本文選題：股權(quán)激勵 + 民族地區(qū)　； 參考：《內(nèi)蒙古財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵長久以來被用作企業(yè)對員工眾多激勵機(jī)制的一種,在提升企業(yè)價(jià)值方面發(fā)揮了重要的作用,因此被各國企業(yè)廣泛使用。有理論認(rèn)為,股權(quán)激勵可以有效地協(xié)調(diào)企業(yè)經(jīng)營者與企業(yè)所有者之間的關(guān)系,能夠從一定程度上解決現(xiàn)代企業(yè)控制權(quán)方面出現(xiàn)的若干弊端。該機(jī)制旨在通過對企業(yè)管理者的長期激勵,最終達(dá)到雙贏的效果。但由于我國資本市場相較西方存在巨大的差異,這就使得股權(quán)激勵對公司治理的效果變得復(fù)雜,因此研究不同領(lǐng)域股權(quán)激勵的效果有著重要的意義。“十三五”時(shí)期實(shí)施供給側(cè)改革以來,股權(quán)激勵制度受到了很大程度的重視,也受到很多民族地區(qū)上市公司的青睞。經(jīng)營者可以通過獲得企業(yè)股權(quán)的方式,參與公司治理。本文將在中國特殊的制度環(huán)境和市場環(huán)境下,對民族地區(qū)上市公司這類關(guān)系著國計(jì)民生的特殊市場主體的股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)績效關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。本文在對比分析國內(nèi)外相關(guān)理論與文獻(xiàn)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,界定了股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)概念,分析了股權(quán)激勵在協(xié)調(diào)現(xiàn)代企業(yè)委托人與代理人利益關(guān)系的作用。介紹了我國股權(quán)激勵實(shí)施的制度基礎(chǔ),回顧了股權(quán)分置改革前后股權(quán)激勵的發(fā)展歷程。通過統(tǒng)計(jì)方法進(jìn)一步分析目前我國民族地區(qū)股權(quán)激勵所采用的主要模式以及現(xiàn)狀,選取2006年至2015年間實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵的上市公司為研究對象,進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)績效的實(shí)證研究。通過SPSS18.0統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件,運(yùn)用主成分分析、曲線估計(jì)和回歸分析等計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方法考察管理層持股比例與企業(yè)績效的關(guān)系。通過上述研究得出結(jié)論:(1)不論是否是國有企業(yè),實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵的民族地區(qū)上市企業(yè)績效均顯著優(yōu)于未實(shí)施的企業(yè);(2)采用主成分分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國民族地區(qū)上市企業(yè)對于資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率和股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃有效期兩項(xiàng)指標(biāo)最為敏感;(3)通過Linear、Quadratic、Cubic三種函數(shù)建立模型,分別進(jìn)行線性回歸和曲線回歸,發(fā)現(xiàn)民族地區(qū)上市企業(yè)管理層持股比例與企業(yè)績效呈線性高程度擬合,同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)也通過了曲線擬合的檢驗(yàn)。根據(jù)論證結(jié)果:管理層持股比例水平與企業(yè)績效正相關(guān)。因此,完善激勵制度,適當(dāng)調(diào)整行權(quán)條件,積極探索新的股權(quán)激勵模式,不斷優(yōu)化公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和外部監(jiān)管力度,將股權(quán)激勵的優(yōu)勢充分發(fā)揮出來,以達(dá)到提升民族地區(qū)國有上市公司企業(yè)績效的效果。
[Abstract]:For a long time, equity incentive has been used as a kind of incentive mechanism for employees, which plays an important role in promoting the value of enterprises, so it is widely used by enterprises all over the world. Some theory holds that equity incentive can effectively coordinate the relationship between the enterprise manager and the enterprise owner, and to some extent solve some disadvantages of the control right of the modern enterprise. This mechanism aims to achieve a win-win effect through long-term incentive to enterprise managers. However, there is a great difference between China's capital market and western countries, which makes the effect of equity incentive on corporate governance more complicated, so it is of great significance to study the effect of equity incentive in different fields. Since the implementation of supply-side reform in the 13th Five-Year Plan period, the equity incentive system has been attached great importance to and favored by listed companies in many ethnic regions. Managers can participate in corporate governance by acquiring equity in the enterprise. Under the special institutional environment and market environment of China, this paper will study the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise performance of listed companies in minority areas, which are related to the national economy and the people's livelihood. On the basis of comparative analysis of relevant theories and literature at home and abroad, this paper defines the concept of equity incentive and analyzes the role of equity incentive in coordinating the relationship between principal and agent in modern enterprises. This paper introduces the institutional basis of the implementation of equity incentive in China, and reviews the development course of equity incentive before and after the reform of split share structure. Through the statistical method, this paper further analyzes the main models and the present situation of equity incentive in minority areas of our country, and selects listed companies that implemented equity incentive from 2006 to 2015 as the research objects. An empirical study on equity incentive and firm performance is carried out. The relationship between managerial shareholding ratio and firm performance is investigated by means of principal component analysis curve estimation and regression analysis with SPSS18.0 statistical software. It is concluded that the performance of listed enterprises in minority areas, whether state-owned or not, is significantly better than that of non-implemented enterprises, and the principal component analysis is used. It is found that the listed enterprises in minority areas are most sensitive to the asset liability ratio and the validity period of the equity incentive plan. The models are established by using three functions of Linear-Quadratic cubic, and the linear regression and curve regression are carried out, respectively. It is found that the proportion of managerial shareholding of listed enterprises in minority areas is linearly fitted to corporate performance, and the curve fitting test is also passed. According to the result, the level of managerial shareholding is positively correlated with enterprise performance. Therefore, we should perfect the incentive system, adjust the exercise conditions appropriately, actively explore the new equity incentive model, constantly optimize the internal governance structure and external supervision of the company, and give full play to the advantages of equity incentive. In order to improve the performance of state-owned listed companies in minority areas.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F275

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