終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、投資者法律保護(hù)與公司股利政策
發(fā)布時間:2018-01-26 05:53
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 現(xiàn)金流量權(quán) 兩權(quán)分離度 投資者法律保護(hù) 公司股利政策 出處:《西南交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:股利政策圍繞著是否將公司留存收益進(jìn)行分配,亦或是否將公司利潤留存進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)活動或者再投資,直接關(guān)系到股東的實(shí)際利益。股利政策能體現(xiàn)一個公司的綜合實(shí)力,傳遞出一定的信息,可以對公司的股價產(chǎn)生影響,能夠在一定程度上體現(xiàn)出公司的結(jié)構(gòu)和管理水平,是了解一個公司的經(jīng)營成果和治理水平的重要尺度。所以,股利政策一直是公司財務(wù)研究的重點(diǎn)與熱點(diǎn)。而隨著La Porta etal(1999)提出終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)開始,終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與股利政策的關(guān)系就得到極大的關(guān)注與研究。在此之前,代理理論的焦點(diǎn)在于股東與經(jīng)理間的代理沖突問題;當(dāng)終極所有權(quán)論提出后,研究內(nèi)容和關(guān)注焦點(diǎn)逐步轉(zhuǎn)移到研究終極所有權(quán)人與中小投資者之間的利益沖突問題。投資者法律保護(hù)屬于外部調(diào)節(jié)機(jī)制,投資者法律保護(hù)的強(qiáng)弱會對終極所有權(quán)人的行為產(chǎn)生一定的影響與約束。本文通過引入投資者法律保護(hù)這一外部調(diào)節(jié)變量,來探究終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司股利政策的關(guān)系,綜合考慮內(nèi)部治理與外部調(diào)節(jié)兩個方面,研究兩方面對公司股利政策的共同作用效果。本文通過文獻(xiàn)研究與實(shí)證研究的方式,以2011年至2014年四年的滬深A(yù)股上市公司的非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)為研究對象,探究終極所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、投資者法律保護(hù)與公司股利政策三者之間的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果顯示:第一,終極所有權(quán)人的現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)與公司股利支付水平存在著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,體現(xiàn)了所有權(quán)對公司股利的激勵作用;第二,終極所有權(quán)人的分離度與公司股利支付水平存在著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,體現(xiàn)了終極所有權(quán)人將股利作為侵占中小投資者利益的工具;第三,上市公司的終極所有權(quán)人為非國有性質(zhì)的股利支付水平整體高于終極所有權(quán)人為國有性質(zhì)的股利支付水平,體現(xiàn)出了市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展、證券市場的規(guī)范對于非國有性質(zhì)的上市公司的具有較強(qiáng)的作用;第四,投資者法律保護(hù)和公司股利支付水平存在著穩(wěn)定的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,體現(xiàn)出了投資者法律保護(hù)對中小投資者利益的保護(hù);第五,投資者法律保護(hù)對于兩權(quán)分離度和股利支付水平之間的關(guān)系具有一定的影響,投資者法律保護(hù)會抑制終極所有權(quán)人通過股利實(shí)施的侵占行為,在一定程度上保護(hù)中小投資者的利益;第六,投資者法律保護(hù)對于不同性質(zhì)的終極所有權(quán)人與股利政策之間關(guān)系具有不同的影響,投資者法律保護(hù)水平的提升對非國有性質(zhì)的上市公司的影響更大。
[Abstract]:Dividend policy revolves around whether to distribute the company's retained earnings, or whether to retain the company's profits for production activities or reinvestment. Dividend policy can reflect the comprehensive strength of a company, convey certain information, can have an impact on the stock price of the company. To a certain extent can reflect the company's structure and management level, is to understand a company's business results and governance level of an important yardstick. Dividend policy has always been the focus and focus of corporate finance research, and with La Porta etal1999), the ultimate ownership structure began. The relationship between the ultimate ownership structure and dividend policy has been greatly concerned and studied. Before this, the focus of agency theory is the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. When the ultimate ownership theory was put forward, the research content and focus gradually shifted to the study of the conflict of interest between the ultimate owner and small and medium-sized investors. The legal protection of investors belongs to the external regulatory mechanism. The legal protection of investors will have a certain impact and constraints on the behavior of the ultimate owner. This paper introduces the external regulatory variable of investor legal protection. To explore the ultimate ownership structure and corporate dividend policy relationship, comprehensive consideration of internal governance and external regulation two aspects. This paper studies the joint effect of the two aspects on the dividend policy of the company. Based on the non-equilibrium panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2014, this paper explores the ultimate ownership structure. The relationship between investor legal protection and corporate dividend policy. The results show that: first, the ultimate owner's cash flow right and the company dividend payment level has a positive correlation. It reflects the incentive effect of ownership on the dividend of the company; Secondly, there is a negative correlation between the degree of separation of the ultimate owner and the level of dividend payment, which reflects that the ultimate owner takes the dividend as a tool to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized investors; Third, the ultimate ownership of listed companies is the non-state-owned nature of the overall level of dividend payment higher than the ultimate ownership of the state-owned nature of the dividend payment level, reflecting the development of the market economy. The regulation of the securities market has a strong effect on the non-state-owned listed companies; In 4th, there is a stable positive correlation between the legal protection of investors and the level of dividend payment, which reflects the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors by legal protection of investors; In 5th, investor legal protection has certain influence on the relationship between the degree of separation of two rights and the level of dividend payment, and investor legal protection will restrain the ultimate proprietors' encroachment through dividend. To protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors to a certain extent; In 6th, investor legal protection has different influence on the relationship between ultimate owner and dividend policy, and the improvement of investor legal protection level has more influence on non-state-owned listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:D922.28;F275;F832.51
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