本文選題：招拍掛出讓機(jī)制 + 拍賣理論��； 參考：《上海交通大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：自2004年以來(lái)，經(jīng)營(yíng)性土地使用權(quán)的招拍掛出讓機(jī)制在我國(guó)土地市場(chǎng)中的核心地位得以確立。但現(xiàn)實(shí)數(shù)據(jù)表明，在不同時(shí)期和不同地域，招標(biāo)、拍賣和掛牌三種出讓方式均得到不同程度的應(yīng)用，而且這三種出讓方式形成的土地價(jià)格也存在差別。根據(jù)拍賣理論中對(duì)收入等價(jià)定理的拓展研究，不同的假設(shè)條件，例如競(jìng)標(biāo)者的價(jià)值結(jié)構(gòu)、對(duì)稱性、進(jìn)入成本、是否允許重復(fù)進(jìn)入等，都會(huì)對(duì)各種拍賣模型形成的成交價(jià)格帶來(lái)不同的影響。而且，在規(guī)定實(shí)施招拍掛機(jī)制的前提下，地方政府可在招標(biāo)、拍賣和掛牌三種出讓方式中進(jìn)行選擇，因此當(dāng)不同出讓方式的土地價(jià)格存在差別時(shí)，不同地域的地方政府會(huì)出于各種目的，在不同時(shí)期選擇不同的方式出讓土地使用權(quán)，進(jìn)而造成了各出讓方式在不同時(shí)期和地域內(nèi)得到不同程度的應(yīng)用的現(xiàn)象。此外，地方政府還可對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)氐恼信膾鞕C(jī)制進(jìn)行微調(diào)，例如上海市在2007年將住宅用地掛牌出讓的現(xiàn)場(chǎng)競(jìng)價(jià)規(guī)則由公開升價(jià)拍賣修改為一價(jià)封閉式拍賣，重慶市土地交易部門則根據(jù)競(jìng)買人的數(shù)量確定出讓方式，北京市還針對(duì)保障性住房用地的出讓創(chuàng)立了一些新的出讓機(jī)制，通過分析這些微調(diào)政策對(duì)土地價(jià)格的影響，能夠揭示地方政府采取這些舉措的目的。本文研究的主要問題就在于通過對(duì)土地使用權(quán)招拍掛出讓方式的理論和實(shí)證研究，比較不同出讓方式形成的土地價(jià)格，并在此基礎(chǔ)上分析地方政府在土地出讓中的行為，以解釋招拍掛出讓機(jī)制在我國(guó)土地市場(chǎng)中的應(yīng)用模式。 造成收入等價(jià)定理不成立的前提條件可能有很多種，因此在對(duì)招拍掛出讓方式進(jìn)行理論研究之前，首先需要根據(jù)我國(guó)土地市場(chǎng)的現(xiàn)狀、開發(fā)商的特征以及競(jìng)價(jià)行為抽象出合理的假設(shè)，并根據(jù)招拍掛機(jī)制的特點(diǎn)建立相應(yīng)的拍賣模型。本文假設(shè)競(jìng)標(biāo)者之間價(jià)值相容且存在信息不對(duì)稱，建立可顯示信息且第一階段允許重復(fù)進(jìn)入的兩階段升價(jià)拍賣模型對(duì)掛牌機(jī)制進(jìn)行理論刻畫，指出專業(yè)競(jìng)標(biāo)者在第一階段隱藏信息的行為造成了競(jìng)價(jià)集中在現(xiàn)場(chǎng)競(jìng)價(jià)階段的現(xiàn)象。本文利用第一階段可顯示信息且允許重復(fù)進(jìn)入的混合拍賣模型對(duì)上海市改革后的掛牌方式進(jìn)行理論分析，指出上海市的這一改革舉措加強(qiáng)了專業(yè)競(jìng)標(biāo)者在掛牌階段隱藏信息的動(dòng)機(jī)，進(jìn)而會(huì)降低土地成交價(jià)格。此外，本文還建立了可顯示信息的單階段升價(jià)拍賣模型以及不公開保留價(jià)格的一價(jià)拍賣模型分別對(duì)拍賣和招標(biāo)機(jī)制進(jìn)行均衡分析。在得到競(jìng)標(biāo)者均衡策略的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)不同出讓機(jī)制的成交價(jià)格進(jìn)行理論比較，得到了本文的主要理論結(jié)果。在實(shí)證研究中，本文利用現(xiàn)實(shí)數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)理論假設(shè)和模型的合理性進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證，并利用我國(guó)重點(diǎn)地市的土地交易數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)主要理論結(jié)果進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證。為了解決選擇樣本數(shù)據(jù)時(shí)出現(xiàn)的選擇性偏差，本文采用兩步回歸法，，一方面通過對(duì)土地價(jià)格建立回歸模型，比較不同出讓機(jī)制形成的土地價(jià)格，另一方面通過對(duì)地方政府的行為建立回歸模型，分析地方政府在選擇出讓方式時(shí)的行為，并解釋各種出讓方式在不同時(shí)期和不同地域的應(yīng)用。 本文的理論和實(shí)證研究得到了以下的結(jié)論：掛牌機(jī)制形成的土地價(jià)格始終高于招標(biāo)機(jī)制；當(dāng)現(xiàn)場(chǎng)競(jìng)價(jià)階段更有可能顯示信息時(shí)，上海市革新后的掛牌機(jī)制能夠有效降低土地價(jià)格；當(dāng)拍賣機(jī)制中有更多競(jìng)標(biāo)者參與時(shí)，拍賣機(jī)制形成的土地價(jià)格高于掛牌機(jī)制。由于掛牌方式既能夠促進(jìn)交易又可推高土地價(jià)格，因此得到地方政府的青睞，在全國(guó)的土地市場(chǎng)中得到了最廣泛的運(yùn)用；招標(biāo)方式則因?yàn)槟軌蚪档屯恋貎r(jià)格而被作為一種有效的調(diào)控措施，在房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)過熱的時(shí)期和地區(qū)得到應(yīng)用；上海市革新后的掛牌機(jī)制的確可降低土地價(jià)格，因而在上海市住宅用地的出讓市場(chǎng)中被沿用至今；拍賣機(jī)制則能夠形成更高的土地價(jià)格，因此至今仍在經(jīng)營(yíng)性用地供給不足且土地公開交易市場(chǎng)較為落后的重慶市得到運(yùn)用。本文的研究還指出北京市地方政府雖然在短期內(nèi)會(huì)追求更高的土地出讓收入，但長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)仍會(huì)服從中央政府對(duì)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行調(diào)控。但重慶市地方政府在選擇出讓方式時(shí)的目的則單純是為了獲得更高的土地價(jià)格，這也是其根據(jù)參與競(jìng)價(jià)的開發(fā)商數(shù)量自動(dòng)調(diào)整出讓方式的原因。 除招拍掛機(jī)制之外，近年來(lái)我國(guó)土地市場(chǎng)中還出現(xiàn)了一些新型的出讓方式。本文對(duì)北京市土地市場(chǎng)中推行的“限地價(jià)，競(jìng)配建”掛牌方式和“定配建，競(jìng)地價(jià)”招標(biāo)方式進(jìn)行了理論研究，指出在限制拍賣起始價(jià)的前提下，結(jié)合“溢價(jià)率超50%需上報(bào)”的規(guī)定，“限地價(jià)，競(jìng)配建”方式可有效控制地價(jià)并促進(jìn)保障房的開發(fā)。但在地價(jià)相同時(shí)，“限地價(jià)，競(jìng)配建”掛牌方式可引導(dǎo)開發(fā)商建設(shè)更多的保障房；在保障房建設(shè)面積相同時(shí)，“定配建，競(jìng)地價(jià)”招標(biāo)方式則可形成更低的土地價(jià)格。因此地方政府可根據(jù)不同的政策重點(diǎn)選擇更有效的出讓方式。 本文的研究結(jié)論為完善土地出讓機(jī)制和規(guī)范地方政府行為提供了一些建議。首先，實(shí)行招拍掛出讓機(jī)制的根本目的在于使土地作為一種國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的價(jià)值得到充分體現(xiàn)，這可以從多個(gè)方面得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。一方面，可通過向缺乏經(jīng)驗(yàn)的中小開發(fā)商提供更多信息，或要求所有競(jìng)標(biāo)者必須在公開掛牌階段的每輪競(jìng)價(jià)中出價(jià)，又或者延長(zhǎng)掛牌階段和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)競(jìng)價(jià)階段中每輪競(jìng)價(jià)的持續(xù)時(shí)間，可促進(jìn)競(jìng)價(jià)過程中的信息顯示。另一方面，還可通過降低中小開發(fā)商的融資成本、減小單次出讓地塊的規(guī)模，或鼓勵(lì)競(jìng)標(biāo)者聯(lián)合競(jìng)價(jià)，鼓勵(lì)更多的中小開發(fā)商參與競(jìng)價(jià)。其次，雖然掛牌機(jī)制可促進(jìn)交易，但同時(shí)也會(huì)推高土地價(jià)格，為避免地方政府以恢復(fù)市場(chǎng)活力的名義過度使用掛牌方式推高地價(jià)，可規(guī)定一定時(shí)期內(nèi)地方政府使用招標(biāo)方式的比例。中央政府應(yīng)要求地價(jià)較高的東部城市加強(qiáng)市場(chǎng)調(diào)控，同時(shí)應(yīng)允許土地交易市場(chǎng)落后的中西部城市對(duì)招拍掛機(jī)制進(jìn)行微調(diào)，以調(diào)整土地供給結(jié)構(gòu)并培養(yǎng)更成熟的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境。最后，針對(duì)地方政府追求土地出讓收入的動(dòng)因，除了將房?jī)r(jià)和地價(jià)的控制、以及保障房的建設(shè)納入對(duì)地方政府官員的政績(jī)考核體系之外，中央政府還應(yīng)加快財(cái)稅體制的改革。 本文的研究意義在于提供了一個(gè)規(guī)范的研究框架來(lái)分析土地價(jià)格的形成機(jī)制以及地方政府在土地出讓中的行為：利用拍賣理論，結(jié)合土地市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)狀，抽象出合理的假設(shè)并建立合適的拍賣模型刻畫招拍掛機(jī)制，在均衡分析的基礎(chǔ)上比較不同出讓機(jī)制形成的土地價(jià)格，進(jìn)而解釋不同出讓機(jī)制下土地價(jià)格的形成機(jī)理，以及招拍掛機(jī)制在不同時(shí)期和不同地域的運(yùn)用模式，并從中剖析地方政府的行為。這些研究能夠?yàn)橥晟普信膾斐鲎寵C(jī)制，規(guī)范地方政府行為提供一些政策方面的啟示和建議。 同時(shí)，本文還得到一些不同于已有研究的結(jié)論。在價(jià)值相容假設(shè)下，向競(jìng)標(biāo)者提供有關(guān)對(duì)手何時(shí)退出的信息反而會(huì)降低賣方的期望收入。競(jìng)標(biāo)者可能會(huì)在混合拍賣的升價(jià)拍賣中隱藏信息，使混合拍賣相對(duì)于一價(jià)拍賣的優(yōu)勢(shì)不復(fù)存在；而且，雖然當(dāng)競(jìng)標(biāo)者之間存在信息不對(duì)稱時(shí)，混合拍賣中的一價(jià)拍賣會(huì)使弱勢(shì)競(jìng)標(biāo)者出價(jià)更為進(jìn)取，但這一效應(yīng)仍無(wú)法超越可顯示信息的升價(jià)拍賣模型中的信息顯示對(duì)價(jià)格的提升作用，因此混合拍賣相對(duì)于可顯示信息的升價(jià)拍賣的優(yōu)勢(shì)也不復(fù)存在。
[Abstract]:Since 2004, the core position of the operating land use right has been established in the land market of our country. But the actual data show that in different periods and different regions, the three ways of bidding, auction and listing have been applied in different degrees, and the land prices of the three modes of selling also exist. According to the expansion of the income equivalence theorem in the auction theory, the different assumptions, such as the value structure of the bidder, the symmetry, the entry cost, and the allowable entry, will have different effects on the transaction price formed by the various auction models. The government can choose three ways of bidding, auction and listing. Therefore, when there are different land prices in different ways of selling, the local governments of different regions will choose different ways to sell the land use right in different periods for various purposes, thus causing the different ways to get different ways in different periods and regions. In addition, the local government can also make a slight adjustment to local register system, for example, in 2007, the bidding rules for the live auction of residential land in Shanghai were changed from open bid auction to one price closed auction, and the Land Trading Department of Chongqing was determined by the number of bidders, Beijing City. In addition, some new transfer mechanisms have been set up for the transfer of land for affordable housing. Through the analysis of the impact of these fine tune policies on land prices, the purpose of these measures can be revealed. The main problem of this paper is the theoretical and Empirical Study of the way of selling land use right. The land price formed by the way of transfer is made, and on this basis, the behavior of local government in the land transfer is analyzed in order to explain the application mode of the mechanism in the land market of our country.
There are many kinds of prerequisites that cause the income equivalence theorem not to be established, so before the theoretical research on the way to hang out the auction, it is necessary to abstract reasonable assumptions according to the current situation of the land market, the characteristics of the developers and the bidding behavior, and establish the corresponding auction model according to the characteristics of the registration system. Assuming that the value of the bidder is compatible and has information asymmetry, the two stage auction model which can display information and the first stage allows repeated entry is described in theory. It is pointed out that the behavior of the professional bidder in the first stage of information hiding causes the phenomenon in the competition stage in the competition set. In the first stage, the mixed auction model which can display information and allow repeated entry is analyzed theoretically in Shanghai after the reform. It is pointed out that this reform measures in Shanghai strengthen the motivation of the professional bidder to hide the information at the stage of listing, and then reduce the land transaction price. In addition, this paper also establishes the information that can be displayed. The single stage auction model and the one price auction model that do not open the price are analyzed in equilibrium for auction and bidding mechanism. On the basis of winning bidder equilibrium strategy, the theoretical comparison of transaction prices of different transfer mechanisms is compared, and the main theoretical results are obtained. In the empirical study, the actual number is used in this paper. The theoretical hypothesis and the rationality of the model are verified, and the main theoretical results are verified by the land transaction data of the key cities in China. In order to solve the selective deviation of the selected sample data, the two step regression method is adopted in this paper. On the one hand, the regression model of the land price lattice is established to compare the formation of different transfer mechanisms. On the other hand, the land price, on the other hand, through the establishment of a regression model of local government behavior, analyze the behavior of local government in choosing the way of selling, and explain the application of various modes of transfer in different periods and different regions.
The following conclusions are obtained: the land price formed by the listing mechanism is always higher than the bidding mechanism; when the competition stage is more likely to show information, the mechanism of Shanghai's reform can effectively reduce the land price; when more bidders participate in the auction mechanism, the auction mechanism is formed. The land price is higher than the listing mechanism. As the way of listing can both promote trade and push up the land price, it gets the favor of local government and gets the most extensive use in the land market of the whole country; the way of bidding is overheated in the real estate market because it can reduce the land price. The period and area have been applied, and the mechanism of Shanghai's renovation can indeed reduce the price of land, so it has been used in the market of the residential land in Shanghai so far; the auction mechanism can form a higher land price, and so far is still in Chongqing, which is still in poor operating land and is relatively backward in the open trading market. The study also points out that Beijing local government will pursue higher land leasing income in the short term, but it will still obey the central government's regulation on the real estate market for a long time. But the purpose of Chongqing local government in choosing the way of selling is simply to get higher land price, which is also the same. According to the number of developers participating in bidding, the reasons for automatic adjustment of the way of selling are automatically adjusted.
In addition to the mechanism of bidding and hanging, there have been some new ways of selling in the land market in recent years. In this paper, a theoretical study is made on the mode of "limit land price, competition and construction" and the way of bidding in Beijing, which is carried out in the land market, and points out that the premium rate is combined with the premise of restricting the initial price of the auction. At the same time, the "limit land price, competition and construction" can guide the developers to build more security rooms. At the same time, the way of "setting up construction and bidding price" can form more than 50%. Low land prices. Therefore, local governments can choose more effective ways of selling according to different policy priorities.
The conclusion of this paper provides some suggestions for improving the land leasing mechanism and standardizing local government behavior. First, the fundamental purpose of the mechanism is to fully embody the value of land as a state-owned asset, which can be realized in many ways. On the one hand, it can be developed through the lack of experience. To provide more information, or to ask all bidders to bid in each round of the bidding stage, or to extend the duration of each round in the stage of listing and in the competition stage, it can promote the information display during the bidding process. On the other hand, it can also reduce the cost of financing by reducing the financing cost of small and medium-sized developers and reduce the single transfer. The size of the plot, or encourage bidders to join the bid, encourage more small and medium-sized developers to participate in the bid. Second, although the listing mechanism can promote the transaction, it will also push up the land price, so as to avoid the overuse of high land price in the name of the local government in the name of restoring the vitality of the market, the local government can use it for a certain period of time. The central government should require the central government to strengthen market regulation and control in the eastern cities with higher land prices. At the same time, the central and western cities of the central and western regions should be allowed to adjust the register system to adjust the land supply structure and cultivate a more mature market environment. The central government should also accelerate the reform of the fiscal and tax system in addition to the control of house prices and land prices, and the construction of the guarantee housing for the performance appraisal system of local government officials.
The significance of this study is to provide a normative research framework to analyze the formation mechanism of land price and the behavior of local governments in land transfer: using auction theory, combining the status of the land market, abstracting reasonable assumptions and establishing a suitable auction model to portray the register system of auction, on the basis of equilibrium analysis. The land price, which is formed by different transfer mechanism, explains the formation mechanism of land price under different transfer mechanism, and the application mode of the system in different periods and different regions, and analyzes the behavior of local government. These studies can provide some policies to improve the mechanism and standardize the behavior of local government. Apocalypse and suggestion.
At the same time, this paper also obtains some conclusions which are different from the existing research. Under the hypothesis of value compatibility, providing the bidder with information about when to exit will reduce the expected income of the seller. The bidder may hide the information in the rising price auction of the mixed auction, so that the advantage of the mixed auction is not to exist at the one price auction; In addition, although there is information asymmetry between bidders, the one price auction in the mixed auction will make the disadvantaged bid more aggressive, but this effect can not exceed the promotion effect of information display on the price in the rising auction model that can show the information, so the advantage of the mixed auction is to sell the advantages of the rising auction which is relative to the information that can be displayed. No longer exist.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F301.2;F724.59

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