本文選題：縱向差異產(chǎn)品 + 價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)制　； 參考：《財(cái)經(jīng)問題研究》2016年07期

【摘要】：價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)制對合謀的作用機(jī)理一直是產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論關(guān)注和爭議的焦點(diǎn)。本文以縱向差異產(chǎn)品模型為基礎(chǔ),構(gòu)建一個(gè)擴(kuò)展的雙寡頭無限期重復(fù)博弈模型,首先求出競爭狀態(tài)下價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)制的均衡利潤,其次利用納什討價(jià)還價(jià)解求出合謀下的企業(yè)利潤,最后通過比較同時(shí)定價(jià)和價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)制兩種情形下企業(yè)維持合謀的激勵(lì),重點(diǎn)考察縱向差異產(chǎn)品下價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)行為對默契合謀的作用機(jī)理。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),如果企業(yè)可以采用價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)制進(jìn)行價(jià)格合謀,則無論是哪家企業(yè)作為價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)制都極大降低了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者背叛合謀的激勵(lì),增強(qiáng)了合謀的穩(wěn)定性,尤其是在高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品企業(yè)作為合謀的價(jià)格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者之時(shí)。對此,筆者建議反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)關(guān)注企業(yè)的序貫提價(jià)行為,發(fā)現(xiàn)潛藏在其中的合謀行為。
[Abstract]:The mechanism of price leadership on collusion has always been the focus of industry organization theory. Based on the vertical differential product model, this paper constructs an extended duopoly indefinite repeated game model. Firstly, the equilibrium profit of price leadership is obtained under competition, and secondly, the profit of collusive enterprises is obtained by Nash bargaining solution. Finally, by comparing the incentive of enterprises to maintain collusion under the conditions of simultaneous pricing and price leadership, the mechanism of price leadership on tacit collusion under vertical differential products is investigated. The study found that if the price leadership system can be used for price collusion, no matter who is the price leader, the price leadership system greatly reduces the incentive for the leader to betray collusion and enhances the stability of collusion. Especially in the high-quality product enterprises as collusive price leaders. In response, the author suggests that antitrust law enforcement agencies should pay attention to the sequential price increase of enterprises and find out the collusion hidden in it.
【作者單位】： 福建農(nóng)林大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織與企業(yè)組織研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社會科學(xué)研究青年基金項(xiàng)目“經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查中的經(jīng)濟(jì)證據(jù)研究”(11YJCZH189)
【分類號】：F224.32

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