發(fā)布時間：2018-04-28 13:36

  本文選題：PPP模式 + 養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)　； 參考：《西安建筑科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著社會不斷發(fā)展,人口老齡化這一問題的嚴(yán)峻性日益凸顯,僅靠政府的財政力量將難以滿足養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)的投資需求,這就為社會資本參與到養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)的建設(shè)提供了良好的契機,同時將PPP模式引入養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)這一建設(shè)方式也逐步受到關(guān)注與重視。由于養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)項目的投資回收期較長,采用PPP模式將在建設(shè)及運營過程中面臨較多的風(fēng)險因素,從而導(dǎo)致項目收益充滿不確定性,而社會資本又十分關(guān)注項目的經(jīng)濟效益,因此為了提高其參與項目的能動性和積極性,有必要對PPP模式下養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)問題進行深入的研究。首先闡述了PPP模式引入我國養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)領(lǐng)域的運作模式。隨后從政治風(fēng)險、不可抗力風(fēng)險、經(jīng)濟風(fēng)險、法律風(fēng)險、市場需求變化五個方面識別系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險;用WBS-RBS識別非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險,系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險和非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險共識別出25個風(fēng)險因素。通過問卷調(diào)查分析各風(fēng)險因素的發(fā)生概率和損害程度,計算風(fēng)險因素對項目綜合影響程度,進而得到各風(fēng)險的貢獻度,為風(fēng)險分擔(dān)問題提供了主次參考。其次從公共部門和私營部門兩個方面分析項目的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)主體,將風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的模式分為單一承擔(dān)主體和由公私雙方共擔(dān)。根據(jù)風(fēng)險控制理論,運用德爾菲法,對單一承擔(dān)主體的風(fēng)險進行分配,得到各風(fēng)險的承擔(dān)主體。然后在已有PPP項目風(fēng)險分擔(dān)博弈分析的基礎(chǔ)上,考慮公私雙方的非對稱地位,采用討價還價模型對談判過程進行研究,假設(shè)公共部門和私營部門對風(fēng)險的態(tài)度都是厭惡的,選取談判成本系數(shù)和私營部門風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)移份額作為參數(shù),確定公私雙方的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)比例,求出風(fēng)險承擔(dān)系數(shù)。基于投資比例和風(fēng)險承擔(dān)系數(shù),提出公私雙方的利益分配方法。最后論文以K市某養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)項目進行實證分析。在PPP合同的設(shè)計與談判中,風(fēng)險承擔(dān)方式將會直接影響項目的成敗。本文旨在將風(fēng)險進行合理分擔(dān),滿足各參與方利益,對我國PPP模式下養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)項目的實施提供理論參考。
[Abstract]:With the development of society, the problem of aging population is becoming more and more serious. It will be difficult to meet the investment needs of pension institutions by relying on the financial strength of the government alone, which provides a good opportunity for social capital to participate in the construction of pension institutions. At the same time, the introduction of PPP model into pension institutions has gradually attracted attention and attention. Because of the long payback period of the pension institution project, the PPP model will face more risk factors in the process of construction and operation, which leads to the uncertainty of the project income, and the social capital pays close attention to the economic benefit of the project. Therefore, in order to improve their initiative and enthusiasm to participate in the project, it is necessary to carry out in-depth research on the risk bearing of pension institutions under the PPP model. First of all, this paper expounds the operation mode of introducing PPP mode into the field of pension institutions in China. Then the system risk is identified from five aspects: political risk, force majeure risk, economic risk, legal risk and market demand change, and 25 risk factors are identified by using WBS-RBS to identify non-system risk, system risk and non-system risk. The probability and damage degree of each risk factor are analyzed by questionnaire, the comprehensive influence degree of risk factor on the project is calculated, and the contribution degree of each risk is obtained, which provides the primary and secondary reference for the risk sharing problem. Secondly, it analyzes the risk bearing subject of the project from two aspects of the public sector and the private sector, and divides the risk bearing model into a single undertaking subject and a public and private co-bearing model. According to the theory of risk control, using Delphi method, the risk of a single subject is allocated and the subject of each risk is obtained. Then on the basis of the PPP project risk sharing game analysis, considering the asymmetric position of both public and private, the bargaining model is used to study the negotiation process, assuming that both the public and private sectors are averse to risk. The negotiation cost coefficient and the private sector risk transfer share are selected as parameters to determine the risk sharing ratio between public and private parties and to find out the risk bearing coefficient. Based on the investment ratio and risk-bearing coefficient, the method of benefit distribution between public and private parties is put forward. Finally, the paper carries on the empirical analysis with a pension institution project in K city. In the design and negotiation of PPP contract, the way of risk bearing will directly affect the success or failure of the project. The purpose of this paper is to share the risk reasonably, to satisfy the interests of all the participants, and to provide a theoretical reference for the implementation of pension institution projects under the PPP mode in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F283;D669.6;F719

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