本文選題：管理防御 + 管理者特征��； 參考：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股票市場中,股票價格的崩盤對投資者的利益和資本市場的健康有序發(fā)展都形成巨大的打擊�，F(xiàn)有股價崩盤方面的文獻從制度背景、公司治理和市場環(huán)境等角度對股價崩盤的成因做了許多研究。作為公司治理的責任者,管理者在公司的經(jīng)營管理中扮演著重要的角色。在公司內(nèi)、外部控制機制下,管理者選擇有利于維護職位穩(wěn)固和追求自身效用最大化的行為,就是管理防御。管理者出于管理防御的動機,對公司不利消息有選擇地隱瞞,就會形成公司的股價崩盤風險。論文針對我國股市個股股價崩盤的現(xiàn)象,分析上市公司管理者管理防御與股價崩盤風險之間的關(guān)系。論文在對管理防御問題以及股價崩盤風險問題相關(guān)文獻進行回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合理性經(jīng)濟人假設(shè)、委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論和高階管理理論,分析了管理者管理防御與股價崩盤風險之間的關(guān)系,并提出研究假設(shè)。接著,論文以2011-2015年我國滬深A(yù)股上市公司作為樣本,從管理者人口學(xué)統(tǒng)計特征、管理者激勵機制和管理者監(jiān)督機制三個方面選擇了7個指標,使用描述性分析、多元線性回歸分析和Logit回歸分析,實證檢驗了管理防御影響因素與股價崩盤風險的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):管理者持股和兩職兼任情況與股價崩盤風險呈正相關(guān),管理者年齡、管理者學(xué)歷、管理者薪酬、獨立董事比例與股價崩盤風險呈負相關(guān)。進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),相比于民營企業(yè),國有企業(yè)中管理防御與股價崩盤風險的相關(guān)關(guān)系更強。論文還使用CRITIC方法構(gòu)建了管理防御水平指數(shù),并驗證了該指數(shù)與股價崩盤風險的正向相關(guān)關(guān)系。根據(jù)研究結(jié)論,論文提出了上市公司應(yīng)通過防控管理者管理防御行為以抑制股價崩盤風險的建議,具體包括建立上市公司管理防御水平評估體系、使用薪酬激勵代替股權(quán)激勵、加強外部制約等措施。論文研究了管理者管理防御行為對股價崩盤風險的影響規(guī)律,在一定程度上豐富了管理防御理論,補充了管理防御與股價崩盤風險關(guān)系的相關(guān)文獻,并為上市企業(yè)防控管理防御行為、降低股價崩盤風險提供了經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:In stock market, the collapse of stock price is a great blow to the interests of investors and the healthy and orderly development of capital market. The current literature on stock price collapse has done a lot of research on the causes of stock price collapse from the perspective of institutional background, corporate governance and market environment. As the responsibility of corporate governance, managers play an important role in the management of the company. In the company, under the external control mechanism, the manager chooses the behavior which is advantageous to maintain the position stability and pursue the own utility maximization, is the management defense. Managers selectively withhold bad news from the company because of management defense, which creates the risk of stock price collapse. Aiming at the phenomenon of stock price collapse in Chinese stock market, this paper analyzes the relationship between management defense of listed companies and the risk of stock price collapse. On the basis of reviewing the related literatures on the issue of management defense and the risk of stock price collapse, this paper combines rational economic man hypothesis, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and higher-order management theory. The relationship between management defense and the risk of stock price collapse is analyzed, and the research hypothesis is put forward. Then, taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2011-2015 as a sample, this paper selects seven indicators from three aspects: demographics, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism, and uses descriptive analysis. Multivariate linear regression analysis and logit regression analysis empirically test the relationship between the influencing factors of management defense and the risk of stock price collapse. It is found that the stock holding and two positions of managers are positively correlated with the risk of stock price collapse. The age of managers, the education of managers, the salary of managers and the proportion of independent directors are negatively correlated with the risk of stock price collapse. Further research shows that the relationship between management defense and stock price collapse risk is stronger in state-owned enterprises than in private enterprises. The paper also uses the CRITIC method to construct the management defense level index, and verifies the positive correlation between the index and the risk of stock price collapse. According to the conclusion of the research, the paper puts forward some suggestions that listed companies should control the risk of stock price collapse by preventing and controlling managers' management defense behavior, including establishing the evaluation system of management defense level of listed companies, and using compensation incentive instead of equity incentive. Strengthen external constraints and other measures. This paper studies the influence of management defense behavior on the risk of stock price collapse, enriches the theory of management defense to a certain extent, and complements the relevant literature on the relationship between management defense and stock price collapse risk. It also provides empirical evidence for the prevention, control and defense of listed enterprises and the reduction of the risk of stock price collapse.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51

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