本文選題：社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金 + 利益相關(guān)者��； 參考：《遼寧大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：過(guò)去十年是中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)事業(yè)迅速發(fā)展的十年，十年間中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)制度得到了進(jìn)一步地完善，社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金的管理水平和運(yùn)營(yíng)狀況也不斷地得以提高，這些都為中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金的進(jìn)一步管理奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。然而，在中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金管理和服務(wù)水平不斷提高的情況下，社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金管理與運(yùn)營(yíng)中還存在三個(gè)較為突出的問(wèn)題：一是用人單位拖繳、欠繳、少繳、不繳社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)用等違法現(xiàn)象；二是在社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)經(jīng)辦機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部的實(shí)際操作過(guò)程中因財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及內(nèi)部控制能力不足等原因造成的基金擠占、挪用等違法行為；三是在社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金給付環(huán)節(jié)因信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)等原因，冒領(lǐng)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金行為時(shí)有發(fā)生。以上三種違法行為的存在，，均使社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金在管理和服務(wù)過(guò)程中因上述違法行為而導(dǎo)致受損。 本文的理論基礎(chǔ)為博弈論、委托-代理理論和成本-收益理論等，在此基礎(chǔ)上主要運(yùn)用完全信息下靜態(tài)博弈和動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型，對(duì)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金管理過(guò)程中存在的上述三種違法行為進(jìn)行研究，以試圖找出影響社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金管理中的經(jīng)濟(jì)性和社會(huì)性變量因素，為下一步實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金的有效、有序監(jiān)督和管理提供理論依據(jù)。 本文除緒論外，主要分為五章，具體內(nèi)容安排如下：第一章介紹了相關(guān)概念及理論基礎(chǔ)。本章節(jié)著重對(duì)研究中需要使用的幾個(gè)重要概念進(jìn)行了內(nèi)涵和外延的界定，同時(shí)對(duì)博弈論、委托-代理理論、成本-收益理論等相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論進(jìn)行了論述。第二章對(duì)中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金征繳環(huán)節(jié)的監(jiān)管進(jìn)行了分析。本章節(jié)首先明確了征繳環(huán)節(jié)的相關(guān)利益主體，并利用博弈方法構(gòu)建靜態(tài)博弈模型，著重對(duì)該環(huán)節(jié)下不同利益主體的策略及其相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)變量進(jìn)行分析。第三章對(duì)中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金運(yùn)營(yíng)環(huán)節(jié)的監(jiān)管進(jìn)行了分析。本章節(jié)首先明確了運(yùn)營(yíng)環(huán)節(jié)的相關(guān)利益主體，利用博弈方法構(gòu)建動(dòng)靜態(tài)博弈模型，著重對(duì)該環(huán)節(jié)下不同利益主體的策略及其相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)變量進(jìn)行分析。第四章則對(duì)中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金給付環(huán)節(jié)的監(jiān)管進(jìn)行了分析。本章節(jié)在明確給付環(huán)節(jié)的相關(guān)利益主體基礎(chǔ)上，利用博弈方法構(gòu)建靜態(tài)博弈模型，并對(duì)該環(huán)節(jié)下不同利益主體的策略及其相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)變量進(jìn)行分析。第五章結(jié)論與政策建議�；谏鲜霾煌h(huán)節(jié)下博弈研究的結(jié)果得出社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金在監(jiān)管實(shí)踐中應(yīng)堅(jiān)持適度性、成本-收益最大化等原則，并就加強(qiáng)和完善中國(guó)社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)基金在不同環(huán)節(jié)下的監(jiān)管提出相關(guān)建議。
[Abstract]:The past decade has witnessed the rapid development of China's social insurance industry. In the past ten years, China's social insurance system has been further improved, and the level of management and operation of the social insurance fund has been continuously improved. All these have laid a solid foundation for the further management of China's social insurance fund. However, with the continuous improvement of the management and service level of the social insurance fund in China, there are three outstanding problems in the management and operation of the social insurance fund: first, the employer delays, fails to pay, and underpays. Non-payment of social insurance fees and other illegal phenomena; second, in the actual operation process of social insurance agencies, due to financial risks, moral risks and inadequate internal control capacity and other reasons such as fund embezzlement, misappropriation and other illegal acts; Third, in the social insurance fund payment link due to asymmetric information and other reasons, social insurance funds to risk the occurrence of behavior. The existence of the above three kinds of illegal acts all cause damage to the social insurance fund in the course of management and service. The theoretical basis of this paper is game theory, principal-agent theory and cost-income theory, etc. On this basis, we mainly use static game and dynamic game model under complete information to study the above three illegal behaviors in the process of social insurance fund management. In order to find out the economic and social variables that affect the management of social insurance fund, and to provide the theoretical basis for realizing the effective, orderly supervision and management of the social insurance fund in the next step, this paper is divided into five chapters except the introduction. The content is arranged as follows: the first chapter introduces the related concepts and theoretical basis. This chapter focuses on the definition and extension of several important concepts used in the research. At the same time, it discusses some basic theories such as game theory, principal-agent theory, cost-benefit theory and so on. The second chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund collection in China. This chapter firstly defines the relevant stakeholders in the collection process, and constructs a static game model by using the game method, focusing on the analysis of the strategies of different stakeholders and their related economic variables in this link. The third chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund operation in China. In this chapter, firstly, the relevant stakeholders of the operation link are defined, and the dynamic and static game model is constructed by using the game method, and the strategies of different stakeholders and their related economic variables are analyzed. The fourth chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund payment in China. On the basis of defining the relevant stakeholders of the payment link, this chapter constructs a static game model by using the game method, and analyzes the strategies of the different stakeholders and their related economic variables under this link. Chapter V conclusions and policy recommendations. Based on the results of the game study under the above different links, it is concluded that the social insurance fund should adhere to the principles of moderation, cost-benefit maximization and so on. And to strengthen and improve China's social insurance fund in different links of supervision and put forward relevant suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F842.61;F224.32

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