【摘要】：食品安全不僅關(guān)系到廣大人民群眾的身體健康,還關(guān)系到經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)的健康發(fā)展。當(dāng)前中國(guó)食品安全事故頻發(fā),不斷打擊著廣大人民群眾對(duì)食品安全的信心。隨著食品安全問(wèn)題的日益嚴(yán)重性,政府監(jiān)管部門(mén)采取多種規(guī)制措施保障食品安全,但從實(shí)施效果看,食品安全問(wèn)題事故頻發(fā)的勢(shì)頭雖然得到一定遏制,但整體形勢(shì)依然十分嚴(yán)峻。有效解決食品安全問(wèn)題,重塑消費(fèi)者信心,任重道遠(yuǎn)。本文運(yùn)用規(guī)制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、博弈論、計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等相關(guān)理論,采用規(guī)范分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合的方法對(duì)中國(guó)食品安全規(guī)制績(jī)效與優(yōu)化路徑進(jìn)行了深入的分析。本文的研究思路如下:首先,提出政府規(guī)制是一種特殊的公共物品,并探討了政府規(guī)制的特征與供需靜態(tài)均衡,借鑒德魯克與羅賓斯的管理學(xué)相關(guān)理論,運(yùn)用規(guī)制效果與規(guī)制效率兩個(gè)指標(biāo)評(píng)價(jià)食品安全政府規(guī)制績(jī)效;其次,從整個(gè)食品供應(yīng)鏈條出發(fā),基于政府規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)、食品生產(chǎn)企業(yè)、消費(fèi)者三個(gè)博弈主體的利益考慮,建立了以中央政府與地方政府、地方政府與食品生產(chǎn)企業(yè)、生產(chǎn)企業(yè)與生產(chǎn)企業(yè)、生產(chǎn)企業(yè)與消費(fèi)者為參與人的四組動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,從理論層面分析了影響中國(guó)食品安全規(guī)制績(jī)效的因素;再次,選取規(guī)制效果與規(guī)制效率兩個(gè)指標(biāo)對(duì)中國(guó)的食品安全規(guī)制績(jī)效進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)。在對(duì)食品安全規(guī)制效果進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)時(shí),采用VAR模型實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)中國(guó)食品安全規(guī)制效果,并進(jìn)行了脈沖響應(yīng)分析與方差分解;在對(duì)食品安全規(guī)制效率進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)時(shí),以數(shù)據(jù)包絡(luò)分析法(DEA)為分析工具,從生產(chǎn)效率的視角對(duì)我國(guó)1997-2012年的食品安全規(guī)制效率進(jìn)行了研究,并在第二階段通過(guò)Tobit模型對(duì)影響規(guī)制效率的因素進(jìn)行了分析,并對(duì)第三章博弈分析中的結(jié)論進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。最后,本文在理論分析與實(shí)證研究基礎(chǔ)上提出中國(guó)食品安全規(guī)制優(yōu)化路徑。得出的主要結(jié)論為:(1)食品安全規(guī)制涉及諸多利益主體,利益主體之間博弈的結(jié)果會(huì)影響食品安全規(guī)制效果。規(guī)制部門(mén)加大對(duì)違規(guī)食品生產(chǎn)企業(yè)的處罰力度,增加其違規(guī)成本,再加之聲譽(yù)損失,企業(yè)選擇生產(chǎn)安全食品的概率就會(huì)增大。消費(fèi)者勝訴的概率越大,獲得的賠償額越多,企業(yè)越有可能選擇生產(chǎn)合格食品;(2)在長(zhǎng)期,監(jiān)督頻次和處罰戶次數(shù)的增加以及食品行業(yè)勞動(dòng)力素質(zhì)的提高均可以提高食品抽檢合格率,提高食品安全規(guī)制效果,而食品工業(yè)產(chǎn)量的增加則降低了食品安全規(guī)制效果。此外,規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)處罰戶次數(shù)的增加對(duì)食品抽檢合格率預(yù)測(cè)方差的影響最大;(3)我國(guó)食品安全規(guī)制綜合效率偏低,并且主要是由純技術(shù)效率水平低下和參差不齊造成的,2009年以后食品安全政府規(guī)制總體效率要高于2009以前的水平。從制度性因素看,規(guī)制立法變量的變動(dòng)可以促進(jìn)食品安全政府規(guī)制效率的提高,而規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)變量的作用則相反;同時(shí)食品工業(yè)勞動(dòng)力素質(zhì)的提高可以提高食品安全規(guī)制效率;從規(guī)制行為看,增加監(jiān)督頻次與處罰戶次數(shù)可以提高食品安全規(guī)制效率。
[Abstract]:Food safety concerns not only the health of the masses, but also the economic and social development. China's food safety accidents are frequent, and the people's confidence in food safety is constantly being combated. With the increasing seriousness of food safety problem, the government supervision department takes a variety of regulation measures to guarantee the food safety, but from the implementation effect, the trend of frequent accidents of food safety has been restrained, but the overall situation is still very serious. To effectively solve food safety problems, rebuild consumer confidence, have a long way to go. This paper applies the theory of regulation economics, information economics, game theory, econometrics and so on, and makes an in-depth analysis of China's food safety regulation performance and optimization path by means of normative analysis and empirical analysis. First of all, the paper puts forward that government regulation is a special public goods, and probes into the characteristics of government regulation and the static equilibrium of supply and demand, and draws on Drucker's theory of management related to Robbins. Secondly, starting from the whole food supply chain strip, based on the interests of three game bodies of government regulation mechanism, food production enterprises and consumers, the central government and local government have been established. The local government and the food production enterprises, the production enterprises and the production enterprises, the production enterprises and the consumers are four groups of dynamic game models of the participants, the factors influencing the performance of China's food safety regulation are analyzed from the theoretical level, and again, The paper evaluates the performance of food safety regulation in China by selecting two indexes of regulation effect and regulation efficiency. In order to evaluate the effect of food safety regulation, VAR model is used to empirically test the effect of China's food safety regulation, and impulse response analysis and variance decomposition are carried out. In order to evaluate the efficiency of food safety regulation, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used as the analysis tool. The efficiency of food safety regulation in China from 1997 to 2012 was studied from the perspective of production efficiency, and the factors affecting the regulation efficiency were analyzed in the second stage through the Tobit model, and the conclusion of the third-chapter game analysis was verified. Finally, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper puts forward the optimization path of China's food safety regulation. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) The food safety regulation involves many interests subjects, and the result of game between interests subject will affect the food safety regulation effect. The regulation department increases the punishment strength to the illegal food production enterprise, increases its illegal cost, and adds the reputation loss, and the probability that the enterprise chooses to produce the safety food will increase. The greater the probability of winning the consumer, the more the compensation awarded, the more likely the enterprise may choose to produce the qualified food; (2) the increase in the frequency of supervision and the number of punishments and the improvement of the quality of the labor force in the long-term period can improve the qualification rate of the spot check of the food, the food safety regulation effect is improved, and the food industry yield is increased, and the food safety regulation effect is reduced. In addition, the increase of the number of penalty households in the regulatory body has the greatest influence on the prediction variance of the qualification rate of food sampling, and (3) the comprehensive efficiency of food safety regulation in China is low. and the overall efficiency of food safety government regulation after 2009 is higher than before 2009. From the institutional factors, the change of regulation legislative variable can promote the improvement of the regulation efficiency of food safety government, but the function of regulation mechanism variable is opposite; meanwhile, the improvement of labor quality of food industry can improve the efficiency of food safety regulation; from the regulation behavior, Increasing supervision frequency and number of penalty households can improve the efficiency of food safety regulation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F203

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