本文選題：新農(nóng)合 + 農(nóng)村商業(yè)醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)�。� 參考：《農(nóng)業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)》2013年01期

【摘要】：由于新型農(nóng)村合作醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)(以下簡(jiǎn)稱"新農(nóng)合")的逆向選擇,政府為高參保率的目標(biāo)承擔(dān)了較重的財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)。本文以商業(yè)醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)進(jìn)入農(nóng)村市場(chǎng)為背景,用R-S保險(xiǎn)模型作為理論工具,分析了新農(nóng)合的強(qiáng)制參與可以避免商業(yè)保險(xiǎn)對(duì)市場(chǎng)的撇脂,降低新農(nóng)合的運(yùn)行成本,并最終與商業(yè)保險(xiǎn)實(shí)現(xiàn)新的均衡,達(dá)到高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)農(nóng)民完全保險(xiǎn),低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)農(nóng)民效用最大的優(yōu)化狀態(tài)。
[Abstract]:Due to the adverse selection of the new rural cooperative medical insurance (NCMS), the government bears a heavy financial burden for the goal of high participation rate. Based on the background of commercial medical insurance entering the rural market, using R-S insurance model as a theoretical tool, this paper analyzes that compulsory participation of NCMS can avoid skimming of market by commercial insurance, and reduce the operating cost of NCMS. Finally, it achieves a new equilibrium with commercial insurance, and achieves the optimal condition of full insurance for high risk farmers and maximum utility for low risk farmers.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究生院;
【分類號(hào)】：F842.6;R197.1;F224

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

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本文編號(hào)：1868155