本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司高管過度自信對現(xiàn)金股利政策的影響　出處：《天津大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 過度自信 行為公司財務(wù) 現(xiàn)金股利分配 股權(quán)制衡 公司成長性

【摘要】：我國上市公司中過度自信的高管普遍存在，，他們所做出的非理性現(xiàn)金股利決策不僅損害了投資者或者股東的利益，而且還可能阻礙公司的發(fā)展�；诖�，本文在對國內(nèi)外有關(guān)研究文獻進行回歸和梳理的基礎(chǔ)上，摒棄了經(jīng)典財務(wù)理論中理性經(jīng)理人的假設(shè)。文章試圖利用我國滬、深兩市2010—2012年A股上市公司發(fā)布的財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)，以行為財務(wù)學的相關(guān)理論為指引，實證檢驗我國高管過度自信這一心理因素與公司現(xiàn)金股利分配政策之間的關(guān)系，及公司成長性和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)這兩個公司特征對上述關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的影響。 過度自信的度量尚未形成統(tǒng)一的標準是制約該理論發(fā)展的一大瓶頸，本文將規(guī)范研究和實證研究相結(jié)合，在第三章首先通過演繹推理初步論證了采用公司的年度盈余預測偏差程度作為高管過度自信的連續(xù)替代變量的可行性和合理性，進而通過構(gòu)建恰當?shù)臄?shù)學模型理論分析了高管過度自信的心理偏好對現(xiàn)金股利決策的影響機理，在此基礎(chǔ)上提出值得深入探討的三個核心命題。第四章實證部分選用2010—2012年滬深兩市發(fā)布了盈利預測的A股上市公司為研究樣本，在控制公司系列特征變量的基礎(chǔ)上，運用多元回歸模型探求了我國上市公司中高管過度自信的心理偏好對現(xiàn)金股利分配行為的影響，研究結(jié)果表明：管理者過度自信的公司傾向于少發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利來增強內(nèi)部融資；且當公司具有越高的成長機會時，其降低公司現(xiàn)金股利分配水平的傾向會更加明顯，即公司的成長性加強了公司高管過度自信對現(xiàn)金股利分配決策的影響；但制衡性的股權(quán)分布能夠在一定程度上避免因高管過度自信引起的減少發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利的非理性行為。 根據(jù)實證研究結(jié)論，文章最后針對性地提出了幫助我國上市公司克服高管過度自信所產(chǎn)生的不利影響的幾點建議：建立科學的高管學習機制及過度自信預警指標；公司不同發(fā)展階段采用不同的股利監(jiān)控政策；避免“一股獨大”現(xiàn)象，采用股權(quán)制衡的結(jié)構(gòu)模式；健全和完善我國上市公司的獨立董事制度。
[Abstract]:There are overconfident executives in listed companies in our country. Their irrational cash dividend decisions not only harm the interests of investors or shareholders, but also hinder the development of the company. On the basis of regression and combing of domestic and foreign research literature, this paper abandons the hypothesis of rational manager in classical financial theory, and tries to make use of Shanghai, China. The financial data released by A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shenzhen in 2010-2012 are guided by the related theories of behavioral finance. This paper empirically tests the relationship between the psychological factor of executive overconfidence and corporate cash dividend distribution policy, and the influence of corporate growth and equity structure on the above relationship. The measurement of overconfidence has not yet formed a unified standard is a major bottleneck restricting the development of the theory, this paper combines normative research with empirical research. In the third chapter, through deductive reasoning, the feasibility and rationality of using the deviation degree of annual earnings forecast as a continuous substitute variable of executive overconfidence are preliminarily demonstrated. Then through the construction of appropriate mathematical model to analyze the influence mechanism of executives' overconfident psychological preference on cash dividend decision. On this basis, it puts forward three core propositions that are worthy of further discussion. The empirical part of Chapter 4th selects A-share listed companies which issued profit forecast in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2012 as the research samples. On the basis of controlling the series of characteristic variables of the company, this paper uses the multiple regression model to explore the influence of the psychological preference of the high management overconfidence on the behavior of cash dividend distribution in the listed companies of our country. The results show that overconfident managers tend to pay less cash dividends to enhance internal financing; And when the company has higher growth opportunities, its tendency to reduce the level of cash dividend distribution will be more obvious, that is, the growth of the company strengthened the corporate executives overconfidence on the impact of cash dividend distribution decisions; But balanced equity distribution can to some extent avoid the irrational behavior of reducing cash dividend due to executive overconfidence. According to the conclusions of empirical research. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions to help the listed companies overcome the adverse effects of overconfidence: establishing a scientific learning mechanism for senior executives and early warning indicators of overconfidence; The company adopts different dividend monitoring policies at different stages of development; To avoid the phenomenon of "one share dominating" and adopt the structural mode of equity balance; Improve and perfect the system of independent directors of listed companies in China.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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