關(guān)注的主題。目前,盈余管理廣泛存在于中國上市公司中,然而,該行為會導(dǎo)致會計信息失真,損害到投資者利益。因此,明確盈余管理動機以及如何有效抑制該行為是值得關(guān)注的問題�，F(xiàn)實生活中,企業(yè)充足的自由現(xiàn)金流為經(jīng)理人的在職消費、過度投資等行為創(chuàng)造了條件,經(jīng)理人為了擁有更多的自由現(xiàn)金支配權(quán),較有可能進行有損公司價值的行為。理論上,自由現(xiàn)金流代理成本會引發(fā)經(jīng)理人的盈余管理行為,并且,成長趨勢緩慢卻擁有高自由現(xiàn)金流的公司存在更為嚴重的自由現(xiàn)金流代理成本,但這種過剩自由現(xiàn)金流即低成長企業(yè)擁有的高自由現(xiàn)金流是否更易引發(fā)盈余管理行為仍然有待確定,而且外部獨立審計作為一種監(jiān)督措施,可能會對自由現(xiàn)金流引發(fā)的盈余管理程度產(chǎn)生一定的影響。本文首先對關(guān)于過剩自由現(xiàn)金流、審計質(zhì)量和盈余管理的相關(guān)理論和國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻進行了梳理,分析了過剩自由現(xiàn)金流與盈余管理的相關(guān)性、審計質(zhì)量對盈余管理的作用以及審計質(zhì)量的高低對另兩者之間相關(guān)性的影響。其次,通過對過剩自由現(xiàn)金流、審計質(zhì)量和盈余管理等概念和計量方法的界定,研究對象選擇了2011—2014年我國A股上市公司,研究了擁有高自由現(xiàn)金流的低成長企業(yè)較其他企業(yè)而言,盈余管理程度的差異以及審計質(zhì)量的調(diào)節(jié)作用,以期為有效抑制我國上市公司的盈余管理行為、完善公司治理、提高公司價值提供證據(jù)。本文得出的主要結(jié)論如下:(1)擁有高自由現(xiàn)金流但成長性低的企業(yè)更傾向于進行盈余管理。(2)高的審計質(zhì)量,例如利用“十大”進行審計可以抑制盈余管理。(3)高的審計質(zhì)量對過剩自由現(xiàn)金流引發(fā)的盈余管理程度起到一定的削弱作用。最后,本文根據(jù)理論與實證探究,從加強股東對管理層的監(jiān)督、加強對中介機構(gòu)的外部監(jiān)督以及優(yōu)化事務(wù)所組織結(jié)構(gòu)等方面提出了建議。
[Abstract]:Since the middle of 1980s, earnings management has gradually become one of the most active research hotspots in the field of corporate finance. Earnings management widely exists in Chinese listed companies, however, this behavior will lead to the distortion of accounting information and damage to the interests of investors. Clear earnings management motivation and how to effectively suppress this behavior is a matter of concern. In real life, sufficient free cash flow creates conditions for managers to consume on the job, overinvest and so on. In order to have more free cash control, managers are more likely to harm the value of the company. In theory, free cash flow agency costs will lead to managers' earnings management behavior, and. Companies with slow growth but high free cash flow have more serious free cash flow agency costs. However, whether this excess free cash flow, that is, the high free cash flow owned by low growth enterprises, is more likely to lead to earnings management behavior remains to be determined, and external independent audit is regarded as a kind of supervision measure. May have a certain impact on the degree of earnings management caused by free cash flow. Firstly, this paper reviews the theory of excess free cash flow, audit quality and earnings management, as well as relevant literature at home and abroad. This paper analyzes the correlation between excess free cash flow and earnings management, the effect of audit quality on earnings management and the influence of audit quality on the other two. Secondly, through the analysis of excess free cash flow. Audit quality and earnings management and other concepts and measurement methods defined, the study object of the 2011-2014 A-share listed companies in China. This paper studies the differences of earnings management degree and the regulatory role of audit quality in low growth enterprises with high free cash flow compared with other enterprises in order to effectively restrain earnings management behavior of listed companies in China. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: 1) Enterprises with high free cash flow but low growth tend to carry out earnings management. For example, "Ten" audit can restrain earnings management.) the high audit quality can weaken the surplus management caused by excess free cash flow. Finally. Based on the theoretical and empirical research, this paper puts forward some suggestions on strengthening shareholder supervision over management, strengthening external supervision on intermediary institutions and optimizing the organizational structure of the firm.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F239.4

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本文編號：1399534