發(fā)布時間：2018-06-23 01:06

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵 + 公司績效��； 參考：《河南師范大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：根據(jù)現(xiàn)代管理理論,股權(quán)激勵作為一種長期激勵機制,意在降低代理成本,提高經(jīng)營效率,以實現(xiàn)股東財富最大化,是一種符合現(xiàn)代企業(yè)長期發(fā)展的激勵方式。股權(quán)激勵對于經(jīng)營效率的提高以及公司股東與企業(yè)管理者之間的委托代理問題的解決都有著很好的效果,激勵科學和合理的公司績效評價體系對于衡量股權(quán)激勵機制效應有著關鍵性的作用。但是信息技術(shù)行業(yè)較相比于其他行業(yè)更具有高成長性、高風險、收益率強等特征,又讓信息技術(shù)行業(yè)成為了目前選擇實施股權(quán)激勵機制數(shù)量最多的行業(yè)之一。所以對于我國信息技術(shù)行業(yè)實施股權(quán)激勵的現(xiàn)狀以及制度設計的研究具有很重要的實踐意義。正是以這樣的思考為出發(fā)點,本文以信息技術(shù)行業(yè)上市公司在股權(quán)激勵制度下的公司績效進行實證研究。本文通過對股權(quán)激勵理論相關知識與國內(nèi)外文獻研究的基礎上,對我國股權(quán)激勵機制的實施現(xiàn)狀進行了探討,包括我國上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的制度背景以及自《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法》(試行)頒布后我國已推出股權(quán)激勵方案的上市公司的股權(quán)激勵模式、公司性質(zhì)、股票來源和行業(yè)分布,并且以2015年12月31日為橫截面我國已宣布實施股權(quán)激勵計劃并在滬深兩市上市的信息技術(shù)企業(yè)作為研究樣本,對股權(quán)激勵與公司績效的相關性進行實證分析。本文選取了上市公司的償債、營運、獲利和發(fā)展等能力作為樣本指標,通過因子分析法來建立公司績效評價模型,計算得到公司績效評價綜合值,引入多個控制變量并以股權(quán)激勵比例作為自變量進行多元回歸,驗證上市公司股權(quán)激勵機制與公司績效之間的關系,希望對上市公司的股權(quán)激勵方案實施與設計提供借鑒。通過實證研究,本文得出以下主要結(jié)論:我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵與公司績效之間具有顯著的正相關關系,管理層股權(quán)激勵在上市公司中發(fā)揮著積極的作用,文章最后針對進一步完善上市公司股權(quán)激勵機制提出了相關的對策建議。
[Abstract]:According to modern management theory, equity incentive, as a long-term incentive mechanism, aims to reduce agency cost, improve management efficiency and realize the maximization of shareholders' wealth, which is a kind of incentive mode in line with the long-term development of modern enterprises. Equity incentive has a good effect on the improvement of management efficiency and the solution of the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. Scientific and reasonable corporate performance evaluation system plays a key role in measuring the effect of equity incentive mechanism. However, the information technology industry has more characteristics of high growth, high risk and strong rate of return than other industries, which makes the information technology industry become one of the industries that choose to implement the stock right incentive mechanism. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the status quo and system design of equity incentive in information technology industry in China. With this thinking as the starting point, this paper makes an empirical study on the corporate performance of listed companies in the information technology industry under the equity incentive system. Based on the relevant knowledge of equity incentive theory and domestic and foreign literature, this paper discusses the current situation of the implementation of equity incentive mechanism in China. Including the institutional background of the implementation of equity incentive in listed companies in China and the stock incentive model of listed companies that have been launched since the promulgation of the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies" (trial implementation), and the nature of the companies. The stock source and industry distribution, and taking December 31, 2015 as the cross section of China, has announced the implementation of the equity incentive plan and listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges as the research sample. The correlation between equity incentive and corporate performance is analyzed empirically. In this paper, the listed companies' solvency, operation, profit and development are selected as sample indicators, and the performance evaluation model is established by factor analysis, and the comprehensive value of corporate performance evaluation is calculated. This paper introduces multiple control variables and uses equity incentive ratio as independent variable to verify the relationship between equity incentive mechanism and corporate performance in order to provide reference for the implementation and design of equity incentive scheme of listed companies. Through empirical research, this paper draws the following main conclusions: there is a significant positive correlation between equity incentive and corporate performance of listed companies in China, and management equity incentive plays an active role in listed companies. Finally, the article puts forward the relevant countermeasures and suggestions to further improve the equity incentive mechanism of listed companies.
【學位授予單位】：河南師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F49;F272.5

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本文編號：2055028