房地產(chǎn)銷售代理合約研究
[Abstract]:After hundreds of years of development, the real estate market in the developed countries has gone through industrialization and urbanization, and has entered the mature stage in the early 1950s. At present, in the developed countries, the real estate market mainly deals with the second-hand house transaction, and the purchase and sale of one-hand house accounts for only a small proportion of the total trading volume. But in our country, however, our country is still in the process of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and the new house transactions exceed the trading volume of the second-hand house each year. In addition, with the development of the social division of labor, many developers in the new house select the mode of the sales agent. Therefore, the sales agent plays an important role in the real estate market of our country, and coordinates the relationship between the two sides of the real estate sales agent, which is of great significance to the development of the real estate industry and the social economy. However, from the current operation of the real estate sales agent market in our country, the sales agent has not been well motivated, the enthusiasm is not fully exerted, the sales agent activity is not high, and the developer is not satisfied with the sales agent's work. In order to coordinate the relationship between the real estate sales agent, the paper proceeds from the view of supply chain to the real estate sales agent. On the basis of introducing the development of the real estate and the sales agent industry in China, and the problems existing in the real estate sales agent industry, the existing research results and the literature are sorted out. and review. As the source of the real estate sales agent activity, the real estate developer should make a sales work The decision of outsourcing is based on the theoretical basis and the motivation of the outsourcing of the business. It is pointed out that the motivation of the outsourcing of real estate is the focus of the developer on the core business, the price of the project and the sales speed, and the promotion of the project. The profit ability of the developer. The developer sells the outsourcing decision, mainly see whether the self-organized sales income is higher or the sales outsourcing In order to start, the principal-agent relationship of the real estate sales agent and the principal-agent problem in the contract theory are analyzed. On the basis of this, the real estate sales agent's activities are analyzed and the real estate sales agent activities are studied. Decision and behavior. To coordinate the relationship between the upstream and downstream enterprises of the real estate sales supply chain, it is necessary to carry out the relationship between the developer and the sales agent Reasonable interest distribution. As a result of the real estate sales agent, the ownership of the real estate is not transferred between the agents, which is similar to the general sales supply There is a fundamental difference in the chain. For this reason, the composition of the selling price of the real estate and the contribution of the sales agent in different price sections to the price increase are analyzed, and it is pointed out that the sales agent can be better driven according to the implementation of the grading into the benefit distribution contract according to the implementation of the different price sections. to mobilize its enthusiasm and to promote the supply chain of real estate The improvement of the operation efficiency. In addition to improving the selling price and increasing the total profit of the project, the implementation of the project stage sales target is for the developer It is of great significance to introduce a feedback and punishment mechanism into the real estate sales agent to study the premises As a base point of the study, the sales agent's degree of work and the whole sales supply chain and commission of the sales agent in the normal commission mode are analyzed first. The respective proceeds from both parties. Subsequently, the sales agent contract is researched on the sales quantity promise. In the commitment contract model, the comprehensive reward and punishment measures of the unit price and the reward and punishment plus the fixed amount are introduced, and the sales agent is obtained through the model construction and the optimization analysis. The decision-making strategy and benefits of the business, and the degree of effort and the parties involved in the sales of agents in both modes On the basis of consideration of general feedback and punishment measures, the comprehensive reward and punishment measures can force the sales agent to select a higher degree of effort, avoid the occurrence of moral hazard, and guarantee the realization of the promise, so as to guarantee the opening of the real estate. The achievement of the intended target of the issuer. The research on the classification of the distribution contract and the commitment contract is for the static income, but in the real economic life, the thing is the dynamic development In order to make the study more close to reality, consider the value of the capital time to the house. The effect of the two parties on the real estate sales agent is analyzed. The behavior of the sales agent and the income of the parties under the two conditions of not considering and considering the time value of the capital are respectively analyzed. The results show that, in the case of considering the time value of the capital, the value of the time value of the fund is not taken into account. And the sales agent works harder, and the real estate project can be realized in the early stage. More sales, and the benefits of the parties are higher. Finally, with the relevant actual Based on the data, the case study is carried out. The data analysis results show that the real estate sales outsourcing can not bring the cost reduction, but can promote the increase of the price of the project product, and the increase of the selling price exceeds the cost increase.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號(hào)】:F299.233.52
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