本文關(guān)鍵詞： 盈余管理程度 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 修正的Jones模型 分組 行業(yè)　出處：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國上市公司盈余管理行為普遍存在，盈余管理行為一定程度上降低了會計盈余信息的質(zhì)量。會計盈余信息的失真違背了財務(wù)報告的目標，侵犯了財務(wù)報告使用者的利益。上市公司盈余管理行為的發(fā)生，很大程度上是由于公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)存在缺陷，而股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理是主要因素。我國上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特殊，，表現(xiàn)為股權(quán)集中度高、股權(quán)制衡度較低、股權(quán)未實現(xiàn)完全流通等，正是由于這些股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的缺陷，誘發(fā)了盈余管理行為，并為盈余管理創(chuàng)造了條件。本文針對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理，盈余管理行為普遍存在的現(xiàn)實背景，從股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度、股權(quán)流通性、第一大控股股東股權(quán)屬性、管理層持股和機構(gòu)投資者持股這六個方面，探究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對盈余管理的影響，目標在于構(gòu)建合理的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，抑制盈余管理行為，并給出政策建議。 首先，本文整理國內(nèi)外文獻進行文獻綜述，發(fā)現(xiàn)國內(nèi)外研究的不足并確定自己的研究方向。在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文詳細闡述了代理理論、契約理論、信息不對稱理論、機會主義理論和產(chǎn)權(quán)理論，為本文實證研究奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。然后本文對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和盈余管理進行了研究現(xiàn)狀分析，為本文實證研究提供了現(xiàn)實依據(jù)。 其次，本文選取2008-2012年中國滬深兩市的A股上市公司，最終獲得有效的5729個樣本。本文結(jié)合上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的特點，以股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度、股權(quán)流通性、第一大控股股東股權(quán)屬性、管理層持股和機構(gòu)投資者持股這六個維度作為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的自變量，用修正的Jones模型計算出的可操縱性應(yīng)計數(shù)的絕對值代表盈余管理程度，作為因變量，運用回歸模型進行實證分析。研究表明，股權(quán)集中度、第一大控股股東股權(quán)屬性和管理層持股比例與盈余管理程度顯著正相關(guān)。股權(quán)制衡度、流通股比例和機構(gòu)投資者持股比例與盈余管理程度顯著負相關(guān)。 再次，在考察股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對盈余管理影響的一般規(guī)律的基礎(chǔ)上，按照盈余管理程度排序，并進行三等位分，取盈余管理程度最高的組為激進組，取盈余管理程度最低的組為保守組，分組探討不同盈余管理程度樣本，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對盈余管理的影響是否不同。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在激進組，股權(quán)集中度與盈余管理程度顯著正相關(guān)，股權(quán)制衡度、流通股比例和機構(gòu)投資者持股比例與盈余管理程度顯著負相關(guān)；在保守組，第一大控股股東股權(quán)屬性、管理層持股比例與盈余管理程度顯著正相關(guān)。這表明分組研究具有說服力。此外，本文重點關(guān)注盈余管理程度較高的激進組，發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)集中度高、股權(quán)制衡度低、股權(quán)未全流通等股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)存在的缺陷，導(dǎo)致盈余管理程度普遍較高。本文還分析了激進組的行業(yè)分布情況，關(guān)注重點行業(yè)，抑制盈余管理行為，促進行業(yè)長遠健康發(fā)展。 最后，在實證研究的基礎(chǔ)上，本文特別針對激進組中股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)缺陷和行業(yè)分布情況提出政策建議，改善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，抑制盈余管理行為，關(guān)注重點行業(yè)。
[Abstract]:Widespread earnings management behavior of Listed Companies in China, the earnings management behavior to a certain extent reduced the quality of accounting information. Accounting information distortion violates the objective of financial reporting, violation of the financial report users' interests. The earnings management behavior, largely due to the drawbacks of corporate governance, and the unreasonable ownership structure is the main factor. The ownership structure of Listed Companies in particular, as ownership concentration, equity balance degree is low, no complete equity circulation, it is because of these defects of ownership structure, earnings management behavior induced, and create conditions for earnings management. Based on ownership structure not reasonable, realistic background of widespread earnings management, from ownership concentration, equity balance degree, stock liquidity, largest shareholder equity property, management holding The six aspects of stock and institutional investor shareholding explore the impact of ownership structure on earnings management. The goal is to build a reasonable ownership structure and curb earnings management behavior, and give policy recommendations.
Firstly, this paper reorganizes the domestic and foreign literature review, found that lack of research at home and abroad and determine the direction of their research. On this basis, this paper describes the principal-agent theory, contract theory, information asymmetry theory, opportunism theory and property rights theory, laid the theoretical foundation for the empirical research in this paper. Then based on the ownership structure and earnings management research present situation analysis, provide a realistic basis for the empirical study.
Secondly, this paper selects Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen 2008-2012 two years, A shares of listed companies, finally obtained 5729 valid samples. This paper combined with the characteristics of the ownership structure of listed companies, the ownership concentration, equity balance degree, stock liquidity, largest shareholder equity property, ownership and management of institutional investors holding the six dimensions as the ownership structure variables, calculated by the modified Jones model can manipulate the absolute value represents the extent of earnings management of accruals, as the dependent variable, the regression model for empirical analysis. The results show that ownership concentration is positively related to moderate, the largest controlling shareholder equity and property management shareholding ratio and the degree of earnings management. Equity balance degree, the proportion of tradable shares and the proportion of institutional ownership and earnings management is negatively associated.
Again, the basic rule in the influence of ownership structure on earnings management, sorted according to the degree of earnings management, and three alleles, the extent of earnings management for the highest group of radical groups, take the degree of earnings management for the lowest group conservative group, group of different level of earnings management sample, whether different effects ownership structure on earnings management. The study found that in the radical group, significant positive correlation of ownership concentration and the degree of earnings management, equity balance degree, the proportion of tradable shares and the proportion of institutional ownership and earnings management is negatively related; in the conservative group, the largest controlling shareholder equity property, is positively related to the proportion of managerial ownership with the extent of earnings management. This research shows that the packet is convincing. In addition, the radical group, this article focuses on the higher degree of earnings management, equity concentration, equity balance degree is low, not equity The defects of ownership structure such as total circulation lead to a high level of earnings management. This paper also analyzes the industry distribution of radical group, focuses on key industries, inhibits earnings management behavior, and promotes the long-term healthy development of the industry.
Finally, on the basis of empirical research, this paper puts forward policy recommendations for improving the ownership structure, controlling earnings management and focusing on key industries.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275.5;F832.51

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本文編號：1441973