本文關鍵詞： 注冊會計師審計 審計質(zhì)量 委托-代理關系 博弈　出處：《北京林業(yè)大學》2008年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】： 目前,上市公司的委托-代理問題以及與審計質(zhì)量的關系問題,已成為我國理論界、資本市場、政府監(jiān)管部門及公司治理所關注的重大課題。本文主要探索了影響注冊會計師審計質(zhì)量的內(nèi)在因素和環(huán)境因素,為用委托代理模型和博弈模型分析審計質(zhì)量提供了理論基礎。 本文采用規(guī)范研究的方法,依托行為理性的基本假設,基于委托-代理視角研究當前我國注冊會計師審計質(zhì)量低下的原因。針對研究主題,提出了兩個問題:一是審計過程中,股東(委托人)、被審計單位與注冊會計師之間的委托-代理關系發(fā)生扭曲的內(nèi)在機制;二是用博弈論的分析方法對審計委托-代理關系中的相互作用機制做了數(shù)理證明。針對這些問題,根據(jù)建立委托人和注冊會計師的博弈模型,揭示了注冊會計師審計質(zhì)量的經(jīng)濟學根源,提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:At present, the principal-agent problem and the relationship between the principal-agent problem and audit quality of listed companies have become the theoretical circle and capital market of our country. This paper mainly explores the internal factors and environmental factors that affect the audit quality of certified public accountants, which provides a theoretical basis for the analysis of audit quality by principal-agent model and game model. Based on the basic hypothesis of behavioral rationality and the perspective of principal-agent, this paper studies the causes of the low audit quality of CPA in China. Two problems are raised: one is the internal mechanism of the distortion of the principal-agent relationship between the audited unit and the CPA in the audit process; The second is the mathematical proof of the interaction mechanism in the audit principal-agent relationship with the method of game theory. In view of these problems, the game model between the principal and CPA is established. This paper reveals the economic root of CPA audit quality and puts forward some policy suggestions.
【學位授予單位】：北京林業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F239.4;F224.32

【引證文獻】

相關碩士學位論文 前1條

1 萬佳;獨立審計對公司真實經(jīng)營業(yè)績影響的研究[D];中南大學;2010年

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本文編號：1531061