機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與公司違規(guī)
本文選題:機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股 切入點(diǎn):產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì) 出處:《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:2015年11月15日發(fā)布的《2015中國(guó)上市公司法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)指數(shù)報(bào)告》指出2014年我國(guó)上市公司出現(xiàn)違規(guī)的次數(shù)同比上年上升了204%,上市公司合規(guī)運(yùn)營(yíng)壓力明顯增大。公司違規(guī)不僅有損企業(yè)自身形象,也擾亂了市場(chǎng)秩序,阻礙了資本市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展,甚至損害了廣大投資者利益,是資本市場(chǎng)重點(diǎn)關(guān)注且亟待解決的重要問(wèn)題,也是市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管者面臨的巨大挑戰(zhàn)。因此,本文以此為研究背景,并結(jié)合我國(guó)上市公司機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀和所有權(quán)性質(zhì)的特殊性,分別研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)公司違規(guī)的影響,以及產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與公司違規(guī)相關(guān)關(guān)系的作用。本文希望通過(guò)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與公司違規(guī)三者關(guān)系的研究,進(jìn)一步了解我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)與我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)健康狀況的相互影響和作用關(guān)系。通過(guò)查閱和梳理國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),本文發(fā)現(xiàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與公司治理的相關(guān)研究起步較早且成果豐富。就機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是否有動(dòng)機(jī)以及能否對(duì)公司治理產(chǎn)生積極影響,已有研究得出了兩個(gè)相對(duì)的結(jié)論即“積極持股論”與“消極持股論”。隨著國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)的積累,“積極持股論”得到了更多的證實(shí)和肯定。當(dāng)持股比例上升時(shí),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者愿意并能夠?qū)局卫硎┘臃e極影響,發(fā)揮有效的監(jiān)督作用。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與公司違規(guī)的研究主要基于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與公司治理的理論成果,F(xiàn)階段國(guó)內(nèi)在該領(lǐng)域涉足較少,仍屬于前沿的研究?jī)?nèi)容,具有一定的研究?jī)r(jià)值。在機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的研究問(wèn)題上,已有文獻(xiàn)已基于盈余管理視角考察了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與國(guó)有控股交互作用下的治理效應(yīng),公司違規(guī)尚屬新的角度和切口。因此,本文以考察國(guó)內(nèi)較少涉足的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股對(duì)公司違規(guī)的影響為出發(fā)點(diǎn),結(jié)合我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)際控制人異質(zhì)性特征,進(jìn)一步研究產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)公司違規(guī)以及機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與公司違規(guī)相關(guān)關(guān)系的影響,順應(yīng)了時(shí)代背景和理論發(fā)展需求,具有一定的創(chuàng)新之處和實(shí)用價(jià)值。本文依據(jù)委托代理理論、機(jī)構(gòu)股東積極主義假說(shuō)、政府干預(yù)理論以及相關(guān)研究分析,建立了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與公司違規(guī)三者關(guān)系的理論框架,并在此基礎(chǔ)之上提出本文的三個(gè)假設(shè)。然后,基于構(gòu)建的兩個(gè)多元線性回歸模型,利用我國(guó)2011-2015年滬深A(yù)股上市公司數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)與結(jié)果分析。經(jīng)檢驗(yàn)本文所有的假設(shè)都顯著成立,可以得出:機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例越高,公司違規(guī)的可能性越小;相較于國(guó)有上市公司,非國(guó)有上市公司違規(guī)的可能性更大;機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例與公司違規(guī)可能性的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系在非國(guó)有上市公司是顯著的,在國(guó)有上市公司是不顯著的。由此,本文認(rèn)為提高機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例有助于抑制公司違規(guī),尤其針對(duì)非國(guó)有上市公司違規(guī)問(wèn)題的解決能取得更好的效果。本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于拓展了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股影響公司違規(guī)的研究視角。本文考慮了產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)因素,基于完整的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與公司違規(guī)三者關(guān)系的理論分析,設(shè)計(jì)了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例與產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的交互項(xiàng)來(lái)重點(diǎn)檢驗(yàn)產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與公司違規(guī)相關(guān)關(guān)系的影響,最后利用最近五年的樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),取得的研究結(jié)論能進(jìn)一步豐富機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股影響公司違規(guī)的理論成果。本文的研究結(jié)論肯定了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者監(jiān)督公司違規(guī)作用的有效性,具有以下實(shí)用價(jià)值:為上市公司控制自身違規(guī)傾向、強(qiáng)化合規(guī)經(jīng)營(yíng)理念、實(shí)現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展目標(biāo)提供方法論,在引入機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的問(wèn)題決策上提供經(jīng)驗(yàn)支持;為鼓勵(lì)和引導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)揮監(jiān)督公司違規(guī)作用以及保障機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作用發(fā)揮的政策制定提供理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:The November 15, 2015 release of <2015 China listed company legal risk index report "pointed out that in 2014 the Chinese listed companies illegal times last year rose by 204%, the listed company compliance operation pressure increased significantly. Companies not only detrimental to the image of the enterprise, but also disrupted the market order, hindered the healthy development of the capital market, or even damage the interests of the majority of investors, is an important problem in capital market focus and urgent challenge, is also the market regulators. Therefore, this paper is based on this background, combined with the particularity of the city, the development of institutional investors in our country the status and nature of ownership, of institutional investors, affect the property nature of the company's violations, and the nature of property rights of institutional investors and companies related relationship. This paper hopes to institutional investors holding Study on property rights and corporate shares, in violation of the relationship between the three, to further understand the ownership structure of Listed Companies in China, are affecting the health of the nature of the actual controller and the capital market of our country and interaction. Through reading and summarizing the relevant literature, this paper found that such research started institutional investors and corporate governance earlier and fruitful on whether institutional investors have the motivation and can have a positive impact on corporate governance, the existing research draws two conclusions: "positive relative ownership theory" and "negative equity theory". With the experience in the accumulation of data, "actively holding theory" has been more confirmed and affirmed. When the shareholding ratio rises institutional investors, willing and able to exert positive influence on corporate governance, play an effective supervisory role. The main research base of institutional investors and corporate irregularities Theoretical results on institutional investors and corporate governance. At this stage in the field are less involved in research content, still belongs to the frontier, has certain research value. In the study of institutional investors and property rights, the existing literature has been based on the visual angle of study of earnings management governance effect of interaction between institutional investors and the state holding the companies is a new angle and cut. Therefore, based on the survey of the domestic and the less involved in the impact of institutional investors on the companies as a starting point, combined with China's actual control of listed companies heterogeneity, further research on the impact of the company's property rights violations and violations of institutional investors and corporate relationship the times background and theoretical development, has certain innovation and practical value. This paper based on the principal-agent theory, machine The shareholder activism hypothesis, analysis of government intervention theory and related research, established the theoretical framework of institutional investors, property companies and the relationship between the three and three hypotheses and on the basis of this paper. Then, based on the two multivariate linear regression model, empirical testing and results analysis of the use of me in 2011-2015 years the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed company data. After inspection all of the assumptions are evident, it can be concluded that higher proportion of institutional investors holding companies, the less likely; compared with the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies illegal more likely; a negative correlation between the ratio of institutional investors and companies the possibility is significant in the non state-owned listed companies, in the state-owned listed companies is not significant. Thus, it increased the proportion of institutional investors holding help Suppression of violations, especially to solve for violations of non state-owned listed companies can get better effect. The innovation of this paper is to expand the impact of institutional investors on Perspective of corporate violations. Considering the nature of property rights, complete investment mechanism based on ownership, property rights and the analysis of the relationship between the three companies illegal theory. The design of the impact of institutional ownership and property rights to the focus of the examination interaction property for institutional investors and companies related, finally an empirical test using the data of the recent five years, the conclusions of research can further enrich the institutional investors affect the company's violation of the theoretical results. The conclusions of this study confirmed effective supervision of institutional investors, illegal action, has the practical value for listed companies to control The body of illegal tendency, strengthening the concept of compliance management, to achieve long-term development goal to provide methodological support, in the introduction of institutional investors decision-making; provide a theoretical basis for encouraging and guiding the institutional investors play a supervisory role and guarantee companies institutional investors play a role in policy making.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號(hào)】:F275;F271;F832.51
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