食品安全利益相關(guān)者行為研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-10-07 17:21
【摘要】:民以食為天,食以安為先。食品安全是攸關(guān)我們每一個人生命健康的大事,隨著近年來屢現(xiàn)報端的食品安全事件,使之逐漸成為了社會大眾最為關(guān)注的熱點問題;谝陨媳尘,在閱讀了大量國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的研究文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)之上,通過對歷年來食品安全事件的統(tǒng)計分析,對我國食品安全問題的成因、現(xiàn)狀及其造成的不利影響有了初步的認(rèn)識。再將商業(yè)倫理學(xué)中的利益自相關(guān)者理論引入食品安全問題的研究中,對食品安全事件中主要利益相關(guān)者的行為進(jìn)行了分析;然后結(jié)合運(yùn)用博弈論中的靜態(tài)與動態(tài)分析方法,對利益相關(guān)者的博弈行為進(jìn)行了比較全面地分析。最后,經(jīng)過案例分析和國外成功經(jīng)驗的借鑒,結(jié)合我國現(xiàn)狀和國情,分別從政府部門、生產(chǎn)企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者三個方面提出了解決食品安全問題這一頑疾的政策建議。研究分析得出的主要結(jié)論如下:1.食品安全問題是由多個利益相關(guān)主體的不當(dāng)行為共同作用造成的,其中包括:政府監(jiān)管部門的失職、企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的缺失、消費(fèi)者維權(quán)意識的淡薄以及環(huán)境和技術(shù)條件的制約。2.通過食品安全主要利益相關(guān)者之間的各種博弈行為的分析表明:加大懲罰力度、提高舉報獎勵、降低消費(fèi)者的維權(quán)成本以及政府部門的執(zhí)法成本是解決食品安全問題的有效途徑。3.食品安全問題的解決之道在于所有利益相關(guān)主體的共同參與,只有政府部門嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管、生產(chǎn)企業(yè)高度自律、消費(fèi)者積極監(jiān)督舉報三頭并重,才能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)社會共治下的食品安全新局面。
[Abstract]:The people take food as the day, and food takes peace as the first. Food safety is a major event that affects the life and health of every one of us. With the repeated occurrence of food safety events in recent years, food safety has gradually become a hot issue that the public pays most attention to. Based on the above background, on the basis of reading a large number of domestic and foreign scholars' research literature, through the statistical analysis of food safety events over the years, the causes of food safety problems in China are discussed. The present situation and its adverse effects have been preliminarily understood. Then it introduces the theory of stakeholders in business ethics into the study of food safety issues, analyzes the behavior of the main stakeholders in food safety events, and then combines the static and dynamic analysis methods of game theory. The game behavior of stakeholders is analyzed comprehensively. Finally, through the case analysis and the successful experience of foreign countries, combined with the current situation and the national conditions of our country, this paper puts forward the policy suggestions to solve the problem of food safety from three aspects: government department, production enterprise and consumer respectively. The main conclusions of the study and analysis are as follows: 1. The food safety problem is caused by the improper behavior of multiple stakeholders, including: the failure of the government supervision department, the lack of corporate social responsibility, the weak awareness of consumer rights protection and the restriction of environmental and technical conditions. Through the analysis of various game behaviors among the main stakeholders of food safety, it is shown that the punishment should be increased, and the reward for reporting should be increased. The effective way to solve food safety problem is to reduce the cost of consumers' rights protection and the cost of law enforcement by government departments. The solution to the food safety problem lies in the joint participation of all stakeholders. Only the government departments strictly supervise, the production enterprises are highly self-disciplined, and the consumers actively supervise and report the cases at the same time. Only in this way can we realize the new situation of food safety under the common rule of society.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:F203
本文編號:2255028
[Abstract]:The people take food as the day, and food takes peace as the first. Food safety is a major event that affects the life and health of every one of us. With the repeated occurrence of food safety events in recent years, food safety has gradually become a hot issue that the public pays most attention to. Based on the above background, on the basis of reading a large number of domestic and foreign scholars' research literature, through the statistical analysis of food safety events over the years, the causes of food safety problems in China are discussed. The present situation and its adverse effects have been preliminarily understood. Then it introduces the theory of stakeholders in business ethics into the study of food safety issues, analyzes the behavior of the main stakeholders in food safety events, and then combines the static and dynamic analysis methods of game theory. The game behavior of stakeholders is analyzed comprehensively. Finally, through the case analysis and the successful experience of foreign countries, combined with the current situation and the national conditions of our country, this paper puts forward the policy suggestions to solve the problem of food safety from three aspects: government department, production enterprise and consumer respectively. The main conclusions of the study and analysis are as follows: 1. The food safety problem is caused by the improper behavior of multiple stakeholders, including: the failure of the government supervision department, the lack of corporate social responsibility, the weak awareness of consumer rights protection and the restriction of environmental and technical conditions. Through the analysis of various game behaviors among the main stakeholders of food safety, it is shown that the punishment should be increased, and the reward for reporting should be increased. The effective way to solve food safety problem is to reduce the cost of consumers' rights protection and the cost of law enforcement by government departments. The solution to the food safety problem lies in the joint participation of all stakeholders. Only the government departments strictly supervise, the production enterprises are highly self-disciplined, and the consumers actively supervise and report the cases at the same time. Only in this way can we realize the new situation of food safety under the common rule of society.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:F203
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前5條
1 左偉;;基于食品安全的企業(yè)、監(jiān)管部門動態(tài)博弈分析[J];華南農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2009年03期
2 左偉;潘涌璋;;基于博弈論的食品安全監(jiān)管分析[J];科技管理研究;2011年23期
3 董紀(jì)元;;基于博弈論的食品安全監(jiān)管分析[J];合作經(jīng)濟(jì)與科技;2013年14期
4 毛曉慶;;引入有獎舉報機(jī)制解決食品安全問題的博弈分析[J];企業(yè)導(dǎo)報;2012年16期
5 官青青;;食品安全的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析——基于各主體行為之間的博弈分析[J];生產(chǎn)力研究;2013年01期
,本文編號:2255028
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/hongguanjingjilunwen/2255028.html
最近更新
教材專著