本文選題：土地市場(chǎng) + 土地使用權(quán)�。� 參考：《西南大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：1987年12月,深圳市首次公開拍賣—宗國(guó)有土地使用權(quán),這次土地拍賣是建國(guó)后中國(guó)第一次把土地使用權(quán)作為資產(chǎn)進(jìn)入市場(chǎng),這意味著土地開始作為商品走向市場(chǎng),宣告了土地市場(chǎng)的誕生。之后在較長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間內(nèi),協(xié)議出讓的方式長(zhǎng)期占據(jù)國(guó)有土地出讓方式的主導(dǎo)地位；由于土地協(xié)議出讓的方式是市場(chǎng)化程度較低的交易方式,在加上各級(jí)地方政府的自由裁量權(quán)過(guò)大,這就使得尋租行為和腐敗行為頻發(fā),造成政府無(wú)法獲得正常市場(chǎng)化的土地出讓收益,致使巨額國(guó)有土地資產(chǎn)流失,嚴(yán)重制約了土地市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展,危害巨大。為改變這種狀況,為營(yíng)造公正、公開、公平的土地出讓市場(chǎng),規(guī)范國(guó)有土地的出讓行為,獲取正常市場(chǎng)化的土地收益：中華人民共和國(guó)國(guó)土資源部于2002年5月9日發(fā)布了《招標(biāo)拍賣掛牌出讓國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)規(guī)定》,之后中華人民共和國(guó)國(guó)土資源部和監(jiān)察部于2004年3月聯(lián)合下發(fā)了《關(guān)于繼續(xù)開展經(jīng)營(yíng)性土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)拍賣掛牌出讓情況執(zhí)法監(jiān)察工作的通知》,該文件明確要求從2004年8月31日開始所有經(jīng)營(yíng)性用地都要采用招標(biāo)拍賣掛牌公開競(jìng)價(jià)的方式出讓,這意味著《招標(biāo)拍賣掛牌出讓國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)規(guī)定》這一制度在全國(guó)全面展開施行。隨后2007年9月28日國(guó)土資源部依據(jù)物權(quán)法及其他相關(guān)法律法規(guī)的法理原則,發(fā)布了39號(hào)令《招標(biāo)拍賣掛牌出讓國(guó)有建設(shè)用地使用權(quán)規(guī)定》。這些就助推了土地市場(chǎng)的進(jìn)一步深入發(fā)展。 土地出讓招拍掛制度的實(shí)施確實(shí)進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化了土地資源配置,顯化了土地的正常市場(chǎng)價(jià)值,地方政府土地出讓的收入也在不斷增長(zhǎng),而且土地出讓經(jīng)濟(jì)收益極大化的好處也充分顯現(xiàn),這樣“土地財(cái)政效應(yīng)”逐漸異化為各級(jí)地方政府追逐的目標(biāo),為了獲得更高的土地出讓收入,地方政府廣泛運(yùn)用“價(jià)高者得”的拍賣和掛牌出讓方式,這樣各地土地出讓價(jià)格不斷上漲,從而引發(fā)房地產(chǎn)價(jià)格非理性過(guò)快上漲。黨中央和國(guó)務(wù)院充分意識(shí)到問(wèn)題的嚴(yán)重性,一直都在致力于調(diào)控。面對(duì)日益嚴(yán)重的地價(jià)和房?jī)r(jià)形勢(shì),從2010年開始黨中央和國(guó)務(wù)院加大了調(diào)控力度,出臺(tái)了一系列的調(diào)控措施：如明確要求各地要合理確定土地供應(yīng)方式和內(nèi)容,探索土地出讓綜合評(píng)標(biāo)方法；明確要求在堅(jiān)持和完善土地招拍掛制度的同時(shí),要積極探索“綜合評(píng)標(biāo)”、“一次競(jìng)價(jià)”、“雙向競(jìng)價(jià)”等出讓方式。中央政府的調(diào)控目的是進(jìn)一步完善土地出讓制度,改進(jìn)當(dāng)前國(guó)有土地市場(chǎng)化出讓的方式,以期穩(wěn)定地價(jià)和房?jī)r(jià)。土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓是國(guó)有土地市場(chǎng)化出讓中的重要方式,因而研究土地市場(chǎng)化下國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓是必然的現(xiàn)實(shí)需求。當(dāng)前直接專門研究國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓的文獻(xiàn)較為少見(jiàn),它們或是綜合籠統(tǒng)地分析國(guó)有土地招標(biāo)出讓的現(xiàn)狀與問(wèn)題,或是簡(jiǎn)要分析國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招投標(biāo)的價(jià)格均衡策略,或是淺顯的定性探討國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓與地價(jià)、房?jī)r(jià)的關(guān)系；這些零散、不系統(tǒng)的研究還不能滿足現(xiàn)實(shí)需求。本研究從理論上擴(kuò)展了國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓的研究視角,豐富深化了國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓的研究?jī)?nèi)容和研究框架,提出了應(yīng)對(duì)當(dāng)前國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓系列問(wèn)題的措施與思路,能為政府進(jìn)一步規(guī)范和完善土地出讓制度的實(shí)踐提供相應(yīng)的參考與借鑒。 國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)實(shí)行市場(chǎng)化出讓是土地市場(chǎng)化發(fā)展的必然趨勢(shì)與要求,經(jīng)營(yíng)性國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓是國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)實(shí)行市場(chǎng)化出讓的重要方式和手段,本文以土地市場(chǎng)化背景下國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)公開招標(biāo)出讓為研究對(duì)象,主要采用文獻(xiàn)研究法、案例與實(shí)例分析法、定量實(shí)證研究法、博弈研究法等方法進(jìn)行研究；其中主要以委托代理理論為分析研究的依據(jù),對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)性國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)公開招標(biāo)出讓中的幾大主要參與主體(政府部門直接招標(biāo)出讓人、評(píng)標(biāo)人及投標(biāo)人等)的激勵(lì)和約束機(jī)制進(jìn)行了深入研究,最終本論文得出以下主要研究結(jié)論。 (1)把市、縣國(guó)土資源行政主管部門或其指定授權(quán)的下屬事業(yè)單位當(dāng)作具有同一性質(zhì)的政府部門直接招標(biāo)人來(lái)進(jìn)行分析。得出了在中國(guó)現(xiàn)有政治行政體制下,國(guó)有土地產(chǎn)權(quán)形成了如下行政性委托代理鏈：全國(guó)人民——全國(guó)人民代表大會(huì)——中央政府國(guó)務(wù)院——各地方政府——各地方政府國(guó)土資源行政主管部門——地方國(guó)土資源行政主管部門具體的工作人員。具體到國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓中,當(dāng)?shù)胤秸畤?guó)土資源行政主管部門直接作為招標(biāo)人時(shí)的激勵(lì)、約束會(huì)出現(xiàn)如下主要問(wèn)題：由行政性委托代理引發(fā)的上級(jí)委托人難于考核下級(jí)代理人,上級(jí)委托人對(duì)下級(jí)代理人約束軟化和政治激勵(lì)不兼容以及出現(xiàn)短期和機(jī)會(huì)主義行為等。然后主要運(yùn)用主成分分析法和回歸分析法從全國(guó)層面和以重慶市、上海市、甘肅省為例的地方政府的層面對(duì)現(xiàn)有土地出讓委托代理激勵(lì)、約束的問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了較為詳盡的實(shí)證解釋與驗(yàn)證。在現(xiàn)有的行政委托代理下政府的國(guó)土資源行政主管部門既是國(guó)有土地產(chǎn)權(quán)的代表也是土地的管理者,既承擔(dān)國(guó)有土地所有者的經(jīng)營(yíng)職能也承擔(dān)政府行政管理部門的土地管理職能,集經(jīng)營(yíng)職能與管理職能于一身,必然會(huì)造成職能錯(cuò)位,行為失范、責(zé)任模糊、激勵(lì)不兼容、約束軟化等內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題。基于此筆者提出了現(xiàn)有上地產(chǎn)權(quán)委托代理激勵(lì)、約束的改進(jìn)設(shè)想,構(gòu)建土地產(chǎn)權(quán)的市場(chǎng)性委托,把土地的經(jīng)營(yíng)職能從政府國(guó)土資源行政主管部門剝離出去,建立國(guó)有土地經(jīng)營(yíng)公司,政府與國(guó)有土地經(jīng)營(yíng)公司之間通過(guò)市場(chǎng)性委托合約進(jìn)行連接,然后對(duì)政府部門直接招標(biāo)出讓人的激勵(lì)約束就換化為對(duì)國(guó)有土地經(jīng)營(yíng)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)代理人的激勵(lì)和約束。 (2)國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓中招標(biāo)人與評(píng)標(biāo)人的委托代理關(guān)系中存在的主要問(wèn)題有：評(píng)標(biāo)勞務(wù)報(bào)酬固定化,總體報(bào)酬水平不高,報(bào)酬的正向激勵(lì)缺乏；評(píng)標(biāo)人的主觀隨意行為傾向可能性大,影響評(píng)標(biāo)結(jié)果的公正公平性；評(píng)標(biāo)人所擁有的權(quán)利和應(yīng)承擔(dān)的責(zé)任反差大、不對(duì)等。雖然固定報(bào)酬模型理論上對(duì)評(píng)標(biāo)人的激勵(lì)是可行的,但是具體實(shí)際度量滿足評(píng)標(biāo)人參與約束與激勵(lì)相容約束是很困難的,而結(jié)合目前施行的評(píng)標(biāo)報(bào)酬普遍偏低的情況來(lái)看,固定報(bào)酬模型存在先天的激勵(lì)缺陷,需要進(jìn)一步改進(jìn)；因而筆者提出了定酬+獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)(f+j)的激勵(lì)報(bào)酬模型,并分析了激勵(lì)模型的求解。之后以評(píng)標(biāo)人的激勵(lì)報(bào)酬機(jī)制為基礎(chǔ),構(gòu)建了基于聲譽(yù)影響函數(shù)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,而且聲譽(yù)激勵(lì)機(jī)制也驗(yàn)證了實(shí)行激勵(lì)報(bào)酬機(jī)制的必要性。然后對(duì)激勵(lì)機(jī)制進(jìn)行了具體的算例數(shù)理驗(yàn)證分析；研究表明激勵(lì)報(bào)酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制相較于固定報(bào)酬對(duì)評(píng)標(biāo)人能有更大的激勵(lì)動(dòng)力,能有更好的激勵(lì)效果。之后從制定并完善對(duì)評(píng)標(biāo)專家進(jìn)行統(tǒng)一管制的法規(guī)、建立并完善具體的管理制度、追加對(duì)評(píng)標(biāo)人的后期評(píng)估、對(duì)評(píng)標(biāo)專家進(jìn)行動(dòng)態(tài)管理這四個(gè)方面探析了評(píng)標(biāo)人約束機(jī)制的構(gòu)建。 (3)依據(jù)當(dāng)前地價(jià)、房?jī)r(jià)的實(shí)際情況和國(guó)家宏觀調(diào)控的需求導(dǎo)向,對(duì)國(guó)家調(diào)控所提倡的國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)綜合評(píng)標(biāo)出讓法從商務(wù)標(biāo)評(píng)價(jià)體系表和技術(shù)標(biāo)評(píng)價(jià)體系表兩個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了較為詳盡的例舉綜合分析；然后運(yùn)用層次分析法和模糊綜合評(píng)價(jià)法進(jìn)行了具體的實(shí)例分析,并對(duì)兩種方法的結(jié)果進(jìn)行了對(duì)比分析與探討；這些實(shí)例分析對(duì)當(dāng)前國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)出讓方式的改進(jìn)作出了有益的探索。 (4)之前經(jīng)營(yíng)性國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)協(xié)議出讓的制度有先天的重大缺陷,該制度的實(shí)行給市場(chǎng)需求主體、土地資源的配置和利用、黨和政府的公信力、社會(huì)的福利水平和社會(huì)的運(yùn)行都帶來(lái)嚴(yán)重的負(fù)面影響,而且正是這些因素推動(dòng)了國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)出讓制度的變遷。于是原有制度被變革為經(jīng)營(yíng)性國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)實(shí)行招標(biāo)、拍賣和掛牌公開出讓的制度,相對(duì)于以往的經(jīng)營(yíng)性國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)實(shí)行協(xié)議出讓的制度,國(guó)有上地使用權(quán)實(shí)行公開招標(biāo)出讓,這對(duì)土地潛在購(gòu)買利用人或投標(biāo)人來(lái)說(shuō)就是天然的最有效的激勵(lì)方式。與協(xié)議出讓相比當(dāng)國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)實(shí)行公開招標(biāo)出讓時(shí),這能減少土地潛在購(gòu)買利用人或投標(biāo)人的交易成本、提升他們參與公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的信心,提高他們公平經(jīng)營(yíng)獲利的可能性和概率；因而土地潛在購(gòu)買利用人或投標(biāo)人有強(qiáng)烈的正向參與激勵(lì)。然后以2004年為分界點(diǎn),主要運(yùn)用相關(guān)分析和回歸分析等方法從土地的供給方地方政府和土地的需求方房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)企業(yè)這兩個(gè)方面,采用全國(guó)層面的數(shù)據(jù)和重慶市層面的數(shù)據(jù),對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)性用地協(xié)議出讓為主的制度激勵(lì)效果與招拍掛出讓的制度激勵(lì)效果進(jìn)行了對(duì)比實(shí)證分析。 (5)在國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓的具體活動(dòng)實(shí)踐中,投標(biāo)人采用單邊支付的合謀機(jī)制具有有效性和激勵(lì)相容性,是有效率的,單邊支付成為投標(biāo)人合謀時(shí)的占優(yōu)現(xiàn)實(shí)選擇。國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓中投標(biāo)人合謀的危害性巨大,不容小視,必須要積極應(yīng)對(duì)。以上述分析為基礎(chǔ),建立國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓中投標(biāo)人圍標(biāo)合謀的動(dòng)態(tài)貝葉斯博弈模型,再對(duì)投標(biāo)人的圍標(biāo)合謀行為進(jìn)行相應(yīng)的信號(hào)博弈分析,再結(jié)合具體的實(shí)際案例對(duì)動(dòng)態(tài)貝葉斯博弈模型進(jìn)行了相應(yīng)的驗(yàn)證分析。之后依據(jù)動(dòng)態(tài)貝葉斯博弈模型的分析結(jié)論,從吸引更多的投標(biāo)參與者、合理設(shè)置出讓底價(jià)、適當(dāng)控制單次出讓土地的面積、完善招投標(biāo)的相關(guān)法律制度、構(gòu)建市場(chǎng)誠(chéng)信體系等方面提出了約束投標(biāo)人合謀行為的措施。 (6)依據(jù)國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓的實(shí)際情形,再進(jìn)一步分析了國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓中存在的監(jiān)察方政府、投標(biāo)人、評(píng)標(biāo)人及招標(biāo)出讓人這幾個(gè)主要的參與主體；然后從四大方面詳細(xì)闡釋了投標(biāo)人、評(píng)標(biāo)人及招標(biāo)出讓人多方合謀的形成原因,并解析了他們多方合謀的三種主要發(fā)起方式。再分類型分別構(gòu)建了他們多方合謀的不同博弈模型進(jìn)行分析,之后結(jié)合多方博弈分析的結(jié)論,從監(jiān)察體系的建設(shè)、交易信息的公開透明、監(jiān)督與舉報(bào)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制的建立、合謀成本的增加、合謀參與方懲罰力度的強(qiáng)化等方面提出了約束多方合謀的措施。 綜上所述,本文結(jié)合現(xiàn)實(shí)需求,主要依據(jù)委托代理理論來(lái)系統(tǒng)深入地研究土地市場(chǎng)化背景下國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓的問(wèn)題,這是全新的研究視角；分層分類詳細(xì)深入地解析了國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓中幾大主要參與主體之間委托代理的主要問(wèn)題,然后主要以激勵(lì)機(jī)制和約束機(jī)制為研究的突破口提出了應(yīng)對(duì)國(guó)有土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)出讓系列問(wèn)題的措施與思路；這些都是新的研究探索,具有一定的創(chuàng)新價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:In December 1987, the first public auction in Shenzhen - the land use right of Zong, the land auction was the first time after the founding of the people's Republic of China to enter the market with the right to use land as an asset, which means that the land began to go to the market as a commodity and declared the birth of the land market. In a long period of time, the mode of the agreement was occupied for a long time. The dominant position of the state-owned land transfer mode is that the land agreement is sold in a way of low degree of marketization, with the excessive discretion of local governments at all levels, which makes the rent-seeking behavior and corruption frequent, resulting in the government can not obtain the normal marketable land transfer income, resulting in a huge amount of state-owned land. In order to change this situation, in order to create a fair, open and fair land sale market, standardize the selling behavior of state-owned land and obtain the normal market income, the Ministry of soil resources of People's Republic of China issued a "bid auction listing" in May 9, 2002. In March 2004, the Ministry of land and resources of People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Supervision jointly issued a notice on the implementation of the law enforcement supervision on the continuation of the bidding and auction of the right to bid for operational land use. The document clearly requires that all operational land should be adopted from August 31, 2004. The sale of public bidding for bidding and auction, which means that the system of the right to use state-owned land for auction by auction and auction is carried out all over the country. In September 28, 2007, the Ministry of land and resources issued 39 orders according to the legal principles of property law and other related laws and regulations. The provision of the right to use land is more than that, which boosts the further development of the land market.
The implementation of the land leasing system has indeed further optimized the allocation of land resources, displayed the normal market value of the land, and the income of the land transfer of the local government is increasing, and the benefits of the extreme economic benefit of the land transfer are fully manifested, so the "land finance effect" has gradually dissimilated to the local governments at all levels. In order to obtain higher land transfer income, local governments have widely used the auction and listing method of "high price persons", so that the prices of land transfer in all parts of the country are rising, thus causing real estate prices to rise rapidly. The Party Central Committee and the State Council fully realize the seriousness of the problem and have been working on the adjustment of the problem. In the face of the increasingly serious land price and house price situation, the Party Central Committee and the State Council have increased its regulation and control since 2010, and introduced a series of regulatory measures, such as a clear requirement for the rational determination of land supply modes and contents, and the exploration of the comprehensive evaluation method of land leasing, and clearly required to adhere to and perfect the system of land bidding and hanging. At the same time, we should actively explore "comprehensive bid evaluation", "one bidding price" and "two-way bidding". The purpose of the central government's regulation and control is to further improve the land leasing system and improve the current mode of market transfer of state-owned land in order to stabilize the land price and house price. The important way is to study the tendering and selling of the right to use the state-owned land under the land market. The current direct special research on the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right is relatively rare. They are or is a comprehensive analysis of the status and problems of the state-owned land tendering and leasing, or a brief analysis of the use of the state-owned land. The price equilibrium strategy of the bid, or a simple qualitative discussion on the relationship between the bid selling of the state-owned land use right and the land price and the house price; these scattered and unsystematic research can not meet the actual needs. This study extends the research perspective of the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right in theory, enriches the tenure of the state-owned land use right. The research content and the research framework put forward the measures and ideas to deal with the problems of the current tendering and selling of the right to use the state-owned land, which can provide the reference and reference for the government to further standardize and improve the practice of the land transfer system.
The market oriented transfer of the right to use state-owned land is the inevitable trend and requirement of the development of the land market, and the bidding and selling of the operating state-owned land use right is an important way and means for the market transfer of the state-owned land use right. In this paper, under the background of the land market, the state-owned land makes public bidding for the use of the right to study the main object. Using the literature research method, case and case analysis, quantitative empirical research, game research method and other methods, the principal agent theory is the basis for the analysis and research, and the main participants in the public bidding and selling of the operating state-owned land use right (the direct tendering and bid assignor, the bid evaluators and the investment of the government departments) The incentive and restraint mechanism of the target person and so on has been thoroughly studied.
(1) analyze the municipal and county administrative departments of land and resources or the subordinate institutions designated by them as the direct tenders of the government departments with the same nature. Under the existing political administrative system in China, the state owned land property rights have formed the following administrative entrustment chain: the people of the whole country - the National People's representative The State Council of the central government - the local government - the local government - the administrative department of land and resources of the local governments - the specific staff of the administrative department of local land and resources. There will be the following main problems: the principal agent initiated by the administrative agency is difficult to examine the lower agent, the superior principal is not compatible with the softening of the lower agent and the incompatibility of the political incentive as well as the short-term and opportunism, and then mainly uses the principal component analysis and the regression analysis method from the national level and Chongqing. City, Shanghai, Gansu Province, as an example, the local government is faced with the existing land leasing agent incentive, the constraints are more detailed empirical interpretation and verification. Under the existing administrative agency, the government department of land and resources administration is both the representative of the state-owned land property right and the land manager, not only the state-owned land management, but also the state. The management function of the owner of the land also bears the land management function of the government administrative department, which sets the management function and the management function in one. It will inevitably result in the internal problems such as the function dislocation, the anomie of the behavior, the blur responsibility, the incompatibility and the softening. Based on this author, the author puts forward the incentive and restraint of the existing land property rights agent. It is conceived to construct a market entrustment of land property rights, to remove the operation function of land from the administrative department of land and resources of the government, to establish a state-owned land management company, to connect the government to the state-owned land management company through a market entrustment contract, and then to change the incentive and constraint of the direct tendering transferor of the government department. In order to encourage and restrict the management agents of state-owned land operation companies.
(2) the main problems in the principal-agent relationship between the bidder and the bid evaluators in the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right are: the fixed remuneration for the bid evaluation, the low overall remuneration level, the lack of positive incentive for the remuneration, the large possibility of the subjective random behavior of the bid evaluators, the impartiality and fairness of the bid evaluation results; the bid evaluation people's support There is a great difference between some rights and responsibilities that should be undertaken. Although the incentive of the fixed reward model is feasible in theory, it is very difficult for the bidders to participate in the constraints and incentive compatibility constraints. The incentive defect of the day needs further improvement; therefore, the author puts forward the incentive compensation model of the remuneration plus incentive (f+j), and analyzes the solution of the incentive model. After that, the incentive mechanism based on the reputation impact function is built on the basis of the incentive reward mechanism of the bid evaluators, and the reputation incentive mechanism also verifies the incentive reward mechanism. It is necessary. Then, a specific example is made to verify the incentive mechanism. The study shows that incentive reward incentive mechanism can have greater incentive power and better incentive effect than fixed remuneration. After that, it can establish and perfect the regulations of unified control of the evaluation experts, and establish and improve the specific management. The system, supplemental to the late evaluation of bidders, and dynamic management of bidders, explores the establishment of the bid evaluation mechanism of four aspects.
(3) according to the current land price, the actual situation of house prices and the demand of the national macro-control, the comprehensive analysis of the two aspects of the comprehensive bid evaluation method of the state-owned land use right, which is advocated by the state regulation and control, is carried out in detail from the scale of the evaluation system of the business standard and the table of the evaluation system of the technical standard; then, the analytic hierarchy process and the fuzzy comprehensive analysis are used. The combined evaluation method has carried on the concrete example analysis, and has carried on the contrast analysis and the discussion to the result of the two methods; the example analysis makes the beneficial exploration to the current state-owned land use right transfer way improvement.
(4) the system of selling the right to use the state-owned land before the operation of the state-owned land has a major inborn defect. The system has brought serious negative impact on the market demand subject, the allocation and utilization of land resources, the public credibility of the party and the government, the welfare level of the society and the operation of the society, and it is precisely these factors that promote the state land. With the change of the system of the right to sell, the original system has been transformed into a system of tendering, auction and publicly selling of the right to use the state-owned land, and the system of selling the right to use the state-owned land use right in relation to the former operating state-owned land use right. The most effective way of motivation is natural. Compared with the agreement transfer, when the state-owned land use right is sold by public bidding, it can reduce the transaction cost of potential buyers or bidders, improve their confidence in fair competition, and increase the probability and probability of their fair operation profit. The potential buyer or bidder has a strong positive participation incentive. Then with 2004 as the demarcation point, the main use of correlation analysis and regression analysis, from the land supply side of the local government and land demand side real estate development enterprises in two aspects, using data from the national level and the data of the Chongqing level, to the management. The incentive effect of the land transfer agreement is compared with the incentive effect of the system.
(5) in the concrete activities of the tendering and selling of the right to use the state-owned land, the conspiracy mechanism of the unilateral payment by the bidder has the effectiveness and incentive compatibility. It is efficient. The unilateral payment becomes the dominant reality choice when the bidder collusion. The state-owned land use right marked out that the conspiracy of the bidder is very harmful and can not be ignored, On the basis of the above analysis, the dynamic Bias game model of the bidder's conspiracy in the tendering and selling of the state-owned land use right is established, and then the corresponding signal game analysis is carried out on the conspiracy behavior of the bidders, and the corresponding verification points are carried out on the dynamic Attitudebeus game model combined with the concrete actual cases. Then according to the analysis conclusions of the dynamic Bias game model, the measures to restrict the collusion behavior of the bidder are put forward from the aspects of attracting more participants, setting up the bottom price, controlling the area of the land, perfecting the relevant legal system of bidding and constructing the market credit system and so on.
(6) according to the actual situation of the tendering and selling of the right to use state-owned land, the tendering of the right to use state-owned land is further analyzed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F301.2

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