本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司 + 董事會治理績效��； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：董事會作為連接股東與經(jīng)理層的“中樞”機構(gòu),是公司的終極控制者和最終決策者,董事會是公司治理的核心。各個國家的立法以及各種機構(gòu)的規(guī)則和指引等都把建設(shè)一個高效的董事會作為公司治理的終極目標(biāo)。我國上市公司董事會治理合規(guī)性明顯改善,但卻有效性偏低,這一不爭的事實迫切需要理論和實踐界將董事會制度改革的出發(fā)點轉(zhuǎn)移至提升董事會治理績效,而不僅是合規(guī)性建設(shè)。董事會特征是治理績效的關(guān)鍵影響因素,董事會特征通過影響董事會履行職能的行為而影響治理績效,因此,以董事會治理績效為導(dǎo)向,研究如何配置董事會特征能夠保障董事會有效履行職能而達(dá)到應(yīng)有的效果,對于提升董事會治理績效具有重要意義。創(chuàng)業(yè)板聚集了高技術(shù)、高成長性、年輕的創(chuàng)業(yè)型公司,是提升我國自主創(chuàng)新能力的重要力量。與大型成熟上市公司相比,這類公司委托代理問題較低、資源稀缺、內(nèi)外部環(huán)境高度不確定,董事會更有動機和能力履行職能,因此,董事會治理績效的影響因素具有特殊性。相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)雖已取得較豐富的研究成果,但實證研究中多以公司績效代替治理績效,未建立治理績效的測量指標(biāo),從而縮小了治理績效的外延,甚至造成概念的混淆；大多遵循“董事會特征→績效”的邏輯范式,而忽視了董事會行為的中介效應(yīng),造成研究結(jié)論多種多樣甚至相互矛盾；多基于線性視角研究變量之間的關(guān)系,而未關(guān)注更符合實際的非線性關(guān)系；多以大型成熟上市公司為樣本,而對創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)的研究較為稀缺。鑒于此,本文基于創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)董事會特點,立足于董事會治理績效,在建立董事會治理績效測量指標(biāo)的基礎(chǔ)上,從非線性視角出發(fā),研究董事會特征如何通過影響董事會履行職能的行為而影響治理績效,以期對董事會治理績效的影響因素這一科學(xué)問題進行探索。 董事會通過履行職能的治理行為而達(dá)成治理績效。董事會行為是指董事會履職能、實現(xiàn)治理目標(biāo)的過程。結(jié)合股東至上主義、利益相關(guān)者理論和組織控制理論,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的治理目標(biāo)是通過公司創(chuàng)新實現(xiàn)股東為主導(dǎo)的核心利益相關(guān)者利益最大化�；谫Y源依賴?yán)碚�、管家理論和委托代理理�?董事會是通過行戰(zhàn)略和監(jiān)督職能而實現(xiàn)公司治理目標(biāo)。據(jù)此,董事會行為可相應(yīng)劃分為戰(zhàn)略為(包括資源提供和戰(zhàn)略參與)和監(jiān)督行為。不同情境下的董事會監(jiān)督和戰(zhàn)略行為水平是權(quán)變的,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會可能更加經(jīng)常的深入到經(jīng)營層面進行監(jiān)督,但對經(jīng)理層機會主義行為,特別是公司合規(guī)和財務(wù)審計的監(jiān)督水平較低；資源提供行為水平更高,戰(zhàn)略參與行為更加積極,且范圍不僅涉及戰(zhàn)略層面而是深入至管理邊界之內(nèi),從而使創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的董事會與戰(zhàn)略、管理的交互融合性較強。 董事會治理績效是董事會通過戰(zhàn)略行為與監(jiān)督行為,履行戰(zhàn)略與監(jiān)督職能而達(dá)到的治理效果。基于董事會戰(zhàn)略行為和監(jiān)督行為,治理績效可以分為戰(zhàn)略行為績效和監(jiān)督行為績效兩個維度。戰(zhàn)略行為績效指董事會通過戰(zhàn)略行為履行其戰(zhàn)略職能取得的效果,具體指標(biāo)至少包括組織創(chuàng)新、股東財富、社會責(zé)任、規(guī)避破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險等。監(jiān)督行為績效是指董事會實施對經(jīng)理層的監(jiān)督與控制行為所產(chǎn)生的治理效果,具體指標(biāo)至少包括代理成本與效率、信息披露質(zhì)量、規(guī)避違規(guī)等。 借鑒產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論的SCP范式,董事會特征對治理績效的影響并非簡單而直接,而是通過董事會行為的傳遞,對治理績效產(chǎn)生影響。董事會特征如董事會結(jié)構(gòu)、人口學(xué)屬性和人力資本的制度設(shè)計影響董事會履行職能的動機和能力,從而影響董事會戰(zhàn)略行為和監(jiān)督行為強度。進一步的,董事會通過資源提供行為和戰(zhàn)略參與行為,影響公司創(chuàng)新、股東財富、社會責(zé)任以及破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險規(guī)避等戰(zhàn)略行為績效；董事會通過監(jiān)督行為,影響代理成本、改善信息披露質(zhì)量和規(guī)避違規(guī)等監(jiān)督行為績效。董事會特征對治理績效的影響存在雙路徑：“董事會特征→戰(zhàn)略行為→戰(zhàn)略行為績效”和“董事會特征→監(jiān)督行為→監(jiān)督行為績效”。 從非線性視角出發(fā),基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的特點,對董事會特征對行為的影響、行為對治理績效的影響以及董事會行為在董事會特征與治理績效之間的中介效應(yīng)提出研究假設(shè)。以董事會治理績效指標(biāo)作為被解釋變量、董事會特征指標(biāo)作為解釋變量、董事會行為指標(biāo)作為中介變量,以2009-2011年我國509家創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為研究樣本,運用非線性的中介效應(yīng)檢驗方法,對研究假設(shè)進行實證檢驗。 由于董事會特征對行為、董事會行為對治理績效的影響并非直線而是非線性的,因此,董事會行為的中介效應(yīng)并非常數(shù),而是隨董事會特征的不同取值而發(fā)生動態(tài)變化,即存在董事會特征通過行為對治理績效產(chǎn)生的瞬間間接效應(yīng)。采用Hayes and Preacher(2010)提出的檢驗非線性中介效應(yīng)的科學(xué)方法,對董事會行為的非線性中介效應(yīng)進行檢驗。該方法用于檢驗X→M→Y中,解釋變量X對中介變量M存在非線性影響并且(或)M對被解釋變量Y存在非線性影響時,X通過M對Y產(chǎn)生的瞬間間接效應(yīng)。數(shù)據(jù)運行采用的統(tǒng)計軟件為MEDCURVE for SPSS,使用OLS回歸對董事會特征對董事會行為的影響以及董事會行為對治理績效影響的系數(shù)進行估計,并執(zhí)行bootstrapping以獲取置信區(qū)間,用來檢驗董事會特征通過行為對治理績效產(chǎn)生的瞬間間接效應(yīng)的顯著性。 通過對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的樣本進行實證檢驗,得到以下重要結(jié)論：第一,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會特征對董事會行為具有顯著影響,不同特征對董事會行為的影響可能是非線性或線性。董事會結(jié)構(gòu)對董事會行為的影響方面,董事會規(guī)模與董事會行為之間呈負(fù)向的對數(shù)曲線關(guān)系；獨立董事比例、董事股權(quán)激勵與董事會行為之間均呈U型關(guān)系。董事會人口學(xué)屬性對董事會行為的影響方面,女性董事比例與董事會行為正相關(guān)；董事平均年齡與董事會行為之間呈負(fù)向的對數(shù)曲線關(guān)系；董事平均學(xué)歷對董事會行為沒有影響。在董事會人力資本對董事會行為影響方面,風(fēng)險投資董事比例與董事會行為之間呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；創(chuàng)始人董事比例特別是創(chuàng)始人內(nèi)部董事比例與董事會行為呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,而創(chuàng)始人外部董事與董事會行為不相關(guān)；董事平均任期與董事會行為之間呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。 第二,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會行為對戰(zhàn)略行為績效和監(jiān)督行為績效的影響有所差異。董事會行為與RD投入、凈資產(chǎn)收益率、托賓Q值、總資產(chǎn)增長率、破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險等戰(zhàn)略行為績效各指標(biāo)存在正向的對數(shù)曲線關(guān)系,這說明隨著董事會行為的強化,董事會治理的戰(zhàn)略行為績效得以提高,但是由于董事會過度履行戰(zhàn)略職能負(fù)效應(yīng)的抵減作用,戰(zhàn)略行為績效提高的速度將越來越緩慢。董事會行為與監(jiān)督行為績效指標(biāo)中的代理效率以及第一類代理成本之間存在正向的對數(shù)曲線關(guān)系,說明隨著董事會行為的強化,代理效率得以提升且提升的速度逐漸變緩；隨著董事會行為的強化,第一類代理成本得以降低且降低的速度逐漸變緩。然而,然而,董事會行為與第二類代理成本、信息披露質(zhì)量等監(jiān)督行為績效指標(biāo)不存在相關(guān)性。這說明創(chuàng)業(yè)類企業(yè)的董事會行為主要體現(xiàn)于提供資源和戰(zhàn)略參與的戰(zhàn)略行為,而監(jiān)督行為相對弱化。驗證了董事會與經(jīng)理層的合作關(guān)系模型,表明資源依賴?yán)碚摵凸芗依碚摳m用于作為創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)情境董事會治理的理論依據(jù)。 第三,董事會行為在董事會特征與戰(zhàn)略行為績效之間起重要的非線性中介效應(yīng)。董事會結(jié)構(gòu)各指標(biāo)、董事會人口學(xué)屬性中的女性董事比例與董事平均年齡以及人力資本各指標(biāo)通過董事會行為的中介作用,而對戰(zhàn)略行為績效以及代理效率、第一類代理成本的監(jiān)督行為績效指標(biāo)產(chǎn)生影響。由于某些董事會特征指標(biāo)與行為之間存在U型或?qū)?shù)曲線關(guān)系,董事會行為與戰(zhàn)略行為績效及代理效率、第一類代理成本之間存在對數(shù)曲線關(guān)系,因此,董事會行為在董事會特征與治理績效之間的中介效應(yīng)并不是固定的常數(shù),而是隨董事會特征變量的不同取值而發(fā)生動態(tài)變化,即董事會特征通過行為對治理績效的影響存在瞬間間接效應(yīng)。董事會行為在董事會特征與代理成本、信息披露等監(jiān)督行為績效之間不存在中介效應(yīng)。同時發(fā)現(xiàn),不同董事會特征對不同治理績效指標(biāo)的影響路徑存在差異,如果忽視董事會行為的中介效應(yīng)直接研究董事會特征與績效的關(guān)系將得到不穩(wěn)定甚至是錯誤的研究結(jié)論。 本文對于已有研究具有如下貢獻(xiàn)：(1)建立“董事會特征→戰(zhàn)略行為→戰(zhàn)略行為績效”和“董事會特征→監(jiān)督行為→監(jiān)督行為績效”的雙路徑模型,深化了“結(jié)構(gòu)→行為→績效”的研究范式,豐富了董事會治理研究框架體系。(2)構(gòu)建董事會治理績效的測量指標(biāo),有助于從董事會履行職能的效果角度,為董事會有效性的實證研究提供理論依據(jù)。(3)將非線性中介效應(yīng)檢驗方法首次應(yīng)用于董事會治理的研究中,驗證了董事會特征通過行為對治理績效動態(tài)的瞬間間接效應(yīng),突破了以往研究的線性邏輯,完善了董事會研究的實證檢驗方法。(4)挖掘了創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)情境下董事會特征、行為對治理績效影響路徑的特殊性,豐富了創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)公司治理的理論研究、以及權(quán)變理論在董事會治理研究中的運用。
[Abstract]:As the "central" organization connecting shareholders and managers, the board of directors is the ultimate controller and final decision maker of the company. The board of directors is the core of corporate governance. The legislation of various countries and the rules and guidelines of various institutions are the ultimate goal for the construction of an efficient board of directors. The board of directors of China's listed companies The governance compliance is obviously improved, but its effectiveness is low. This indisputable fact urgently needs the theoretical and practical circles to transfer the starting point of the board system reform to the improvement of the performance of the board of directors, but not only the construction of compliance. The characteristics of the board of directors are the key factors affecting the performance of the board of directors, and the characteristics of the board of directors will affect the performance of the board of directors by influencing the performance of the board of directors. The behavior of the board affects the performance of governance. Therefore, taking the board governance performance as the guidance, it is of great significance to study how to allocate the characteristics of the board of directors to ensure the effective performance of the board of directors to achieve its due effect and to improve the performance of the board of directors. The gem is a high technology, high growth, and young entrepreneurial company, which is promoted. Compared with the large and mature listed companies, these companies have lower principal-agent problems, scarce resources, highly uncertain internal and external environment, and the board of directors have more motivation and ability to perform functions. Therefore, the factors affecting the performance of the board of directors are special. The related literature has made a rich study of the related literature. But in the empirical study, most of the empirical studies take the company performance instead of the governance performance, and do not establish the measurement indicators of the governance performance, thus reducing the extension of the governance performance and even the confusion of the concept, most of which follow the logical paradigm of "the characteristics of the board of directors", while ignoring the intermediary effect of the board behavior, resulting in a variety of research conclusions. It is even contradictory; it is based on the linear perspective to study the relationship between variables, and does not pay attention to the nonlinear relationship that is more in line with the actual situation; most of them are large and mature listed companies as samples, and the research on entrepreneurial enterprises is scarce. On the basis of the performance measurement indicators, the paper studies how the board characteristics affect the performance of the board of directors by affecting the performance of the board of directors from the nonlinear perspective, in order to explore the scientific problem of the influencing factors of the performance of the board of directors.
The board of directors can achieve governance performance by performing the governance behavior of the function. The behavior of the board refers to the process of the performance of the board of directors and the realization of the goal of governance. Based on the theory of resource dependence, the theory of housekeeping and the theory of principal-agent, the board of directors can achieve the goal of corporate governance through the line strategy and supervision function. Accordingly, the behavior of the board of directors can be divided into strategies (including resource provision and strategic participation) and the supervision line. The board of directors of the GEM may be more often overseen in the management level, but it has a lower level of supervision of the executive level opportunistic behavior, especially the corporate compliance and financial audit; the level of resource provision is higher, the strategic participation is more active, and the scope not only involves the strategic level but the depth. To enter the management boundary, so that the board of directors of GEM companies and strategic management interaction fusion.
Board governance performance is the governance effect achieved by the board of directors through strategic behavior and supervisory function. Based on the strategic behavior and supervision behavior of the board of directors, the governance performance can be divided into two dimensions: strategic behavior performance and supervision performance performance. The specific indicators include organizational innovation, shareholder wealth, social responsibility, and evasion of bankruptcy risk. The performance of supervisory behavior refers to the governance effect of the board of directors' supervision and control of the manager's level, and the specific indicators include at least the agency and efficiency, the quality of information disclosure, and the avoidance of violation.
Referring to the SCP paradigm of industrial organization theory, the impact of board characteristics on governance performance is not simple but direct, but it has an impact on governance performance through the transfer of board behavior. The characteristics of the board of directors, such as board structure, demography property and human capital system design, affect the motivation and ability of the board to perform its functions. Further, the board provides behavior and strategic participation through resources, which affects corporate innovation, shareholder wealth, social responsibility and the avoidance of bankruptcy risk. The board of directors, through supervision, affects the cost of generation, improves the quality of information disclosure and evade violations. There are two ways of the governing performance of the board of directors: the characteristics of the board of directors, the strategic behavior, the performance of strategic behavior, the characteristics of the board of directors, the supervision behavior, and the performance of supervision behavior.
From the nonlinear perspective, based on the characteristics of the GEM listed companies, the influence of the board characteristics on the behavior, the influence of behavior on the governance performance and the intermediary effect between the board behavior and the governance performance are put forward. The board governance performance indicators are taken as the explanatory variables and the characteristics of the board of directors are made. In order to explain the variables, the behavior index of the board of directors as the intermediary variable, taking the 509 GEM listed companies of our country as the research sample for 2009-2011 years, using the nonlinear intermediary effect test method, the empirical test of the research hypothesis is carried out.
Because of the behavior of the board of directors, the influence of the board behavior on governance performance is not linear but nonlinear. Therefore, the intermediary effect of the board behavior is not constant, but changes with the different values of the board of directors, that is, the characteristics of the board of directors have the instantaneous indirect effect on the performance of governance by the characteristics of the board of directors. Ha A scientific method proposed by yes and Preacher (2010) to test the nonlinear mediation effect of the board behavior. The method is used to test the nonlinear intermediary effect of the board behavior. This method is used to test the X to M to Y, explaining the nonlinear effect of the variable X on the intermediate variable M and (or) the existence of the nonlinear effect of M on the interpreted variable Y. The statistical software used for data operation is MEDCURVE for SPSS, which uses OLS regression to estimate the influence of board characteristics on the board behavior and the influence of board behavior on governance performance, and carries out bootstrapping to obtain confidence interval, which is used to test the transients of the board characteristics through behavior to governance performance. The significance of the indirect effect.
Through the empirical test of the sample of the GEM listed companies in China, the following important conclusions are obtained: first, the characteristics of the board of directors of the GEM listed companies have a significant influence on the board behavior, and the influence of the different characteristics on the board behavior may be nonlinear or linear. There is a negative logarithmic curve relationship between the behavior of the board and the board of directors; the proportion of independent directors, the U relationship between the directors' equity incentive and the board behavior. The proportion of the board of directors has a positive correlation with the behavior of the board of directors; the average age of the board and the behavior of the board are negative. The relationship between the logarithmic curve and the average degree of directors has no effect on the behavior of the board of directors. There is a negative correlation between the proportion of the director of the board of directors and the behavior of the board of directors; the proportion of the directors and directors, especially the internal directors of the founders, is positively related to the behavior of the board of directors. There is no correlation between the external directors and the board of directors, and there is a positive correlation between the average term of directors and board behavior.
Second, the influence of board behavior on the performance of strategic behavior and supervision performance is different. The relationship between board behavior and RD investment, net asset yield, Tobin Q value, total asset growth rate, bankruptcy risk and other strategic behavior performance indicators have positive relationship with the opposite number, which indicates that the behavior of the board of directors is strengthened. The performance of the strategic behavior of the board of directors has been improved, but the speed of the performance improvement of the strategic behavior will be more and more slow due to the overperformance of the board's overperformance of the negative effect of the strategic function. There is a positive logarithmic curve relationship between the agency efficiency of the board behavior and the performance indicators of supervision and the first type of cost. It shows that with the strengthening of the board of directors, the speed of the agency efficiency is gradually improved and the speed of promotion gradually slows down. With the strengthening of the board of directors, the speed of the first type of agency cost can be reduced and reduced gradually. However, the performance indicators of the board behavior and the second types of agency costs and the quality of information disclosure do not exist. This shows that the behavior of the board of directors is mainly reflected in the strategic behavior of providing resources and strategic participation, and the supervision behavior is relatively weak. The model of the cooperation relationship between the board of directors and the manager level is verified, which shows that the theory of resource dependence and the theory of housekeeping are more applicable to the theoretical basis of the governance of a creative enterprise.
Third, the board behavior plays an important nonlinear intermediary effect between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance of the strategic behavior. The index of the board structure, the proportion of the directors of the board of directors and the average age of the directors in the demography of the board of directors, and the mediating role of each index of human capital through the behavior of the board of directors, and the performance of strategic behavior and the acting efficiency of the agency. There is a relationship between the U type or logarithmic curve between the characteristic index and the behavior of some board of directors. There is a logarithmic curve relationship between the board behavior and the strategic behavior performance and the agency efficiency, and the first agent cost. Therefore, the board behavior is characteristic and governance of the board of directors. The intermediary effect between performance is not a fixed constant, but a dynamic change with the different values of the characteristic variables of the board of directors. That is, the characteristics of the board of directors have an instant indirect effect on the effect of governance on the performance of governance. The board behavior does not exist between the characteristics of the board of directors and the agency cost, information disclosure and so on. At the same time, it is found that there are differences in the impact of different board characteristics on different governance performance indicators. If the intermediary effect of the board behavior is ignored, the relationship between the characteristics of the board and the performance of the board will be unstable or even the wrong conclusion.
This paper has the following contributions to the existing research: (1) establishing the dual path model of the characteristics of the board of directors, strategic behavior, strategic behavior performance, the characteristics of the board of directors, supervision behavior and performance of supervision, which deepens the research paradigm of "structure, behavior and performance" and enriches the framework of the research on the governance of the board of directors. (2) construction of the framework of the research on the governance of the board of directors. The measurement index of board governance performance helps to provide theoretical basis for the empirical study of the effectiveness of the board of directors. (3) applying the nonlinear intermediary effect test method to the study of board governance for the first time, verifies the instantaneous and indirect effect of the board's characteristics on the dynamic performance of governance. We should break through the linear logic of previous research and improve the empirical test method of the board research. (4) excavate the characteristics of the board of directors, the particularity of the impact of behavior on the governance performance, and enrich the theoretical research on corporate governance of the enterprise, and the application of the contingency theory in the research of the board governance.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F271

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