本文選題：新農(nóng)合 + 農(nóng)村商業(yè)醫(yī)療保險��； 參考：《農(nóng)業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟》2013年01期

【摘要】：由于新型農(nóng)村合作醫(yī)療保險(以下簡稱"新農(nóng)合")的逆向選擇,政府為高參保率的目標承擔了較重的財政負擔。本文以商業(yè)醫(yī)療保險進入農(nóng)村市場為背景,用R-S保險模型作為理論工具,分析了新農(nóng)合的強制參與可以避免商業(yè)保險對市場的撇脂,降低新農(nóng)合的運行成本,并最終與商業(yè)保險實現(xiàn)新的均衡,達到高風險農(nóng)民完全保險,低風險農(nóng)民效用最大的優(yōu)化狀態(tài)。
[Abstract]:Due to the adverse selection of the new rural cooperative medical insurance (NCMS), the government bears a heavy financial burden for the goal of high participation rate. Based on the background of commercial medical insurance entering the rural market, using R-S insurance model as a theoretical tool, this paper analyzes that compulsory participation of NCMS can avoid skimming of market by commercial insurance, and reduce the operating cost of NCMS. Finally, it achieves a new equilibrium with commercial insurance, and achieves the optimal condition of full insurance for high risk farmers and maximum utility for low risk farmers.
【作者單位】： 中國社會科學院研究生院;
【分類號】：F842.6;R197.1;F224

【參考文獻】

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本文編號：1868155