本文選題：PFI模式 + 利益相關(guān)者�。� 參考：《重慶工商大學》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,隨著我國社會經(jīng)濟的突飛猛進,基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的需求與日俱增,為緩解城市化基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)壓力,政府部門提高了公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目的建設(shè)力度。由于政府部門的財政資金短缺,為解決地方的債務危機,各級政府紛紛借助民間資本力量,通過合資或承包的方式將基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)項目外包給私營部門或私人財團。在眾多的私企代建制模式下,相比其它模式,PFI(私人主動融資)模式的運行機制更加靈活,實行全面的代理制度,因此風險也較大。針對PFI模式的這一優(yōu)缺點,在分析PFI模式各利益主體間的委托代理關(guān)系及諸多代理問題基礎(chǔ)之上,研究了核心利益相關(guān)者的博弈并建立PFI模式核心利益相關(guān)者的激勵約束。本文基于PFI模式概述及PFI模式中核心利益相關(guān)者的界定；從合同關(guān)系上分析了具體簽署的合同類型；闡述了PFI模式中利益主體間的委托代理關(guān)系及代理中的違規(guī)、“消極”、“尋租”等問題。在此基礎(chǔ)上,針對有效監(jiān)管問題構(gòu)建了政府與PFI項目公司、項目管理單位與承包商的兩組監(jiān)督博弈；針對PFI模式中存在的兩種“尋租”行為,構(gòu)建了PFI項目公司與承包商的尋租三方博弈,給出了三者的最優(yōu)行為策略,構(gòu)建項目管理單位與承包商的“尋租”的三方博弈,從政府角度提出防尋租的有效措施。為了引導代理人的行為、規(guī)避違規(guī)、“尋租”等風險問題、確保項目的有效運轉(zhuǎn)、實現(xiàn)項目的整體利益最大化,本文在第五章從政府角度建立了PFI模式核心利益相關(guān)者的激勵約束。考慮到如何引導代理人行為向整體利益靠攏,在激勵約束上,分別從最優(yōu)激勵合同、聲譽激勵、監(jiān)督約束、制度約束做出分析。在最優(yōu)激勵合同機制設(shè)計上,提出最優(yōu)激勵系數(shù)的設(shè)計、風險的合理分配、激勵強度的控制三方面的建議；在聲譽激勵部分,建議政府建立有關(guān)代理人的優(yōu)秀聲譽企業(yè)、“黑名單”名錄庫,利用聲譽形成代理人的自我約束；約束方面,采用監(jiān)督約束和制度約束,本文認為健全法律法規(guī),結(jié)合具體事項特殊監(jiān)督及市場監(jiān)督才是長期有效的監(jiān)督約束方式；通過激勵約束方面的研究,為PFI模式核心利益相關(guān)者的長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展提供了實際參考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of social economy in our country, the demand for infrastructure construction is increasing day by day. In order to alleviate the pressure of urbanization infrastructure construction, government departments have enhanced the construction of public infrastructure projects. In order to solve the local debt crisis, governments at all levels use private capital to outsource infrastructure projects to the private sector or private consortia by means of joint ventures or contracts. Compared with other modes, the operating mechanism of PFI (Private active financing) mode is more flexible, and the overall agency system is implemented, so the risk is higher. In view of the advantages and disadvantages of PFI model, based on the analysis of the principal-agent relationship and many agency problems among the stakeholders in PFI model, the game of core stakeholders is studied and the incentive constraints of core stakeholders in PFI model are established. Based on the outline of PFI model and the definition of core stakeholders in PFI model, this paper analyzes the specific contract types in terms of contract relationship, expounds the principal-agent relationship among stakeholders and the violation of agency in PFI mode, "negative". Rent-seeking and other issues. On this basis, this paper constructs two groups of supervisory game between government and PFI project company, project management unit and contractor, aiming at two kinds of "rent-seeking" behavior in PFI mode. This paper constructs a tripartite rent-seeking game between the PFI project company and the contractor, gives the optimal behavior strategy of the three, constructs the tripartite game between the project management unit and the contractor, and puts forward effective measures to prevent rent-seeking from the angle of the government. In order to guide the agent's behavior, avoid the risk problems, such as violation, rent seeking and so on, ensure the effective operation of the project, and realize the maximization of the overall benefit of the project. In the fifth chapter, the incentive constraints of the core stakeholders in the PFI model are established from the point of view of the government. In consideration of how to guide agent behavior towards the overall interests, this paper analyzes the incentive constraints from the optimal incentive contract, reputation incentive, supervisory constraint and institutional constraint. In the design of optimal incentive contract mechanism, the author puts forward three suggestions: the design of optimal incentive coefficient, the reasonable distribution of risk, and the control of incentive intensity, and in the part of reputation incentive, it is suggested that the government should establish the excellent reputation enterprise of the relevant agent. In the "blacklist" list, the reputation is used to form the self-restraint of the agent. In the aspect of restraint, the supervision and the system are adopted, and the author thinks that the laws and regulations should be improved. The combination of specific items special supervision and market supervision is a long-term effective supervision and constraint mode. Through the research on incentive and constraint it provides a practical reference for the long-term stable development of PFI model core stakeholders.
【學位授予單位】：重慶工商大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F283

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本文編號：2057378