本文選題：高管薪酬　切入點(diǎn)：銀行穩(wěn)定性　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：高管薪酬可以認(rèn)為是對(duì)其努力與貢獻(xiàn)的回報(bào)，但是高管的薪酬和績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系是不對(duì)稱的，發(fā)生極大損失時(shí)高管薪酬卻沒有相應(yīng)的下降。過多的高管薪酬能有效地激勵(lì)高管盡力提高銀行績(jī)效，但又會(huì)導(dǎo)致倒閉風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的劇增。高管薪酬與銀行穩(wěn)定性關(guān)系許多學(xué)者進(jìn)行了不斷的研究與探索，對(duì)此有兩個(gè)觀點(diǎn)，其中道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論不適合解釋中國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)的實(shí)際情況，其原因在于中國(guó)不存在存款保險(xiǎn)制度，但存在較高的國(guó)有股東比率。然而在所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離的情況下，通常存在委托代理問題。根據(jù)委托代理理論，高管薪酬的負(fù)面影響歸因于從委托代理關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的殘余成本，即經(jīng)理人的決策不完全符合股東意圖。 這就是世界各國(guó)經(jīng)過金融危機(jī)后，爭(zhēng)先出臺(tái)‘限薪令’的原因，中國(guó)財(cái)政部2009年初也發(fā)布《金融類國(guó)有及國(guó)有控股企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬管理辦法-征求意見稿》，盡管符合世界金融市場(chǎng)改革趨勢(shì)，但是就受較多管制的產(chǎn)業(yè)容易失去國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，不利于留住較好的人才。因此，本文采用委托代理理論對(duì)于高管薪酬與銀行穩(wěn)定性指標(biāo)之間的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金高管薪酬與銀行穩(wěn)定性之間存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)性關(guān)系，而總高管薪酬與銀行穩(wěn)定性沒有明顯的相關(guān)性，薪酬績(jī)效彈性與銀行穩(wěn)定性之間沒有相關(guān)性，最后信用貸款比率與高管薪酬之間存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系，而與房地產(chǎn)與建筑業(yè)貸款比率不存在相關(guān)性。 根據(jù)上述實(shí)證分析結(jié)果，本文認(rèn)為商業(yè)銀行通過強(qiáng)化股東決定薪酬的權(quán)利，確保薪酬委員會(huì)的對(duì)立性以及引入限制性股票激勵(lì)方式充分發(fā)揮薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制在商業(yè)銀行公司治理和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管控中的導(dǎo)向作用，同時(shí)建立健全科學(xué)有效的公司治理機(jī)制，以促進(jìn)國(guó)內(nèi)商業(yè)銀行穩(wěn)健經(jīng)營(yíng)和可持續(xù)發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation can be seen as a reward for effort and contribution, but the relationship between executive pay and performance is asymmetrical. Executive pay does not fall in response to heavy losses. Excessive executive pay can be an effective incentive for executives to do their best to improve bank performance. However, it will lead to a sharp increase in the risk of bankruptcy. Many scholars have studied and explored the relationship between executive compensation and bank stability, and there are two points of view, among which the theory of moral hazard is not suitable to explain the actual situation in China's financial market. The reason is that there is no deposit insurance system in China, but there is a high ratio of state-owned shareholders. However, in the case of separation of ownership and control, there is usually a principal-agent problem. The negative effect of executive compensation is attributed to the residual cost from the principal-agent relationship, that is, the manager's decision is not entirely in line with the shareholders' intention. This is why countries around the world, after the financial crisis, rushed to issue 'pay restraint orders'. At the beginning of 2009, the Ministry of Finance of China also issued "measures for the Management of compensation for Heads of State-Owned and State-owned holding Enterprises in Finance-draft for comments." although in line with the trend of financial market reform in the world, industries subject to more control are vulnerable to losing international competitiveness. Therefore, this paper uses principal-agent theory to analyze the correlation between executive compensation and bank stability index. The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between cash executive compensation and bank stability, but there is no significant correlation between total executive compensation and bank stability, and there is no correlation between compensation performance elasticity and bank stability. Finally, there is a positive correlation between credit loan ratio and executive compensation, but no correlation with real estate loan ratio and construction loan ratio. According to the above empirical analysis results, this paper argues that commercial banks strengthen the right of shareholders to determine compensation. To ensure the opposites of the compensation committee and the introduction of restrictive stock incentives to give full play to the guiding role of the compensation incentive mechanism in the corporate governance and risk management of commercial banks, and to establish a scientific and effective corporate governance mechanism. In order to promote the domestic commercial banks stable management and sustainable development.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.33

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前8條

1 陳學(xué)彬,李翰,朱曄;完善我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制的SWARM模擬分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2003年09期

2 李華民;國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行薪酬體制改革及激勵(lì)目標(biāo)改進(jìn)[J];金融論壇;2003年03期

3 楊大光;朱貴云;武治國(guó);;我國(guó)上市銀行高管薪酬和經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效相關(guān)性研究[J];金融論壇;2008年08期

4 茍開紅;我國(guó)股份制商業(yè)銀行薪酬構(gòu)成及長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)研究[J];國(guó)際金融研究;2004年11期

5 周立;趙瑋;;委托-代理、薪酬激勵(lì)與商業(yè)銀行治理[J];金融評(píng)論;2012年01期

6 李克文,鄭錄軍;高管人員激勵(lì)機(jī)制與商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效[J];南開學(xué)報(bào);2005年01期

7 李松;盧宇燕;洪正;;加強(qiáng)公司治理能夠防止金融機(jī)構(gòu)過度冒險(xiǎn)嗎?——關(guān)于高管激勵(lì)與銀行冒險(xiǎn)行為的一個(gè)綜述[J];金融教育研究;2012年01期

8 郭新明;;我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行管理者薪酬“激勵(lì)過度”的制度完善[J];上海金融;2009年11期

，

本文編號(hào)：1659814