本文選題：服務外包　切入點：不完全契約　出處：《河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著全球產(chǎn)業(yè)的重新調(diào)整,第三產(chǎn)業(yè)即服務業(yè)的蓬勃發(fā)展在世界經(jīng)濟的結(jié)構(gòu)和布局中發(fā)揮越來越重要的作用。發(fā)達國家開始將越來越多、越來越復雜的服務業(yè)功能轉(zhuǎn)向其他地方,于是出現(xiàn)了一個新的產(chǎn)業(yè)——服務外包。當看到這種新興行業(yè)所帶來的發(fā)展機遇后,各個企業(yè)便開始爭先恐后的進入服務外包行業(yè)。然而我們在收獲服務外包所帶來的收益的同時,也必須面對隨之而來的挑戰(zhàn)。服務外包的委托-代理雙方通過契約來規(guī)定雙方的權利和義務,但雙方的有限理性,外界環(huán)境的不確定性,信息的不對稱性等因素都會使得契約具有不完全性。不完全的服務外包契約容易使發(fā)包方面臨著敲竹杠、機會主義等風險。因此,在不完全契約的背景下,研究服務外包風險以及治理機制具有一定的現(xiàn)實意義。 本文遵循理論--建模--實證的思維及論述過程。首先,在委托代理理論、交易成本理論和不完全契約理論的理論支持下,分析了契約不完全的成因以及由此導致的契約風險。其次,針對契約風險,本文參考了以往學者研究所涉及的諸多治理機制,分別以基于正式契約治理機制(完備契約機制、激勵懲罰機制、監(jiān)控機制)和基于關系契約治理機制(信息共享機制、溝通機制、信任機制、聲譽機制)為基礎提出相關的研究假設,并構(gòu)建了雙態(tài)綜合治理機制模型。最后,本文根據(jù)國內(nèi)外相關的成熟量表設計了初始調(diào)查問卷,在此基礎上通過對小樣本題項的凈化處理,形成了比較合理的調(diào)查問卷。針對問卷調(diào)研獲得的數(shù)據(jù)信息進行逐步回歸分析,以驗證模型中的假設,并對實證檢驗結(jié)果進行分析和論證,在此基礎上提出了可供企業(yè)防范和治理契約風險的建議。 本文的實證結(jié)果顯示,雙邊綜合治理機制對契約風險的治理效果要高于正式契約或關系契約治理機制其中的任何單一治理形式的治理效果。其中,完備契約、激勵懲罰、監(jiān)控和溝通與契約風險存在著顯著地負相關關系；信息共享和信任與契約風險存在負相關關系,但是不顯著的；聲譽與契約風險未得到與理論假設一致的結(jié)果,即不存在顯著負相關關系。
[Abstract]:With the readjustment of the global industry, the vigorous development of the tertiary industry, that is, the service industry, is playing an increasingly important role in the structure and layout of the world economy.Developed countries began to shift more and more complex service functions to other places, and a new industry-service outsourcing emerged.After seeing the development opportunity brought by this new industry, each enterprise begins to rush into the service outsourcing industry.However, as we reap the benefits of outsourcing, we must also face the challenges that come with it.The principal-agent of service outsourcing stipulates the rights and obligations of both parties through contract, but the limited rationality of both parties, the uncertainty of external environment and the asymmetry of information make the contract incomplete.Incomplete service outsourcing contracts are likely to expose the contracting parties to risks such as ripping off, opportunism and so on.Therefore, under the background of incomplete contract, it is of practical significance to study the risk and governance mechanism of service outsourcing.This paper follows the thinking and argumentation process of theory-modeling-demonstration.Firstly, with the support of principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory and incomplete contract theory, this paper analyzes the causes of incomplete contract and the contractual risks caused by it.Secondly, in view of contract risk, this paper refers to many governance mechanisms involved in previous scholars' research, respectively, based on formal contract governance mechanism (complete contract mechanism, incentive and punishment mechanism).Based on the monitoring mechanism and the relational contract governance mechanism (information sharing mechanism, communication mechanism, trust mechanism, reputation mechanism), this paper puts forward the relevant research hypotheses, and constructs a two-state comprehensive governance mechanism model.Finally, this paper designs the initial questionnaire according to the domestic and foreign mature scale, and on this basis, through the purification of small sample items, a more reasonable questionnaire is formed.On the basis of stepwise regression analysis of the data information obtained by questionnaire investigation, the hypothesis in the model is verified, and the empirical test results are analyzed and demonstrated. On the basis of this, some suggestions are put forward for enterprises to prevent and manage contractual risks.The empirical results show that the governance effect of bilateral comprehensive governance mechanism on contract risk is higher than that of any single governance form of formal contract or relational contract governance mechanism.Among them, complete contract, incentive punishment, monitoring and communication have significant negative correlation with contract risk, information sharing and trust have negative correlation with contract risk, but not significant.The results of reputation and contract risk are not consistent with theoretical hypothesis, that is, there is no significant negative correlation between reputation and contract risk.
【學位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F719;F224

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