本文關(guān)鍵詞： 產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng) 現(xiàn)金股利 代理沖突 管理者激勵(lì) 公司治理　出處：《云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股利問(wèn)題一直以來(lái)受到公司金融學(xué)者的密切關(guān)注,學(xué)者們將他稱之為“十大待解決的財(cái)務(wù)問(wèn)題”中的一個(gè)問(wèn)題。其中代理問(wèn)題是現(xiàn)代公司治理過(guò)程中普遍存在的問(wèn)題,備受各學(xué)者的關(guān)注,由于現(xiàn)代企業(yè)普遍存在管理權(quán)和所有權(quán)相分離的現(xiàn)象,從而導(dǎo)致存在管理者與股東之間信息不對(duì)稱以及利益方面的沖突,管理者隨意使用自己的管理權(quán)力而損害了股東的利益。通過(guò)股利政策對(duì)公司進(jìn)行治理是公司治理的必然趨勢(shì),之前的學(xué)者對(duì)于現(xiàn)金股利支付的研究多數(shù)以公司的內(nèi)部視角作為切入點(diǎn),以此來(lái)探索公司的現(xiàn)金股利政策,對(duì)于從公司的外部特征影響研究的較少,本文試圖從公司的外部影響因素--產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)角度來(lái)研究對(duì)公司的現(xiàn)金股利支付的影響。產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)作為一種外部公司治理機(jī)制可以有效的降低由于信息的非對(duì)稱性引起的公司代理成本,對(duì)公司管理層進(jìn)行有效地監(jiān)督和制約。本文在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,選取了2010年1月1日至2015年12月31日的A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,探討產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)這一外部影響因素對(duì)現(xiàn)金股利支付的影響。通過(guò)實(shí)證研究本文得出以下結(jié)論:1、產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度與公司現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放意愿呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。當(dāng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度越大時(shí),公司的現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放意愿越強(qiáng);當(dāng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度越小時(shí),公司的現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放意愿越弱。2、產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度與公司現(xiàn)金股利支付水平呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。當(dāng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度越大時(shí),公司的現(xiàn)金股利支付水平較高,支付較多的現(xiàn)金股利;當(dāng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度越小時(shí),公司的現(xiàn)金股利支付水平較低,支付較少的現(xiàn)金股利。
[Abstract]:The dividend problem by financial scholars pay close attention to the company all the time, scholars called him "a problem of financial problems to be resolved in ten. The agency problem is a common problem in the process of modern corporate governance, has attracted the attention of scholars, the modern enterprise management and ownership exists the phenomenon of phase separation, which leads to the conflict between shareholders and managers of asymmetric information and the interests of the managers can use their own management authority and damage the interests of shareholders. The dividend policy of the company governance is the inevitable trend of corporate governance, the majority of scholars for the study before the cash dividend payment to the company internal perspective as a starting point, in order to explore the cash dividend policy of the company, for the impact of the less from the external characteristics of the company, this article attempts from the company outside Department of factors: product market competition point of view to study the influence on the company's cash dividend payment. Product market competition as an external corporate governance mechanism can effectively reduce the information asymmetry caused by the agency cost, effective supervision and restriction on the management of the company. On the basis of previous research, from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2015, A shares of listed companies as the sample data, the influence factors on product market competition and the external influence on the cash dividend payment. Through the empirical research, this paper draws the following conclusions: 1, cash dividend will positively related to the degree of product market competition with the company. When the degree of product market competition is large, the company the cash dividend will be stronger; the degree of product market competition more hours, the company's cash dividend will increasingly weak.2 product A cash dividend payment level and the degree of competition is positively correlated. When the degree of product market competition is large, the company's cash dividend payment level is higher, pay more cash dividend; when the degree of product market competition more hours, the company's cash dividend payment level is low, pay less cash dividends.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 傅頎;汪祥耀;路軍;;管理層權(quán)力、高管薪酬變動(dòng)與公司并購(gòu)行為分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2014年11期

2 楊德明;趙璨;;國(guó)有企業(yè)高管為什么會(huì)滋生隱性腐敗?[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2014年10期

3 王曾;符國(guó)群;黃丹陽(yáng);汪劍鋒;;國(guó)有企業(yè)CEO“政治晉升”與“在職消費(fèi)”關(guān)系研究[J];管理世界;2014年05期

4 馮根福;趙玨航;;管理者薪酬、在職消費(fèi)與公司績(jī)效——基于合作博弈的分析視角[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2012年06期

5 方軍雄;;高管權(quán)力與企業(yè)薪酬變動(dòng)的非對(duì)稱性[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2011年04期

6 陳冬華;梁上坤;蔣德權(quán);;不同市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程下高管激勵(lì)契約的成本與選擇:貨幣薪酬與在職消費(fèi)[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2010年11期

7 盧銳;魏明海;黎文靖;;管理層權(quán)力、在職消費(fèi)與產(chǎn)權(quán)效率——來(lái)自中國(guó)上市公司的證據(jù)[J];南開(kāi)管理評(píng)論;2008年05期

8 羅宏;黃文華;;國(guó)企分紅、在職消費(fèi)與公司業(yè)績(jī)[J];管理世界;2008年09期

9 胡建平;干勝道;;產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、自由現(xiàn)金流量和代理成本[J];統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策;2008年07期

10 楊華榮;陳軍;陳金賢;;產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)度對(duì)上市公司自愿性信息披露影響研究[J];預(yù)測(cè);2008年01期

，

本文編號(hào)：1485367