本文關(guān)鍵詞：創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)獨(dú)立董事社會(huì)資本與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系研究　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：企業(yè)兩權(quán)分離現(xiàn)狀導(dǎo)致公司所有者不能對(duì)企業(yè)進(jìn)行有效管理和控制，出現(xiàn)了“內(nèi)部人”的現(xiàn)象，且經(jīng)過(guò)“水門事件”“洛克希德丑聞案”等一系列事件后，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們發(fā)現(xiàn)外部市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)“內(nèi)部人”的約束十分有限。因此，，為了保證董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性，解決上述問(wèn)題，獨(dú)立董事制度應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。該制度在以美國(guó)為首的一些西方國(guó)家被證明是一種行之有效、并廣泛采用的制度，在提高公司決策過(guò)程的科學(xué)性、安全性、效益性，加強(qiáng)公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，預(yù)防公司總裁和其他內(nèi)部控制人為所欲為、魚肉公司和股東利益，強(qiáng)化公司內(nèi)部民主機(jī)制，維護(hù)小股東和其他公司利害關(guān)系人的利益等方面發(fā)揮了積極作用。因此，我國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)在2001年8月發(fā)布的《關(guān)于在上市公司建立獨(dú)立董事制度的指導(dǎo)意見(jiàn)》中，強(qiáng)制要求所有上市公司必須聘請(qǐng)獨(dú)立董事，建立獨(dú)立董事制度。 經(jīng)過(guò)十幾年的發(fā)展，獨(dú)立董事在我國(guó)上市公司董事會(huì)中所占比例越來(lái)越重，在以往的研究中多從獨(dú)立董事特征或者背景進(jìn)行研究，但是在我國(guó)注重關(guān)系的這一特殊背景下，有必要從獨(dú)立董事社會(huì)資本和社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)角度來(lái)考察獨(dú)立董事與企業(yè)績(jī)效的關(guān)系。并且，在以往研究中多采用大樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析，且多為主板和中小板企業(yè)，雖然研究結(jié)論具有一定的普適性，但是忽略了行業(yè)和企業(yè)規(guī)模的影響，相對(duì)于這些企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)又有其自身的特殊性，上市時(shí)間短、公司規(guī)模小、以高新技術(shù)企業(yè)和制造業(yè)為主、企業(yè)可利用外部資源有限，在這種情況下，獨(dú)立董事社會(huì)資本與企業(yè)績(jī)效間的關(guān)系可能與主板和中小板企業(yè)存在差異。因此，本文采用創(chuàng)業(yè)板數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)上市公司獨(dú)立董事社會(huì)資本及其企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)獨(dú)立董事制度的實(shí)施效果與獨(dú)立董事社會(huì)資本的作用。在查閱相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)時(shí)，作者發(fā)現(xiàn)國(guó)內(nèi)外針對(duì)獨(dú)立董事與企業(yè)績(jī)效領(lǐng)域的研究結(jié)論較混亂，因此本文首先將國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行分類整理，接下來(lái)對(duì)社會(huì)資本理論、委托代理理論、資源依賴?yán)碚�、利益相關(guān)者理論等理論進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)闡述，為本文研究奠定理論基礎(chǔ)，在此基礎(chǔ)上，確定衡量獨(dú)立董事社會(huì)資本的4個(gè)維度，分別是縱向關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)、橫向關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)、聲譽(yù)和認(rèn)知，并參考以往文獻(xiàn)，選取財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)凈資產(chǎn)收益率及市場(chǎng)指標(biāo)托賓Q作為衡量企業(yè)績(jī)效的指標(biāo)，同時(shí)將企業(yè)層面的相關(guān)變量作為控制變量，結(jié)合創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)的現(xiàn)狀，作出相關(guān)研究假設(shè)，進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，并結(jié)合我國(guó)市場(chǎng)制度和創(chuàng)業(yè)板特征對(duì)回歸結(jié)果進(jìn)行解釋分析，最后根據(jù)本文結(jié)論從優(yōu)化獨(dú)立董事選聘機(jī)制、明確獨(dú)立董事職權(quán)、推進(jìn)獨(dú)立董事職業(yè)化發(fā)展以及完善獨(dú)立董事激勵(lì)機(jī)制四方面對(duì)如何完善我國(guó)上市公司獨(dú)立董事制度提出建議。
[Abstract]:The separation of the two rights of enterprises leads to the inability of the owners to manage and control the enterprises effectively, the phenomenon of "insiders", and after a series of events such as the Watergate incident and the Lockheed scandal. Economists find that external market mechanisms have very limited constraints on "insiders". Therefore, in order to ensure the independence of the board of directors, to solve these problems. The independent director system emerged as the times require. This system has been proved to be an effective and widely used system in some western countries led by the United States. It can improve the scientific, security and efficiency of the decision-making process of the company. Strengthen the competitiveness of the company, prevent the company president and other internal controllers from doing whatever they want, the interests of the fish company and shareholders, and strengthen the internal democratic mechanism of the company. The interests of minority shareholders and other corporate stakeholders have played an active role. In August 2001, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the guidance on establishing Independent Directors system in listed companies, which required all listed companies to hire independent directors and establish independent director system. After more than ten years of development, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors of listed companies in China is more and more heavy. In the previous studies, the characteristics or background of independent directors are studied more and more. However, under this special background, it is necessary to examine the relationship between independent directors and corporate performance from the perspective of independent directors' social capital and social network. In the previous studies, large sample data are used to analyze, and most of them are main board and small and medium-sized board enterprises. Although the conclusions of the study have certain universality, they ignore the influence of industry and enterprise scale. Compared with these enterprises, gem enterprises have their own particularity, short time to market, small scale, mainly high-tech enterprises and manufacturing industries, enterprises can use limited external resources, in this case. The relationship between social capital and corporate performance of independent directors may be different from that of main board and small and medium-sized board enterprises. This paper uses gem data to study the relationship between social capital and corporate performance of independent directors of listed companies. Empirical test of the implementation of the gem independent director system and independent director of the role of social capital. The author found that the domestic and foreign independent directors and corporate performance research conclusions are more confused, so this paper first classified the relevant literature at home and abroad, then social capital theory, principal-agent theory. Resource dependence theory, stakeholder theory and other theories are elaborated systematically, which lays a theoretical foundation for this study. On this basis, it determines the four dimensions to measure the social capital of independent directors, which are vertical relationship network. Horizontal relationship network, reputation and cognition, and refer to the previous literature, select financial indicators of net asset return and market indicators Tobin Q as indicators to measure corporate performance. At the same time, the related variables at the enterprise level as control variables, combined with the current situation of gem enterprises, making relevant research assumptions, empirical analysis. And combined with the market system and gem characteristics of the regression analysis of the results, and finally according to the conclusion of this paper from the optimization of the mechanism of independent director selection and appointment, to clarify the authority of independent directors. To promote the professionalization of independent directors and to improve the incentive mechanism of independent directors, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to improve the independent director system of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F271;F832.51

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