本文關(guān)鍵詞：股權(quán)激勵終止和重置及其對代理成本影響的研究，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

浙江工業(yè)大學碩士論文 股權(quán)激勵終止和重置及其對代理成本影響的研究 INCENTIVETERMINATIONAND EQUITY RESETTINGBEH噙?訂ORR正SEARCH Abstract Asinrecent behavioroflisted incentive years，the companyequity is and the incentive increasinglywidespread important,whileequity terminating behavioris too． graduallyincreasing This reviewsthe factorsofChina's to paper determining listed companies terminatethe incentiveandtheinfluenceof the equity plans terminatingequity incentivebehaviortothe costs． company’Sagency This also the ofChinaeselisted paperanalyzes feasibility incentivetermsand someadvisesto equity gives therelativeinstitutional designment． The researchshows downturnof empirical that： 1 the stockmarketindexisthe mainexternalcauseofthe listed incentive company’Sequity plantermination；in shorterthe of addition，the timethe easiertheterminationof listing，the equity the of incentive’effectiononthe incentive． 2 Althoughimplementation equity costsis terminationof agency nonlinear,the incentivewill equity significantly increasethe COSt． agency Sothis forwardthe this paperput policy forwardthe suggestion：Sopaperput the ofnot to policysuggestion：Onpremiseprejudiceexistinginvestors’interests，， incentive shouldbe that ofthebetter equity resetting introduced，SO part performance listed will smooth the corporations incentive implementateequity plan． KEY incentive incentiveterms WORDS：Equity terminating；Agencycosts；Equity stockindex reset；Listedtime；The 萬方數(shù)據(jù) 浙江工業(yè)大學碩士論文 股權(quán)激勵終止和重置及其對代理成本影響的研究 目 錄 1緒論……………………………………………………1 1．1 研究問題的提出……………………………………………………………1 1．1．1選題背景……………………………………………………………1 1．1．2選題意義……………………………………………………

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：股權(quán)激勵終止和重置及其對代理成本影響的研究，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。